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INTRODUCTION

Economic models are like stick figures: stripped-down representations of real-life situations.' Like stick figures, models are judged
by how successfully they replicate complex phenomena. 2 A stick
person whose legs grow from its ears is not as accurate as one whose
legs grow from a torso. 3 Similarly, an economic model that informs
us that 2 + 2 = 7 should be reconsidered, for something surely is
wrong, either with the assumptions made in formulating the model
4
or in the application of the model to real world experiences.
1. See EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 9 (1978)
(describing common conception of models as "a more or less accurate physical representation
or image of some real-life phenomenon").
2. See Allan Gibbard & Hal R. Varian, Economic Models, COLUM. J. PHIL. 664, 665 (1978)
(indicating that underlying motive of economic modeling is desire to explain economic structures in societies). There exists a range of phenomena that the modeling process attempts to
explain, resulting in a variety of models. See id at 664-65 (describing different phenomena
and their subsets). Not all models seek to replicate a phenomenon. Some, referred to as
caricatures, instead seek to emphasize, and even distort, a particular aspect of reality in order
to learn about the effects of the highlighted factor on the whole. Id. If Baird and Jackson
intended for their creditors' bargain model to be a caricature, they have not made their intent
known.
3. This is not to say that the drawing will not be aesthetically pleasing; many fine artists
seek to distort rather than replicate reality. See, e.g., HENRI MATISSE, BATHERS BY A RIVER
(1916-1917), PABLO PICASSO, MAN SMOKING A PIPE (1911); MAN RAY, PORTRAIT OF ALFRED
STIEGLrrz (1912-1913); NICOLAS DE STAEL, FIGURE BY THE SEA (1952). Nonetheless, a figure
whose legs grow from its ears does not accurately replicate the human form.
4. There is nothing "wrong" in assuming that 2 = 3.5, in which case "2" - "2" = 7
(unless "7" were assigned some other value). The problem in this instance arises in applying
this model to the real world in which the rule is "2 + 2 = 4."
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Thomas Jackson, alone5 and in conjunction with Douglas Baird 6
or Robert Scott, 7 has developed a model for the evaluation of bankruptcy law that rests on basic principles of economic analysis. This
contractarian model8 is both positive and normative. Jackson and
5.

See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON,

THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW

228-48

(1986) [hereinafter JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMrrs] (delineating comprehensive and coherent
model that describes bankruptcy law in normative terms); Thomas H. Jackson, Of Liquidation,
Continuation, and Delay: An Analysis of Bankruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules, 60 AM. BANER.
L.J. 399, 401-04 (1986) [hereinafterJackson, Bankruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules] (outlining core goals of bankruptcy law and describing relationships therein); Thomas H. Jackson,
Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 73, 74-77 (1985)
[hereinafter Jackson, TranslatingAssets and Liabilities] (describing role of bankruptcy proceedings in terms of normative theory); Thomas H.Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 725, 727-31 (1984) [hereinafter Jackson, Avoiding Powers] (creating framework for examining contours of "avoiding powers" in bankruptcy); Thomas H.Jackson, Bankruptcy, NonBankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE LJ. 857, 858-71 (1982) [hereinafter
Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements] (developing normative theory against which
bankruptcy rules can be examined).
6. See, e.g., DoUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H.JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS
ON BANKRUPTCY 20-30 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter BAIRD & JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS] (detailing history of bankruptcy law and concluding that it may be unwise to grant
social rights in bankruptcy that do not exist outside it); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, CorporateReorganization and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate
Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 97, 103-04 (1984) [hereinafter
Baird &Jackson, Adequate Protection] (positing that bankruptcy law should be concerned only
with interests of those who would have property rights in assets even in absence of bankruptcy
law and suggesting that broader social goals should be left to other areas of law); accord Douglas G. Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 183-84 (1987) [hereinafter Baird, World Without Bankruptcy] (arguing that current inclusion of broad societal
concerns in bankruptcy is inappropriate).
7. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Bankruptcy Sharingand the Creditors'Bargain,75 VA. L. REV. 155, 178 (1989) (creating expanded
economic model based on creditors' bargain theory to evaluate bankruptcy law).
8. As an important corollary of the contractarian aspects of their creditors' bargain theory, Baird and Jackson contend that prebankruptcy entitlements should only be subject to
limitation when essential to the maximization of asset distributions to creditors. See BAIRD &
JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 41-55 (arguing that mere use of
collective proceeding does not justify granting creditors rights that do not exist outside bankruptcy, and also does notjustify altering priority of claims from what would exist in absence of
collective proceeding); JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMrrS, supra note 5, at 71-83 (stating that
"[c]hanges in substantive rules unrelated to preserving assets for the collective good of the
investor group, however, run counter to the goals of bankruptcy"); Douglas G. Baird, Loss
Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Banhruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CI. L. REV. 815, 823
(1987) [hereinafter Baird, Loss Distribution] ("The only pointJackson and I make is that priorities that exist under non-bankruptcy law should run parallel to priorities in bankruptcy. To
the extent that these priorities generate bad distributional consequences, they should be
changed in both settings."); see also Jackson & Scott, supra note 7, at 155-56 (discussing
problems resulting from alterations in original bankruptcy entitlements law as basis for denying such changes because of distributional goals).
Because this Article focuses on the commencement of a bankruptcy case rather than on
what occurs in a case once it has begun, the Article does not address Baird and Jackson's
controversial corollary to their creditors' bargain model, with one exception. This debate,
which is essentially centered over the propriety of an independent federal judgment about the
substantive law that governs distributions to creditors once a bankruptcy petition has been
filed, has been obscured by the jargon of law and economics analysis. Although couched in
more modern terminology, the debate is very nearly the same as an earlier debate conducted
over the last 100 years that focuses on whether Article III courts can or should create federal
common law when exercising diversity jurisdiction. Compare Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1. 18-19
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his colleagues first apply this model to claim that the collective remedy of bankruptcy9 is efficient 1 ° in that it is the likely bargain that
creditors would strike in advance, before a debtor's financial difficulties develop. 1 ' They also apply this positive vision of bankruptcy
law to make normative conclusions about the wisdom of numerous
(1842) (holding that federal courts, in exercising diversity jurisdiction, need not follow decisions of state whose law is being applied), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
79 (1938) with Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938) (overruling Swift and
holding that state, not federal common law, applies in diversity actions). Indeed, Baird and
Jackson rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979),
for its conclusion that federal bankruptcy law "should not create rights," and should only "act
to ensure that the rights that exist [under nonbankruptcy law] are vindicated to the extent
possible." JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 21-22; accord BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 50 (describing Supreme Court's observation in
Butner that nonbankruptcy rights should be respected in bankruptcy unless some bankruptcy
policy calls for different result as "the most crucial inquiry we face in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code"); Baird, Loss Distribution, supra, at 818 n.3 (citing Butner and stating that "departing from non-bankruptcy rules in bankruptcy introduces the problem of forum shopping").
Baird and Jackson conclude that, as noted in Butner, "if we do not respect nonbankruptcy
rights in bankruptcy... we introduce a forum shopping problem." BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 50.
The analogy between the proper role of federal law in cases governed by diversity jurisdiction and those governed by bankruptcy jurisdiction is not a perfect one. In contrast to the
serious questions involving Article III courts' authority to create a federal common law from
diversity jurisdiction, the constitutional power to create a federal common law surrounding
the debtor/creditor relationship is clearer. Moreover, Baird and Jackson question not only
the propriety of a federal common law in the context of bankruptcy, but also challenge the
propriety of any federalization of the substantive laws surrounding the definition of a debtor's
estate and its distribution to creditors. See id. at 39-42 (arguing that nothing concerning
availability of collective procedures to promote interests of creditors as group, such as federal
bankruptcy laws, explains why single creditor unable to satisfy its claims outside bankruptcy
should be able to look to fund to do so). These questions, however, are best left for another
article.
9. See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 7 (describing bankruptcy as "collective debt-collection device in which creditors' interests are evaluated in the aggregate in order
to get most for creditors as group"); see also infra notes 42-45, 67-74 and accompanying text
(detailing collective remedies such as assignment for benefit of creditors and equitable receivership as options available to creditors under state law).
10. Jackson never explicitly contends that creditors' ex ante agreement to create a bankruptcy system is an efficient result, but that claim generally follows from this sort of contractarian analysis. See David G. Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1341,
1343-44 (1987) (characterizing Jackson's model of bankruptcy as "pursuit of efficiency").
11. SeeJackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 5, at 860 (attempting to
develop normative theory of bankruptcy law based on viekr that ideally bankruptcy law should
"mirror the agreement one would expect the creditors to form among themselves were they
able to negotiate such an agreement from an ex ante position"). In referring to the bargain as
an ex ante agreement, Jackson is describing the result that creditors and debtors would achieve
in the absence of bankruptcy proceedings and in the presence of perfect information. See
JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 15-19 (arguing that creditors would agree in
advance to arrangement that would guarantee all of them some portion of debtor's assets,
rather than receiving nothing under individualized remedies that apply in absence of collective proceeding); see alsoJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 136, 152 (1971) (advancing theory
that rational, self-interested people, when stripped of all knowledge about themselves and
possessing only general knowledge about society, will reach more fair and just solutions to
problems). The justification for presuming the existence of an ex ante agreement has been
sharply criticized. See Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38
VAND. L. REV. 713, 823-25 (1985) (questioning creditor bargain theory assumptions of perfect
information and knowledge); Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HorsTRA L. REV. 563, 578-79
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2
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and related judicial doctrines.'
This Article focuses on one such application of creditors' bargain
theory-Jackson's contention that the standard for commencement
of a bankruptcy case can be made more efficient by adoption of an
insolvency test, in place of the current "inability to pay debts as they
13
come due" standard.
In developing this creditors' bargain model, Jackson and his co(1980) (criticizing contractarian theory which relies on ex ante premises because it requires ad
hoc attribution of historical qualities to persons asked to take losses so others might benefit).
12. See, e.g., Baird &Jackson, Adequate Protection,supra note 6, at 125-29 (examining Bankruptcy Code and decisions of bankruptcy courts in light of creditors' bargain theory);Jackson,
Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 5, at 871-78 (applying original creditors'
bargain model to bankruptcy code); Jackson & Scott, supra note 7, at 178-202 (applying expanded model of creditors' bargain theory to analyze distributional effects of bankruptcy).
The debate as to whether federal bankruptcy law should create substantive advantages over
its state law counterparts invites critical assessment of the rights and obligations of debtors
and creditors under the Bankruptcy Code as compared to those under state law. A complete
comparison of these rights and obligations exceeds the scope of this Article, but a few examples will provide a brief overview of the concerns involved in the debate. First, there is an
issue as to whether the avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code can be justified in the
face of differing nonbankruptcy entitlements. SeeJACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at
68-88, 123-46 (arguing that federal bankruptcy should not change relative entitlements); see
also Jackson, Avoiding Powers, supra note 5, at 750-79 (contending that federal bankruptcy
should not allow creditor to improve its position over that held under state law). A second
issue is whether creditors should receive priority distributions from a bankruptcy estate when
a priority distribution would not follow under the state law regime. See Baird, Loss Distribution,
supra note 8, at 824-28 (analyzing problems of forum shopping that arise when federal Bankruptcy Code grants benefits not available in state proceedings). But see Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 789-93 (1987) (arguing that state law mostly results
in different, but not necessarily less fair, distribution of bankrupt's assets than federal law
allows). Also, the question whether secured creditors should be compensated for the time
value of the delay in the enforcement of their rights represents an additional topic of debate.
See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITs, supra note 5, at 183-90 (arguing that those who benefit from
delay should pay costs of those who suffer); Baird, Loss Distribution, supra note 8, at 831-33
(arguing that bankruptcy must give secured creditors some rights outside of proceeding that
mandate adjustments in division of assets to account for delays related to imposition of bankruptcy proceedings); Baird &Jackson, Adequate Protection, supra note 6, at 114-16 (discussing
methods of incorporating time value of money into overall value of rights); see also United Say.
Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1988) (holding that undersecured creditors are not entitled to compensation for delays caused by automatic stay in
foreclosure on collateral). But see Warren, supra, at 803 (arguing that allowing secured creditors interest on their claims is simply different decision on distribution of debtors' assets,
because secured creditor receives money that, in absence of such rule, it would otherwise have
to share with unsecured creditors). An additional issue arises with respect to whether debtors
should be able to reject executory contracts and unexpired leases in bankruptcy when they
would be unable to do so under state law. See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at
110-11 (arguing that collectivization principle of bankruptcy should not confer right on
debtor to reject executory contract or unexpired lease if debtor could not do so outside
bankruptcy).
13. SeeJACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 200-08 (arguing that current "inability to pay debts as they become due" standard is insufficient and advocating replacement with
general insolvency standard); see also 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (1988) (detailing current standard
to be applied for commencement of involuntary bankruptcy case). This section states that
"the Court shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case... only if (1) the debtor
is generally not payingsuch debtor'sdebts as such debts become due unless such debts are the subject
of a bona fide dispute ....
Id. (emphasis added).
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authors first compare a debtor's balance-sheet insolvency1 4 to a
"common pool problem."' 5 The premise of the "common pool
problem" is that in the case of a jointly owned body of water filled
with fish, the invisible hand of self-interest fails to maximize joint
welfare.16 If the pool is not owned by any one person, then diverse,
self-interested individuals are free to fish in the pool without restraint.' 7 Absent a constraining mechanism of some sort, individual
anglers have no incentive to limit the size of their catch, thus leaving
too few fish to reproduce and maintain the pool's population for
8
future years.'
According to Jackson, a debtor's insolvency resembles a "common pool," with the assets of the insolvent debtor substituted for
the fish and the debtor's creditors substituted for the self-interested
fishermen. 19 Rather than catch the insolvent debtor's assets with a
14. Throughout this Article, the term "insolvent" is used in the bankruptcy or balancesheet sense of the word. See infra note 27 (further defining "insolvency" for purposes of Article). A debtor is balance-sheet insolvent when the sum of its assets are less valuable than the
sum of its liabilities. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (Supp. II1l991) (defining insolvent as "[a]
financial condition such that the sum of such entity's debts is'greater than all of such entity's
property, at a fair valuation"); Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 1(19), 30 Stat. 544, 544
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1976)) (repealed 1978) (defining "insolvency" as
occurring when aggregate of individual's property, exclusive of any property that is conveyed
or removed with intent to defraud creditors, is valued as insufficient to repay individual's
debts); UNiF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 2(l), 7A U.L.A. 442 (1978) ("A person is insolvent when the present fair salable value of his [or her] assets is less than the amount that will
be required to pay his [or her] probable liability on his [or her] existing debts as they become
absolute and matured."); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 2(a), 7A U.L.A. 648 (1985) ("A
debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all of the debtor's assets at a
fair valuation."); see also JAMES A. MAcLAcHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 15, at 12 (1956) (noting that
debtor is generally considered insolvent when sum of property is insufficient to pay debts).
15. BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 39-43;JACKSON,
LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 10-19.
16. See BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 39 (explaining that in common pool, "self-interest would dictate that everyone catch fish without restraint, despite the interest of the group as a whole in preserving the resource for the future").
17.

JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 11-13. Jackson demonstrates that di-

verse ownership is a necessary assumption for the premise that the result reached by individual action is worse than a cooperative solution. Id at 12-19. Jackson illustrates this principle
by contrasting the incentive that a sole profit-maximizing owner of a pond has to limit fishing
in a current year, thereby permitting an increase in the stock for fishing in subsequent years,
with the owner's incentive to catch as many fish today as possible that exists when the pond is
subject to depletion through others' unchecked use. Id. at 11-12.
18. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 12-13.
19.

JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 12-13. The analogy is not a perfect one.

In some instances, creditors may be interested in maintaining a debtor as a customer rather
than always "fishing the pond dry." See infra notes 181-87 and accompanying text (arguing
that where debtor's assets are replenishable, creditors will make efforts to structure payment
in accord with replenishment). The likening of a debtor's assets to a pool of fish does not
consider the replenishable characteristics of fish as compared to a common pool of assets.
Although common pool problems involve exhaustible resources, the drcumstances under
which these problems arise will differ depending on whether the exhaustible resources are
replenishable or not. See Alan E. Friedman, The Economics of the Common Pool: Property Rights in
Exhaustible Resources, 18 UCLA L. REV. 855, 856 n.8 (1971) (describing two distinct types of
exhaustible resources that may generate common pool problems: replenishable and

344

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:337

rod and reel, creditors will take the assets through individual collec20
tion remedies of attachment, garnishment, execution, and levy.
When Jackson and his colleagues posit that a debtor's insolvency
presents a common pool problem, they are referring to the fact that
the self-interested actions of individual creditors may run counter to
the interest of the creditors as a group. 2 ' With this observation they
nonreplenishable resources); see also infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text (discussing
role of replenishable resources in common pool analysis).
A particular resource is termed replenishable if "nature will appreciably augment it before
the end of the time period within which use of that stock is presently contemplated." Friedman, supra, at 856 n.8. Simply stated, if nature continues to produce the resource in question
as it is being depleted, the resource is replenishable. In theory one might think a resource's
replenishable qualities would prevent it from being exhausted, but as Friedman explains, even
replenishable resources will be exhausted if the rate of exhaustion exceed!; the rate of replenishment. Id. Friedman illustrates this last point with a reference to animal species. Id. Be-

cause animals reproduce, they can be said to be a replenishable resource. If, however, an
animal species is killed at a rate that far exceeds its rate of reproduction, the species will
become extinct. Id At some point the last members of the species will be killed before having
an opportunity to reproduce, and the replenishable resource will thus be exhausted. Id
20. See infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text (describing operation of individual remedies available to creditors under state law); see also BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 39-43 (using common pool analysis to describe advantages of
collective proceeding in bankruptcy over individual collection remedies);JACKsoN, LooIC AND
LIMITS, supra note 5, at 13 (comparing common pool problem of fish to bankruptcy where
creditors pursue self-interest, potentially prejudicing other creditors' interests).
21. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 10 (arguing that "[tihe basic problem
that bankruptcy law is designed to handle ... is that the system of individual creditor remedies may be bad for the creditors as a group"). Jackson defines a common pool problem as
resting on three essential premises, as follows. "One, that the participants are unable (for one
reason or another) to get together and make a collective decision. Two, that the participants
are selfish (or cold and calculating) and not altruistic. Three, that the result reached by individual action is worse than a cooperative solution." Id. at 10 n.9; see also infra notes 140-57
and accompanying text (delineating circumstances that create common pool problem).
Baird and Jackson identify these same three premises as underlying game theory's "prisoner's dilemma model," which may also be applied to evaluate bankruptcy law. SeeJackson,
Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 5, at 862 ("The central feature of a prisoners' dilemma is rational individual behavior that, in the absence of cooperation with other
individuals, leads to a sub-optimal decision when viewed collectively."); see also BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 39 (explaining that creditors' pursuit of
their interests, seemingly rational behavior to each individually at that time, will damage creditors' ability to collect debts in bankruptcy absent group cooperation); see also infra note 142
and accompanying text (detailing similarities between common pool problem and prisoners'
dilemma theory).
Although the analogy of the relationship between a balance-sheet insolvent debtor and its
creditors to the problem created by a common pool does not demand the conclusion that
creditors would reach an ex ante agreement to institute the collective remedy of bankruptcy,
Jackson contends that creditors would agree in advance to create a system of collective remedies that "runs parallel with a system of individual debt collection rules and is available to
supplant them when and if needed ....
JACKSON, LoGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 13,
Jackson argues this point for two reasons. First, Jackson contends that creditors would agree
to collective remedies because they are risk averse and collective action reduces risk. Id. at 15.
As an illustration of this principle, Jackson offers the following example of a debtor with two
creditors who are asked to "agree in advance to a system that, in the event of Debtor's insolvency, guaranteed them $12,500, in lieu of a system that gave them a 50 percent chance of
$25,000-payment in full-and a 50 percent chance of nothing .
I..."
Id. Jackson concludes
that risk averse creditors would prefer the assurance of $12,500 over a 50/50 chance of payment in full. Id Second, Jackson argues that creditors would reach this ex ante agreement
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make a powerful case for the need for a collective bankruptcy remedy of some form, although their analysis is deficient on the details.
No one has seriously suggested that the Bankruptcy Code 2 2 be repealed in its entirety though, 2 3 and as a result the conclusion that a
because the size of the common pool, in this case the debtor's assets, will be greater in a
collective forum than in a series of individual collection actions, either because enforcement
of collective remedies saves administrative expenses or preserves a business debtor's going
concern value. Id. at 16.
Although it is questionable whether creditors necessarily would enter into the ex ante agreement thatJackson posits, a criticism of this aspect of the creditors' bargain model exceeds the
scope of this Article. See Carlson, supra note 10, at 1342-55 (arguing that if contractarian
philosophers such as Jackson were to attribute real histories to people in their hypothetical
bargains, they would be less likely to reach suggested bargains). Rather, this Article focuses
on whether and under what circumstances a debtor's financial difficulties would pose a common pool problem to its creditors, and disagrees withJackson's identification of balance-sheet
insolvency as that set of circumstances.
22. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The current Bankruptcy Code substantially derives from the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2683
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). The Bankruptcy
Reform Act was subsequently amended, most notably in 1984 and 1986, and is commonly
referred to as the "Code" or the "Bankruptcy Code." This Article adopts these references.
23. But see Baird, World Without Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 174 (imagining "world without
bankruptcy" in attempt to identify what bankruptcy law adds or should add to creditors' remedies, although ultimately concluding that need exists for some form of federal bankruptcy
law). James Bowers has argued in several articles, replete with tongue-in-cheek references to
Murphy's Law and "Far Side" cartoons about vultures, that nonbankruptcy law is as efficient
as bankruptcy law (although, based on Murphy's Law, neither even approaches perfection).
James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the
Elementary Economics of Failure,88 MICH. L. REV. 2097, 2099-2100 (1990) [hereinafter Bowers,
Bankruptcy Theory]; James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan? Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 GA. L. REV. 27, 29 (1991) [hereinafter
Bowers, Loss Distribution]. In a similar vein, Ronald Picker criticizes the literature that defends
bankruptcy as resolving a common pool problem among creditors and argues, by means of
game theory, that the problem could be better resolved through the use of security interests.
Ronald C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior,and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 645, 64549 (1992). Picker does not explicitly call for the repeal of the Bankruptcy Code, but he does
imply that the Code is irrelevant in light of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) Id at 649. Contrainfra notes 246-91 and accompanying text (rebutting Picker's contention that security interests are capable of resolving common pool problem presented by
creditors' collection efforts).
Recently, a number of scholars, led by Baird and Jackson, have questioned the need for
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. See JACKSON, LOGic AND Limrrs, supra note 5, at 218-24
(examining justifications for chapter 11 bankruptcy and arguing that chapter I l's elimination
is desirable because remedy fails to provide claimants with procedures that result in fair distributions of assets); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Casefor Corporate Reorganization, 15 J. LEGAL
STun. 127, 128 (1986) [hereinafter Baird, Uneasy Case] (noting that it is very rare for value of
company in financial trouble to be greater when company is reorganized than when company
is liquidated piece by piece). But see Jackson & Scott, supra note 7, at 190-99 (retreating from
position supporting abolition of chapter 11 by arguing that theory of risk sharing explains
need for reorganization provisions). Others have followed Baird and Jackson in contending
that bankruptcy theory insufficiently supports the need for reorganization. See, e.g., Barry E.
Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 441 (1992) (examining risk
sharing theory of bankruptcy critically and concluding that theory does not justify corporate
bankruptcy reorganization); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Casefor
Chapter 11, 101 YALE LJ. 1043, 1049-50 (1992) (contending on empirical grounds that no
need exists for chapter 11 of Bankruptcy Code).
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need exists for the collective remedy of bankruptcy is hardly
controversial.
More importantly, Jackson uses the creditors' bargain model to
support a normative conclusion about the initiation of bankruptcy
cases. 2 4 He proposes the rebuttable presumption 25 that an involuntary bankruptcy petition be granted whenever "there are multiple
creditors and a reasonable prospect of insolvency." 2 6 Jackson argues that the dominant standard for involuntary relief, the debtor's
general inability to pay debts as they come due standard, 2 7 is insufficient to ensure that bankruptcy proceedings are conducted in all
24. See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 193-209 (using creditors' bargain
model to raise questions regarding appropriateness of current standards for commencement
of bankruptcy cases, and arguing for adoption of insolvency standard for both voluntary and
involuntary petitions; also discussing without resolution wisdom of bounty to provide creditors and shareholders incentives to commence proceedings before debtors become entirely
unable to carry their loan burdens). The only application of the creditors' bargain model to
determine the proper standard of commencement for bankruptcy is found in Jackson's book,
The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law. Id. Thus, although Baird and Scott have joined Jackson
in works that embrace the common pool metaphor, they have not joined Jackson in his argument that an insolvency standard for commencement of bankruptcy cases should be adopted.
In fact, Baird supports a standard that would leave the decision regarding when to bring a
voluntary case to the discretion of the debtor. Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 INT'L REV. OF LAW & ECON. 223, 225-27 (1991) [hereinafter Baird, Initiation Problem].
25. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMrrs, supra note 5, at 200. Jackson would rebut the presumption of the availability of bankruptcy relief when a petitioner's motives are strategic and not in
good faith-namely, when a petition is filed solely to secure some benefit of federal bankruptcy law that is not available under state law. Id. at 191-97; cf. infra notes 381-83 and accompanying text (noting that Jackson's willingness to penalize petitioners under these
circumstances based on their motives is inconsistent with his premise that debtors and creditors act purely out of their own self-interest).
26. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMrrs, supra note 5, at 200. Jackson never explains the significance of the presence of multiple creditors in terms of his "creditors' bargain" model, but
presumably it relates to the assumption of diverse ownership or use of the common pool. See
infra notes 141-57 and accompanying text (discussing competing claims of creditors over common pool of debtor's available assets); cf. infra note 98 and accompanying text (pointing out
that most courts have agreed with proposition that there is no need for collective relief if
debtor has only one creditor).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (1988). The Bankruptcy Code's use of equitable insolvency is
to be contrasted with bankruptcy, or balance-sheet, insolvency. The term "equitable insolvency" refers to an entity that is unable, or has failed, to pay debts as they become due, that is,
an entity in general default. BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6,
at 105. Bankruptcy insolvency, on the other hand, refers to an entity whose assets, when fairly
valued, are insufficient to pay all outstanding debts. Id. Theoretically, one could be insolvent
in bankruptcy but not in equity because of long-term debt that has not yet come due. Id.
Similarly, there are situations in which the debtor is unable to meet payments as they become
due, despite the fact that the value of the debtor's assets exceeds its liabilities. JACKSON,
LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 198.
Jackson's view that a debtor's equitable insolvency or general default serves as a good indication of its balance-sheet insolvency is not new. See Israel Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A
Medieval Concept in Modern Bankruptcy Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 189, 211-15 (1938) (discussing
merits of equitable insolvency as indication of insolvency).
Because it is confusing to use the term "insolvent" to refer both to balance-sheet or bankruptcy insolvency and to equitable insolvency, the term "insolvent" is used in this Article to
refer only to balance-sheet insolvency, with reference to a debtor that is "insolvent in the
equitable sense" as a debtor in general default.
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qualifying cases. 28 Specifically, Jackson criticizes the current standard as insufficient because it does not permit the commencement
of an involuntary bankruptcy case against a balance-sheet insolvent
debtor that is able to meet debts as they come due. 29 To a reader
unfamiliar with the historical development of the involuntary bankruptcy commencement standard, Jackson's proposed insolvency
standard may appear to be an uncontroversial extension of the common pool analogy. A brief review of this history, however, indicates
that Jackson's proposal should be viewed with a great deal of skepticism, because Congress abolished a similar standard in 1978 largely
to remove the requirement that creditors prove a debtor's balancesheet insolvency. 30 Jackson offers little justification for his proposed
return to an insolvency standard other than through his analogy of a
balance-sheet insolvent debtor to a common pool of fish.
In other contexts, commentators have criticized both the conclusions and methodology of the creditors' bargain model, arguing that
as a law and economics-based theory, the model provides a skewed
perspective from which to analyze bankruptcy law. 3 1 Similarly, com28. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 200 ("The test in section 303(b)(1) of

showing that the debtor is 'generally not paying debts as they come due' is, as a matter of
theory, insufficient by itself.").
29. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 200.

30. Compare Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 3a-b 30 Stat. 544, 546-47 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)-(b) (1976)) (repealed 1978) (permitting commencement of involuntary bankruptcy case upon showing of act of bankruptcy) with 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1)
(1988) (permitting commencement of involuntary bankruptcy case upon showing of debtor's
failure to pay debts as they come due). For a discussion of the merits of various bankruptcy
standards, see REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I, at 14-15 (1973) [hereinafter REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAws] (arguing that "failure to pay" standard provides more effective relief for creditors); Susan Block-Lieb, Why So Few CreditorsFile Involuntary Petitionsand Why the Number Is Not
Too Small, 57 BROOKLYN L. REV. 803, 803 (1991) (attributing adoption of "failure to pay"
standard as due to Congress' understanding that it would be easier standard for creditors to
prove).
31. See, e.g., Bowers, Bankruptcy Theory, supra note 23, at 2105-07 (using "parable of the
vultures" analogy to demonstrate that bargaining among creditors advocated in creditors'
bargain model is not profitable for those creditors); David G. Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory and the
Creditors' Bargain, 61 U. CINN. L. REV. 453 [hereinafter Carlson, Creditors'Bargain](noting that
creditors' bargain model has been criticized because of its focus on wealth maximization as
overriding goal); Countryman, supra note 11, at 823-25, 827 (attacking creditors' bargain
model for its assumptions of perfect information and its reliance on concept of "fully informed greed"); Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationalityin Bankruptcy Decisionmaking,33 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 333, 335 (1992) [hereinafter Korobkin, Bankruptcy Decisionmaking] (outlining
foundation of creditors' bargain model that focuses largely on maximizing economic returns,
and offering several alternative approaches to bankruptcy that are premised on broader social
values than simply wealth enhancement); Donald R. Korobkin, RehabilitatingValues: AJurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 737 (1991) [hereinafter Korobkin,Jurisprudence of
Bankruptcy] (criticizing Jackson's economic model for its failure to explain complex dimensions of bankruptcy law); Warren, supra note 12, at 789-93 (criticizing creditors' bargain theory as only representing different distributional choice). James Bowers also criticizes the
economic analysis of Baird andJackson's model by arguing that their common pool analogy is
inapt because it fails to account for the actions of debtors and secured creditors. Bowers,
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mentators argue that in particular instances the value judgments inherent in an economic analysis of the law have led to misplaced
policy decisions.3 2 This Article does not join these commentators in
criticizing Jackson's basic methodology, however. Rather, it accepts
the usefulness of building a model that questions the result that
would follow if perfectly informed, risk-neutral actors, who face no
strategic or practical impediments to bargaining, are assumed to behave only in their own self-interest.
Constructing a simplified version of some complex reality is not
the end of the model-building process, however. The modeler
should also step back from her handiwork and determine whether
the model indeed resembles and thus explains the real world. In
considering this resemblance, the modeler should question both the
results reached by means of the model and the model's underlying
premises. Very often, economic models simplify reality by assuming
a perfect market in which there exist no externalities or transaction
costs. In determining how well the model reflects the real world,
this second step in model building may require a relaxation of these
simplifying assumptions.
This Article takes that second step by asking whether the insolvent debtor actually presents a common pool problem to its creditors-are the legs growing out of the stick person's ears or its torso?
It accepts the basic contours of Jackson's model, which theorizes
that the creditors of a financially distressed debtor may face a comBankruptcy Theory, supra note 23, at 2103-13. He contends that under nonbankruptcy law,
debtors are likely to be efficient distributors of their own assets, and that bankruptcy law may
be unnecessary to achieve an efficient result. Id.
In his most recent collaboration with Professor Scott, Jackson has slightly tempered his
assertion that bankruptcy law should never seek to accomplish distributional goals. See Jackson & Scott, supra note 7, at 157-58 (expanding framework of creditors' bargain model to
argue that distributional effects premised on anticipation of uncontrollable business failures
would be explicitly included in ex ante bargain unless cost of implementation did not outweigh
benefits of enhancing creditors' wealth). Commentators have criticized Jackson's risk-sharing
theory of bankruptcy law as insufficient to justify the need for a separate body of bankruptcy
law. See Carlson, Creditors' Bargain,supra (arguing that risks that cannot be mitigated through
human precaution can be allocated through contracts).
32. See, e.g., Lynn A. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining over Equity's Share in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L, REV. 125, 180 (1990)
(criticizing creditors' bargain model's assumptions that absolute priority rule will be strictly
enforced in bankruptcy proceedings); David G. Carlson, Postpetition Interest Underthe Bankruptcy
Code, 43 U. MiAmi L. REv. 577, 624-31 (1989) [hereinafter Carlson, Postpetion Interest] (arguing that Baird and Jackson's creditors' bargain model fails to offer efficient results); Raymond
J. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 EMoRY LJ. 1009, 1014 n.5 (1987) (arguing that proper issue in bankruptcy law is
extent to which federal policy should alter state outcomes and not whether state law should
have any role); Jay L. Westbrook, A FunctionalAnalysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REv.
227, 251 n. 114, 337 (1989) (criticizingJackson for preoccupation with notion that bankruptcy
should not change state law results because such preoccupation obfuscates executory contract
analysis).
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mon pool problem when seeking to collect their delinquent debts.
It instead critiques Jackson's conclusion that insolvency should be
the sole standard governing the commencement of bankruptcy cases
and his contention that the common pool analogy justifies this
conclusion.
Thus, rather than attacking the methodology of law and economics or of modeling in general, this Article takes issue with Jackson's
application of the creditors' bargain model to the question of the
proper standard for bringing a bankruptcy case. Part I surveys
debtor/creditor law by first describing procedures through which a
debtor might cooperatively repay delinquent obligations to individual groups of creditors. It then discusses various coercive collection
remedies,3 3 including involuntary bankruptcy, as ways in which an
individual creditor or group of creditors might force a debtor to
make payment. Next, Part I contrasts the current standard for commencement of an involuntary case with the standard's predecessor
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.34 Part I concludes by contrasting the nearly unfettered ability of a debtor to voluntarily commence a bankruptcy case under the current Bankruptcy Code with
the eligibility requirements under the former Act.
Part II of this Article explains in detail the circumstances under
which a common pool problem will exist.3 5 It defines a common
pool problem as negative production or consumption externalities
caused when use of exhaustible resources cannot be resolved
33.

Commentators have not consistently defined the term "coercive" remedies. Compare

Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive CreditorRemedies, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 730,

730 n.2 (1989) (defining "coercive collection" and "coercive creditor remedies" as "only
those self-enforcing remedies that are, at least to some extent, prior to and independent of
the alternative process of postjudgment execution") with William C. Whitford, A Critique ofthe
Consumer Credit Collection System, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 1047, 1048 n.3 (defining "coercive execu-

tion" as "legally valid transfers of value to the creditor that occur without the debtor's consent"). Throughout this Article, the term "coercive collection remedies" is used in
accordance with Whitford's definition. Whitford provides a useful illustration of his
definition:
[W]hen the sheriff seizes the debtor's property pursuant to a writ of execution, when
the debtor's employer pays a portion of wages owed the debtor to the creditor pursuant to a writ of garnishment, or when the creditor under a security interest forcibly
but legally repossesses property of the debtor by self help these creditors have exercised a coercive collection remedy.
Whitford, supra, at 1048 n.3.
34.

Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.

§§ 1-1255 (1976)), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2682 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 &Supp. III 1991)). In contrast to the common
reference to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as the "Code" or the "Bankruptcy Code," see

supra note 22, practitioners, courts, and commentators commonly refer to the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, including its numerous amendments, as the "Act," the "Bankruptcy Act," or the
"former Act." This Article follows this common usage.
35. See infra notes 141-57 and accompanying text (articulating definition of common pool
problem and Jackson and Baird's metaphor to explain concept and its effect).

350

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:337

through the definition of property rights,3 6 and argues that Jackson's view of the circumstances under which the creditors of a financially troubled debtor face a common pool problem is too narrow
for several reasons. First, Jackson does not distinguish between the
potential for a common pool problem and the problem itself. In
addition, Jackson too narrowly defines the exhaustible resources
against which creditors can proceed. An insolvent debtor's assets
are easily described as exhaustible resources, but, to a debtor whose
earnings accrue more slowly than its obligations on claims, its earnings too are a scarce resource. Moreover, Jackson too narrowly describes the ways in which collection efforts by one creditor affect
those efforts of the debtor's other creditors. He considers only the
pure consumption externality that occurs when multiple actors seek
to consume exhaustible resources. Part II defines the concepts of
rate and product consumption externalities and applies these concepts to various types of debtors, noting that the timing of a rate
consumption externality depends on the replenishable nature of a
debtor's assets and that the existence of a product consumption externality depends on the interrelationship of a debtor's assets to its
earning capacity. Moreover, Part II notes that creditors face options
in determining how best to collect delinquent claims. Some methods are more effective than others, and under certain circumstances
pursuit of a less effective remedy can cause externalities. Finally,
Jackson does not explore the possibility that a common pool problem may be resolved through the definition of property rights. Part
II concludes that it is possible to avoid the common pool problem
that creditors of a financially troubled debtor may face by the creation of a voluntary security interest.
Part III expands on the economic analysis developed in Part II as
applied to the question regarding the proper standard for commencement of a bankruptcy case. The circumstances under which
creditors of a financially troubled debtor face a common pool problem suggest that both the present standard for commencement of an
involuntary case and Jackson's proposed refinements of the standard are insufficient. Moreover, the resolution of a common pool
problem was not Congress' exclusive policy goal in enacting the
Bankruptcy Code. Part III considers the standard for involuntarily
thrusting a debtor into bankruptcy in light of these alternative policy
goals. It also considers whether debtors should be required to
prove their insolvency or general default as a precondition to obtaining voluntary bankruptcy relief. After comparing and contrast36.

See infra notes 141-306 and accompanying text.
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ing Congress' purposes in permitting creditors to file involuntary
petitions with Congress' goal of permitting debtors to voluntarily
commence bankruptcy cases, this Part concludes that the standards
for the two types of petitions should not be equated.
I.

CREDITORS' OPTIONS UNDER-STATE AND FEDERAL LAW FOR
DEBT REPAYMENT

Creditors extend credit primarily on the expectation that they will
be paid out of a debtor's earnings.3 7 Earnings include the debtor's
salary, wages, or commissions if the debtor is an individual, 38 or the
debtor's revenue if it is a partnership, corporation, or other business
entity.3 9 An individual debtor may quit or lose his job, however,
able to find employment only at a lesser rate; a business debtor may
become less profitable or close its doors. In either event, not all of
the debtor's creditors can be paid out of the debtor's earnings.

A.

Overview of Collection Remedies

Creditors face two basic choices in deciding which remedies to
pursue. First, a creditor must decide whether to adopt a cooperative
or adversarial stance toward a debtor. The creditor may seek the
debtor's cooperation in scheduling repayment of the debt, or the
creditor may coerce repayment from the debtor through a variety of
remedies. In the second choice, the creditor must decide whether to
proceed alone or collectively with all or some of the debtor's other
creditors. A creditor's remedial choices will differ depending on
40
whether it is unsecured or secured.
1.

Cooperativerepayment

Many debtors that find themselves in financial difficulties want
37. SeeJACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 8 ("Whatever the reasons for lending
and whatever its form, the terms on which consensual credit is extended depend to a substantial extent on the likelihood of voluntary repayment and on the means for coercing
repayment.").
38. The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define an individual as a natural person,
but courts have generally adopted this interpretation based on usage of the term in the Code.
See Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2199 (1991) (noting that "person," as used in Code,
includes individuals (natural persons) and holding that individuals not engaged in business
may qualify as debtors under Code). This Article uses the term "individual" in this sense.
39. The Code does not define the term "business debtor," but the term is used in this
Article to refer to a debtor engaged in business. Most often a business debtor will be a corporation, partnership, or other business association, but an individual debtor might also engage
in business as a sole proprietor. Business debtors are additionally contrasted with consumer
debtors. See infra note 178 (defining consumer debtor).
40. See generally BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 1517 (describing special rights of secured creditors to pursue property that is usually exempt
and to take possession of property without consent of owner or sanction of court).
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only to repay their creditors as best they can and then move on with
their affairs. These cooperative debtors can repay delinquent debts
41
one at a time, or as a group.
a.

Individual cooperative repayment

The debtor may cooperate with an individual unsecured creditor
and either pay or settle the past-due claim. 4 2 A secured creditor
also may find that the debtor is cooperative in turning over collateral for repossession and resale.
b.

Collective cooperative repayment

An insolvent debtor may instead cooperate with its creditors as a
group, ensuring that creditors not paid in full are at least paid an
equitable portion of the debtor's liquidated assets. Under state law,
debtors may accomplish this either through "workout" agreements
or by assigning their assets to assignees for the benefit of creditors. 43 A workout agreement is simply a contract between a delinquent debtor and two or more of its creditors by which the parties
agree to either the payment of a reduced amount of the debtor's
outstanding indebtedness or an extension of the due (late for repayment of the outstanding indebtedness, or to a combination of a reduction and an extension. 4 4 And while no single definition of a
voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors exists, the phrase
generally refers to a voluntary transfer to an assignee by a debtor of
some or all of its assets to be subsequently applied to the debtor's
45
outstanding debts.

41. See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMIrrs, supra note 5, at 9 (describing voluntary options of
debtor that include simply paying off creditor or creditors to terminate debt).
42. See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 9 (noting voluntary option of paying
creditors before bankruptcy proceedings commence). Depending on the timing of the voluntary payment by the debtor and on the debtor's financial picture at the time the transfer is
made, a voluntary payment may amount to an avoidable preference. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)
(1988) (defining preference as transfer of property of debtor made to or lbr benefit of creditor, within 90 days or 1 year before filing of bankruptcy petition, on account of antecedent
debt, while debtor is insolvent, and enabling transferee to receive more than it would have
received if transfer had not occurred and transferee had participated in hypothetical chapter 7
liquidation case); see also LYNN M. LoPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS § 2.4 (2d ed. 1991) (citing examples to illustrate contrary goals of preference law
and lawyers' objectives in prebankruptcy period).
43. LAWRENCE F. KING & MICHAEL L. COOK, CREDITORS, DEBTORS, AND BANKRUIPTCY 37576 (2d ed. 1989).
44. BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 1283-84; KING &
COOK, supra note 43, at 575-76. The contract doctrine of consideration requires that a
workout agreement involve at least two of the debtor's creditors, so that one creditor's promise to forbear is exchanged for another creditor's promise to do the same. BAIRD &JACKSON,
CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 1283; KING & COOK, supra note 43, at 577.
45. ALEXANDER M. BURRILL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF VOLUNTARY ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS 4 (5th ed. 1887). These assignments "are usually
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Under federal law, debtors can "cooperate" in repaying their
creditors simply by filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition. 46 The
current Bankruptcy Code does not require that debtors show insolvency or any other level of financial hardship as a precondition to
the filing of a voluntary petition. 47 All that a debtor must allege in
its voluntary bankruptcy petition is that it is a "person" 48 eligible for
relief under title 11 of the United States Code. 49
2.

Coercive collection

Of course, the debtor may not be so agreeable. If the debtor is
uncooperative, unsecured and secured creditors can coerce repayment of the debtor's obligations by forcing a sale of the debtor's
property. Creditors can also forcibly collect outstanding claims
through either individual or collective collection remedies.
a. Individual coercive collection

For unsecured creditors, individual collection remedies are governed by state law through actions of attachment, garnishment, execution, or levy. 50 Under each of these individual remedies, general
creditors are precluded from forcing a sale of a debtor's property
resorted to by debtors who find themselves unable to pay their creditors in full, or the embarrassed state of whose affairs has compelled them to discontinue the transaction of business."
Id.
Both statutes and common law govern an assignment for the benefit of creditors. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-117-401 to -407 (Michie 1987) (establishing guidelines for those making assignment for benefit of creditors); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-2-41 to -59'(1989) (detailing
procedures and rules governing assignment for benefit of creditors); see also BAIRD &JACKSON,
CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 1289-1301 (noting that trust, not contract,
law generally governs common-law assignments for benefit of creditors); STEFAN A. RIESENFELD, REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 430-41 (4th ed. 1987) (describing state common
and statutory law as historically and currently applied to assignment for benefit of creditors).
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988) (providing that voluntary bankruptcy case is commenced
by filing of petition by eligible debtor).
47. See id- § 109 (delineating categories of individuals and businesses that qualify as debtors but omitting mandatory financial criteria for such classifications).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (Supp. III 1991); 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988); see also Toibb v.
Ratner, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2199 (1991) (ascribing literal meaning to Code's definition of "person" in deciding that individual with no business is "person" eligible for chapter 11 relief).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988). The Code excludes such "persons" as railroads, banks, and
insurance companies from the definition of "debtor" for purposes of chapter 11 bankruptcy.
Id. § 109(d).
50. See BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 4-10 (detailing prejudgment and postjudgment remedies available to creditors under state law). An attachment refers to the creditor's ability to seize a specific piece of property as early as the
filing of a complaint, which can in turn be used to satisfy judgment once entered. Id. at 6.
Execution and levy refers to a postjudgment remedy to enforce a judgment against property
of the debtor that is in the debtor's possession. Id at 8-9. Garnishment, which can be either a
prejudgment or postjudgment remedy, refers to attachment or execution of property of the
debtor in the possession of a third party, most notably a debtor's wages or other forms of
personal income. Id. at 6-7.
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until they obtain a judgment against the debtor and follow compli-

cated procedures for enforcing their right to payment. 5 ' Unsecured
creditors that successfully sue a defaulting debtor generally obtain
an automatic judgment lien against the debtor's nonexempt real

property, 52 but this lien is not self-executing.5 3 To enforce a judgment lien against real property, judgment creditors ordinarily must
take other judicially supervised steps, usually involving mortgage
foreclosure 54 or execution and levy. 5 5 To enforce a judgment
against a debtor's personal property, judgment creditors generally
must take additional steps.5 6 In order to obtain a lien against the
debtor's personal property, the judgment creditor generally must
seek a writ of execution. 57 As in the case of judgment liens, these
51. BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 4-10. In limited
circumstances, general creditors may be entitled to attach the debtor's property before judgment. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:26-2(a)-(e) (West 1987) (detailing circumstances in which
prejudgment attachment is proper); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 6001, 6201 (McKinney 1978)
(establishing general provisional remedies and prejudgment attachment in particular); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 811.01-.03 (West 1989) (granting creditor right to attach property of debtor).
A prejudgment attachment lien merely provides general creditors with an inchoate lien that is
unenforceable until afterjudgment. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 6222, 6224 (McKinney
1978) (delineating grounds for discharge or annulment of attachment and including cases in
which judgment has been fully satisfied as providing one such ground); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 925-23 (1989) (mandating final judgment prior to proper attachment of debtor's property); see
also BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 6-7 (noting that prejudgment lien does not give creditor title to property because creditor might not win suit and
because even if creditor prevails, creditor must take additional steps to obtain writ of execution before ownership of property passes to creditor).
52. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:26-11 (West 1989) (stating that "[t]he judgment in the
action shall be a lien on defendants' real estate"). The entry of a judgment results in the
automatic attachment of ajudgment lien against the debtor's real property in all jurisdictions
except Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island. BAIRD &
JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS,

supra note 6, at 8;

RIESENFELD,

supra note 45, at

89-90. In Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi, entry of a judgment may result not only in an
automatic lien against the debtor's real property, but also in a lien against certain of the
debtor's personal property. RIESENFELD, supra note 45, at 150 nn.44-45.
53. BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 8.
54. See RIESENFELD, supra note 45, at 97 (stating that creditors may only enforce judg-

ment liens through mortgage foreclosure procedures in several jurisdictions).
55.

See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 99 2A:17 to :60 (West 1989) (requiring "leave of court" to

levy and subsequently sell "rights and credits" of debtor); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R, 5230 (McKinney 1990) (establishing procedural guidelines for executions by specifying that debtor's
property may be levied upon and sold); R.I. GEN. LAW § 9-25-23 (1989) (requiring final judgment to attach debtor's property for subsequent execution and levy); see also RIESENFELD, supra
note 45, at 97 (noting that some jurisdictions only allow levy and sale under writ of execution
to enforce judgment liens while otherjurisdictions allow execution and foreclosure as alternative remedies).
56.

See BAIRD

&JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS,

supra note 6, at 9 (explaining

different procedures required to seize various types of real property, and noting that generally
transitory nature of chattels requires sheriff to take possession or otherwise deprive debtor of
use of property).
57. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:17 to :60 (West 1989) (declaring that writ to bind
property or goods of person is not binding until delivered by appropriate officer); N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. L. & R. 5230 (McKinney 1990) (establishing requirements for writ of execution); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 9-25-23 (1989) (requiring writ of execution for attachment); see also BAIRD &
JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 9 (explaining that in most states
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execution liens are not self-executing. 58 In most jurisdictions, execution liens are only enforceable by a sheriff or other official who
levies against the debtor's property and sells it,59 paying the creditor
out of the proceeds of the sale. 60 And when general creditors instead seek to enforce a judgment against a debtor's personal property that is in the possession of another, they must resort to a writ of
garnishment rather than a writ of execution. 6 1 These individual coljudgment itself does not create lien against debtor's personal property, but that issuance or
service of writ of execution may).
58. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS & CREDITORS 36
(1986).
59. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 699.510-.548 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992) (setting
forth writ of execution and notice of levy procedures, specifically focusing on issuance of writ
and information that must be contained therein, as well as on proper time to levy upon any
property named in writ and necessary notice for individuals involved in levying process); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 56.21-.25 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991) (detailing phases of execution sale including mandating notice that must take place over one-month period; precise hours and day of
week of sale; location of sale either to take place on courthouse steps or where property was
taken into possession; and execution and delivery of bill of sale); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:26-15,
:17-45, :17-60 (West 1989) (explaining execution sale, special order, and leave of court); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5230, 5232, 5233 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992) (highlighting execution
procedure and levy and sale of debtor's personal property); see also BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 10 (advocating stringent regulation of creditorinduced property sales as necessary to protect debtor and junior creditors); WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 58, at 36-37 (noting that creditor remains unsecured general creditor until
"execution" process begins and outlining procedures for collection or "levying" process, beginning with court-ordered writ and leading to sheriff's seizure of any personal property and
posting of notice of seizure on any real property).
60. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 701.810-.830 (West 1990) (providing order for
distribution of proceeds from sale or collection of debtor's assets, giving highest priority to
creditors with preferred labor claims; which include unsecured claims for wages, salaries, or
commissions and for contributions to employee benefit plans; specifying 30-day time limit to
pay out proceeds; and granting levying officer option of depositing proceeds that might be
subject to conflicting claims with court before distribution); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 56.27 (West
1990) (requiring that all money collected under writ of execution be paid to party favored in
outcome of execution cause of action); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-1 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992)
(outlining law enforcement officer's duty to collect debt and other sums of money from
debtor); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5234(a) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992) (sanctioning distribution of proceeds to creditor from sale of debtor's personal property).
61. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-77.28 (West 1991) (explaining details of garnishment); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-63 (West 1989) (noting authority of court to order payment of
debt by garnishment); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 812.02 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991) (delineating circumstances under which garnishment may and may not take place); see also BAIRD &JACKSON,
CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 9 (differentiating between writs of execution
and garnishment as related to liens on personal property); JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra
note 5, at 9 (explaining that writs of execution usually revolve around seizure of tangible real
and personal property, whereas writs of garnishment involve seizure of intangible property);
RIESENFELD, supra note 45, at 217-33, 242, 243 (providing case examples of scope and effect
of garnishment proceedings and interrelationship between garnishment and trustee process).
But see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 700.030-.050 (West 1990) (allowing execution and levy
to be wielded by creditors against both property in possession or control of debtor and property in possession or control of third persons or bailees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-361
(West 1991) (providing for wage execution cause of action); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 5231
(McKinney 1990) (creating income execution remedy for creditors). The most common
forms of garnishment are brought against a debtor's receivables, business or otherwise. Even
debtors that are not in business have receivables. For example, a debtor's deposits and other
bank accounts represent obligations owed to the debtor by banks to which the debtor has lent
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lection remedies are referred to as "grab laws," because unsecured
creditors pursue them on a piecemeal basis, independent of one another. Pursuit of various state law remedies such as execution, attachment, garnishment, levy, and the like may involve a "race to the
courthouse" by a debtor's creditors, with the creditors who win the
race entitled to "grab" the debtor's assets away from the debtor's
62
slower creditors.
Secured creditors need not jump through so many hoops in collecting a delinquent claim. If a creditor's security interest in a
debtor's collateralized property has been properly created and perfected under state law, 63 the creditor can proceed to repossess the
collateral, thereby enforcing the claim without the aid of any court
or officer of the court. 64 Once the collateral is repossessed, the secured creditor is authorized to sell it65 in a commercially reasonable
67
fashion 6 6 and apply the proceeds of the sale to the overdue debt.
b.

Collective coercive collection

Grab laws are not the only type of coercive collection remedy
available under state law. Most states also provide creditors with a
collective means for the repayment of loan obligations. State collecfunds merely by setting up accounts. Similarly, the debtor's rights to be paid regular wages,
salaries, or commissions also constitute obligations owed to the debtor by his or her
employers.
62. See MACLAcHLAN, supra note 14, § 5, at 3 (examining various types of local "grab
laws" and distinguishing them from standard bankruptcy remedies); see aho Jackson, Translat.
ing Assets and Liabilities, supra note 5, at 74 (discussing problematic nature of grab laws that
arise because most debtors owe more than one creditor).
63. In all 50 states, Article 9 of the U.C.C. governs the creation, perfection, and priority
of most voluntary security interests in personal property. See U.C.C. § 9-102 (1981) (clarifying scope of personal property definition); cf U.C.C. § 9-104 (1985) (listing transactions to
which Article 9 does not apply). Other state laws govern many involuntary security interests
in personal property, commonly referred to as statutory or mechanics' liens. See, e.g., Aiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-981 (1990 & Supp. 1991) (providing for imposition of lien for labor in
construction, alteration, or repair of buildings or other structures); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
254, § 1 (West 1988) (granting liens to employees or trustees for personal labor performed
on buildings or structures). Finally, state mortgage laws govern the creation, perfection, and
priority of voluntary liens against real property. Cf Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613
(1918) (explaining that where state laws and laws of Congress with respect to liens against
property conflict, state laws will be suspended to extent of actual conflict as provided by Federal Bankruptcy Act).
64. See U.C.C. § 9-503 (1981) (granting secured party right to proceed without judicial
intervention as long as done peacefully).
65. See id. § 9-504 (allowing secured party to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of repossessed collateral); see also id. § 9-505 (illustrating ways in which secured creditor may not be
required to sell collateral that is repossessed and indicating that if proper procedures are
followed, secured creditor may instead elect to retain collateral in satisfaction of debt).
66. See id. § 9-504 (outlining elements of commercially reasonable sale).
67. See id. § 9-504(1) (permitting application of proceeds of sale to reasonable expenses,
attorneys fees, and satisfaction of indebtedness by holders of both security interests and
subordinate security interests).
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tive remedies include an assignment for the benefit of creditors68 or
equitable receivership. 69 In most states, the collective remedy of assignment for the benefit of creditors is not a coercive remedy, however, because it cannot be commenced involuntarily against a
debtor. 70
In addition, federal law provides creditors with a collective 7
means for compelling repayment: involuntary bankruptcy. 72 The
68. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing state law basis and elements of
assignment for benefit of creditors).
69. See WILLIAM A. ALDERSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF RECEIVERS § 2, at 2
(1905). Alderson defined equitable receivership as follows:
A receiver, generally speaking, is one to whom anything is delivered by another...
[or, more specifically, is] a ministerial officer of a court of chancery, appointed as an
impartial and indifferent person between the parties to a suit to take possession of
and preserve, pendente life, and for the benefit of the party ultimately entitled to it, the
fund or property in litigation, when it does not seem equitable to the court that
either party should have possession or control of it.
Id.; accord CHARLES F. BEACH, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAW OF RECEIVERS § 1, at 1 (1888) (defining receiver as ministerial officer of court whose powers are limited to those prescribed by
court and who may be viewed as indifferent or impartial to interests of parties in suit). As in
the case of assignments for the benefit of creditors, the provisional remedy of receivership is
both a creature of common law and of statute. See generally KING & COOK, supra note 43, at
599-604 (indicating that receiver may be appointed in mortgage foreclosure proceedings to
represent judgment lien creditors or to administer all assets of financially distressed debtor);
RIESENFELD, supra note 45, at 443-54 (detailing demise of federal general receivership and
identifying basic tenets of general receivership under state law); Robert A. Greenfield, Alternatives to Bankruptcyfor the Business Debtor, 51 L.A. BARJ. 135, 136-38 (1975) (describing benefits
and advantages of using assignments in liquidating bankruptcy proceedings). For a general
discussion of the common law of receivership, see ALDERSON, supra, §§ 12-18, at 16-20 (tracing history of appointment of receivers from Court of Chancery to U.S. courts as well as
statutory history of power to appoint receivers); BEACH, supa, §§ 1-7, at 1-9 (providing brief
introduction on law of receivers and concept of receivership in general). For examples of
state statutes permitting the appointment of a receiver, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-8-3
(1989) (allowing appointment of receiver without prior notice to trustee in extraordinary circumstances); IOWA CODE ANN. § 626.33 (West 1989) (authorizing court to appoint receivers
when it deems such appointment necessary and proper); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 155, § 52
(West 1992) (providing powers for receiver in event of termination or corporate dissolution);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.490 (Vernon 1988) (granting court power to appoint one or more receivers to aid corporation in liquidation proceedings; allowing either individual or domestic
or foreign corporation to be named as receiver and describing corresponding powers); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 21-21-5 (1989) (noting appointment of receivers by judge or court
when bankruptcy action is pending); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.06 (West 1980) (allowing district courts to appoint receivers and in turn order liquidation of assets and
businesses).
70. See BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 1289 (noting
that assignment for benefit of creditors generally takes place pursuant to agreement by which
debtor voluntarily conveys property to third party who then executes agreement's terms).
71. Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor any other federal law provides general creditors
with an individual collection remedy. The Internal Revenue Code provides the Internal Revenue Service with collection remedies that are applicable only to the Service. See 26 U.S.C.
§§ 6321-6323, 6325 (1988) (establishing lien process for collection of overdue taxes).
72. See 11 U.S.C. § 803(a)-(k) (1988) (outlining procedures for commencement of involuntary bankruptcy cases, describing types of debtors involuntary cases can be brought against,
and explaining notice and hearing procedures as well as actions that can be taken in event of
dismissal of creditor's petition for involuntary bankruptcy). The earliest bankruptcy laws only
provided a means for commencing an involuntary case and, thus, were exclusively collection
remedies. See MACLACHLAN, supra note 14, §§ 26-27, at 20-21 (noting that early English and
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federal Bankruptcy Code permits creditors to initiate either a chapter 7 liquidation or a chapter 11 reorganization case against the will
of a debtor, 73 but the Code does not permit creditors to file an involuntary chapter 12 or 13 petition. 74
American bankruptcy laws were creditor remedies, initiated only at request of creditors). See
generally CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 3-45 (1972) (describing
bankruptcy legislation from 1789-1827 as "The Period of the Creditor"); Baird, World Without
Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 174 (hypothesizing world where bankruptcy is nonexistent in order
to determine precise role bankruptcy law should play in legal realm); Louis E. Levinthal, Early
History of Bankruptcy Laws, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 223, 224 (1918) (criticizing scant development of
historical background of English and American bankruptcy law); Treiman, supra note 27, at
191-92 (tracing historical notion of "act" of bankruptcy and reconciling it with objectives of
modem law).
73. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1988); see DANIEL R. COWANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 3.4, at 134 (1986) (defining chapter 7 as "liquidation bankruptcy" in which debtor surrenders all nonexempt assets to creditors while trustee collects remaining assets and sells them,
distributing proceeds pro rata to creditors; defining chapter II as "reorganizational bankruptcy" because debtor need not surrender assets, but rather may enter into workout arrangements with creditors while remaining in business).
74. Chapter 12 involves the debt adjustment of a family farmer. II U.S.C. § 109()
(1988); see id. § 101(19) (Supp. I1 1992) (explaining regular annual income requirement necessary to qualify as "family farmer"). Chapter 13 involves the debt adjustment of an individual with a regular income. See id. § 109(e) (1988) (limiting debtor eligibility under chapter 13
to those debtors having noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $ 100,000 and
noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts of less than $350,000); see also id. § 101 (30) (Supp.
I1 1991) (defining individual with regular income sufficiently stable to make debt payments
under chapter 13). Involuntary chapter 12 and 13 cases are not permitted under the Code.
See, e.g., Foster v. Heitkamp (In re Foster), 670 F.2d 478, 492-93 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating in
dicta that involuntary chapter 13 case is not permissible); see also 2 WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 303.03, at 303-10 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1992) (discussing inapplicability of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings under chapters 12 and 13).
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Involuntary Bankruptcy

As the law currently exists, 75 three or more creditors7 6 holding
claims 7 7 that are neither contingent 78 nor the subject of a bona fide
75. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeships Act of 1984 (BAFJA), Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 303, 98 Star. 333, 352 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988)) (amending sections 303(b) and (h) of Code as part of omnibus substantive and jurisdictional amendments to bankruptcy provisions). Section 303(b) currently provides that an involuntary
bankruptcy case may be commenced via the filing of a petition:
(1) by three or more entities, each of which is either a holder of a claim against
such person that is not contingent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute,
or an indenture trustee representing such a holder, if such claims aggregate at least
$5,000 more than the value of any lien on property of the debtor securing such
claims held by the holders of such claims;
(2) if there are fewer than 12 such holders, excluding any employee or insider of
such person and any transferee of a transfer that is voidable under section 544, 545,
547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, by one or more of such holders that hold in the
aggregate at least $5,000 of such claims;
(3) if such person is a partnership(A) by fewer than all of the general partners in such partnerships; or
(B) if relief has been ordered under this title with respect to all of the general
partners in such partnership, by a general partner in such partnership, the
trustee of such a general partner, or a holder of a claim against such partnership;
or
(4) by a foreign representative of the estate in a foreign proceeding concerning
such person.
11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1)-(4) (1988).
76. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1988). Butsee id. § 303(b)(2) (permitting single creditor to file
involuntary petition when debtor has fewer than 12 creditors; in counting debtor's creditors
for this purpose, employees, insiders, and creditors whose claims are voidable are excluded).
For a general discussion of the intricacies of counting a debtor's creditors for purposes of
§ 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, see 2 COLLIER, supra note 74, §§ 303.07[1][b], 303.08[12],
at 303-19 to -21, 303-41 to -45.
77. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (Supp. III 1991) (defining claim as right to payment or right to
equitable remedy giving rise to payment, regardless of whether fixed or liquidated in nature).
Although there exists no explicit requirement that a petitioning creditor exhaust its state collection remedies as a prerequisite to commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case,
courts are divided on this issue. Compare, e.g., In re Win-Sum Sports, Inc., 14 B.R. 389, 392-93
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (holding that exhaustion of state remedies is not required) with, e.g.,
In re F.R.P. Indus., Inc., 73 B.R. 309, 313 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987) (discussing petition as
having been filed in bad faith where debtor appeared solvent, petitioning creditors did not
first pursue state collection remedies, and creditor's true motive in filing was to effectuate
takeover of debtor); In re Dwoskin, 24 B.R. 41, 42 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (acknowledging that
cases involving sole creditor's involuntary petition will be dismissed when creditor will not be
prejudiced by pursuit of state collection remedies); In re R.V. Seating, Inc., 8 B.R. 663, 665
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (considering "economy of bankruptcy administration" when determining if creditors' or debtors' interests are better served by dismissal).
78. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1988). Although the Code does not explicitly define the term
"contingent," courts have generally agreed on its meaning. See, e.g., In re Causcus Distribs.,
Inc., 83 B.R. 921, 928 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (defining contingent claim as "one which is
dependent on some future event for liability to attach"); see also 2 COLLIER, supra note 74,
§ 303.08[l 1][a], at 303-32 to -33 (expanding definition of contingent claim to require dependence on occurrence of future event and not merely on actions of debtor to dispute claim and
enter counterclaim).
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dispute 7 9 and that total more than $5000 of the value of any lien8 0
against the debtor's encumbered property can file either an involuntary petition for a chapter 7 liquidation 81 or a chapter 11 reorganization 8 2 against an eligible debtor.8 3 The debtor is entitled to contest
an involuntary petition within twenty days of the filing. 84 If the petition is timely controverted, the court must determine whether to
enter an order for relief, which serves to commence the case, or to
sustain the debtor's objections to the petition.8 5 A debtor may object to the petition on a number of grounds, 6 including (1) that an
insufficient number of creditors joined in the petition;8 7 (2) that one
or more of the petitioning creditors did not have standing to file; 88
79. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1988); see also 2 COLLIER, supra note 74, § 303.08[1 l][b], at
305-35 (noting that only since 1984 have petitioning creditors been required by statute to
show that their claims were not subject of "bona fide dispute"). The Code does not define the
term "bona fide dispute." For a discussion of the various definitional uses of the term, see
infra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (outlining several circuit court applications of term
"bona fide dispute").
80. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1988). Nothing in § 303 precludes a fully secured creditor
from joining in an involuntary petition. See Paradise Hotel Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 842
F.2d 47, 49 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that fully secured creditor is entitled to join in involuntary
bankruptcy petition with two creditors whose unsecured claims exceed $5000); In re Crabtree,
32 B.R. 837, 839 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (allowing secured creditor to act as petitioning
creditor if aggregate of other petitioning creditors' claims is at minimum $5000 above value
of any lien). But see Pleas Doyle & Assocs. v.James PlazaJoint Venture (In reJames PlazaJoint
Venture), 67 B.R. 445, 448 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986) (determining that fully secured creditors
are not entitled to commence involuntary bankruptcy case where no proof as to number of
creditors exists).
81. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
82. Id. §§ 1101-1174. Involuntary chapter 12 and 13 cases are not permitted under the
Code. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (stating that Code's limitations on criteria that
satisfy chapters 12 and 13 standards have been interpreted to not permit involuntary bankruptcy under these chapters).
83. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)-( (1988) (articulating qualifications for debtors under chapters 7 and I 1 of Bankruptcy Code). With narrow exceptions, § 303(a) of the Code permits the
filing of an involuntary petition against any debtor eligible for voluntary relief; involuntary
petitions may not be filed against commercial farmers, family farmers, or corporations that do
not qualify as moneyed, business, or commercial corporations. Id. § 303(a); see also id.
§ 303(k) (outlining requirements for commencing involuntary case against foreign bank).
84. Id. § 303(h) (setting forth 20-day contest period and mandating in addition that
court issue order of relief against debtor if petition is not timely filed); see FED. R. BANKR. P.
1011 (b) (alloting 20 days after service of summons for debtor to present defenses and objections to involuntary bankruptcy petitions, except where party is not within state, in which case
court will prescribe appropriate extended time limit); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1013(b) (granting
court power to enter order for relief if no defenses or pleadings have been filed within time
limits). But see Wynn v. Erikson, 889 F.2d 644, 646 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that delay between filing and granting of relief did not violate bankruptcy procedures requiring timely
orders).
85. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1988).
86. See 2 COLLIER, supra note 74, § 303.23, at 303-100 to -104 (providing complete list of
defenses against involuntary petition, including lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, and
debtor's denial that standard for commencement is satisfied).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (1988) (establishing requisite number of peutioning creditors
needed for commencement of involuntary case).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1988) (indicating that creditors may be barred from joining in
petition if claim is contingent or subject to bona fide dispute).
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or (3) that the standard for commencement of an involuntary case
89
had not been satisfied.
There are two statutory standards for commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case. The first is a "general failure to pay" debts
as they become due standard. 90 The second focuses on whether a
custodian has been appointed to oversee and take possession of the
debtor's assets. 9 1
The "general failure to pay" standard requires an allegation that
the debtor is generally not paying debts as they come due, with an
exception for certain disputed obligations. 92 Legislative history indicates that Congress intended to give courts considerable discretion in determining a debtor's "general failure to pay,"' 93 and courts
have applied a flexible standard that considers the totality of the circumstances. 9 4 Consistent with the analysis prescribed in the legislative history, 95 courts generally consider both the number and
89. See id. § 303(h) (establishing standards for commencement of involuntary case); see
also infra notes 90-108 (delineating current statutory standards for commencement of bankruptcy case).
90. Id. § 303(h)(1). This provision states:
(h) If the petition is not timely controverted, the court shall order relief against the
debtor in an involuntary case under the chapter under which the petition was filed.
Otherwise, after trial, the court shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary
case under the chapter under which the petition was filed, only if(1) the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due
unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute ....
Id (emphasis added). Congress amended this provision in 1984, removing debts that are
subject to bona fide dispute from the determination of whether the debtor meets this standard. See infra notes 99-102 (discussing types of controversies that constitute "bona fide"
dispute).
91. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(2) (1988). This provision allows for relief under the involuntary
bankruptcy petition in situations in which:
(2) within 120 days before the date of the filing of the petition, a custodian, other
than a trustee, receiver, or agent appointed or authorized to take charge of less than
substantially all of the property of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien
against such property, was appointed or took possession.
Id.
92. See id. § 303(h)(1) (excepting certain bona fide disputed debts from standard of
"general failure to pay").
93. See REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 30, pt. II, at 75 ("The scope and meaning of 'generally unable' and 'generally failed' are left to the courts; it is not possible to lay
down guidelines that will fit all cases."); see also In re B.D. Int'l Discount Corp., 701 F.2d 1071,
1075-76 (2d Cir.) (noting historic fluctuation in Congress over specific requirements of "general failure to pay" standard), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983).
94. See Bartmann v. Maverick Tube Corp., 853 F.2d 1540, 1546 (10th Cir. 1988) (confirming that bankruptcy court determination of whether creditors have met their burden
should examine all circumstances in balancing interests of creditors and debtors); In re
Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong, Inc., 779 F.2d 471, 475 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting
that standard of "generally not paying" was adopted to allow for greater flexibility in initiating involuntary cases by encouraging courts to consider totality of circumstances that existed
at time petition filed); see also 2 COLLIER, supra note 74, § 303.12[4], at 303-61 (describing
''generally not paying standard" as one that balances interests of debtor and creditor).
95.

See REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAws, supra note 30, pt. II, at 75 (indicating congres-

sional intent for courts to consider more than alleged debtor's inability to pay some portion of
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amount of unpaid claims, 9 6 as well as other factors such as the manner in which the debtor has conducted its financial affairs. 9 7 Absent
special circumstances, however, the majority of courts, will not find
that a debtor's failure to pay a single debt constitutes a "general"
98
failure to pay debts as they come due.
debts, and including other factors, such as number and amount of debts, in determination of
whether debtor is "generally unable to pay").
96. See, e.g., In re Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong, Inc., 779 F.2d at 475
(holding that debtor's failure to pay 26 creditors constituted failure to generally pay debt
despite debtor's consistency in making small monthly payments); In re B.D. Int'l Discount
Corp., 701 F.2d at 1076 (emphasizing congressional intent to have courts examine totality of
circumstances in considering debtor's ability to pay, but noting that standard's application has
not made courts' determination quick or easy); In re J.B. Lovell Corp., 80 B.R. 254, 255
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1987) (emphasizing nonpayment of few large debts as sufficient to meet
"generally not paying" standard even if debtor is paying most creditors); In re B.D. Int'l Discount Corp., 15 B.R. 755, 763 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stipulating that nonpayment of single
claim can constitute general nonpayment), aff'd, 24 B.R. 876 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd on
other grounds, 701 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983); In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 142 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980) (holding that determination of reasons why
alleged debtor is not paying debts is not relevant to examination of totality of circumstances),
aft'd, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Hill, 5 B.R. 79, 83 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980) (stating
that "generally not paying" standard should consider percentage of debt being paid to accommodate individuals who may inadvertently overlook minor claims); In re Kreidler Import
Corp., 4 B.R. 256, 260 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (holding that when amount of debt not being
paid constitutes significant portion of debtor's total liability, it is reasonable to find that
debtor has failed to meet "generally paying its debt" standard).
97. See, e.g., In re Bishop, Baldwin, Rewald, Dillingham & Wong, Inc., 779 F.2d at 475
(factoring debtor's involuntary closure of business into consideration of "generally not paying" standard); In re Covey, 650 F.2d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 1981) (weighing voluntary closure of
car dealership into balancing test of creditors' and debtor's interests); Boston Beverage Corp.
v. Turner, 81 B.R. at 747 (allowing evidence of involuntary debtor's inability to pay consumer
debt to be examined in determination of whether individual was generally paying debts as
they became due); In re Arriola Energy Corp., 74 B.R. 784, 790 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987) (examining nature and totality of involuntary debtor's financial affairs); see also In re Trans-High
Corp., 3 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980) (interpreting § 303(h)(1) of Bankruptcy Code to
mean that court order for relief is proper when debtor is not paying its debts "in the regular
course of business" and dismissing petition for failure to establish deviation from regular
course). See generally 2 COLLIER, supra note 74, § 303.12[4], at 303-64 (listing other criteria to
be considered in applying "generally not paying standard," including debtor's other financial
dealings, total debt compared with debtor's annual income, debtor's liquidity, debtor's voluntary business closure, and whether debtor has operated business and conducted financial matters with lack of good faith).
98. See Concrete Pumping Serv., Inc. v. King Constr. Co. (In re Concrete Pumping Serv.,
Inc.), 943 F.2d 627, 630 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that single creditor may force debtor into
involuntary bankruptcy when there is showing of fraud); Paradise Hotel Corp. v, Bank of Nova
Scotia, 842 F.2d 47, 51 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting in dicta that nonpayment of single debt is
insufficient proof of debtor's general default, absent "truly extraordinary circumstances");
Bankers Trust Co. v. Nordbrock (In re Nordbrock), 772 F.2d 397, 399 (8th Cir. 1985) (condemning use of bankruptcy courts as forum to collect single, isolated debt); First Florida Nat'l
Bank, N.A. v. Smith (In re Smith), 129 B.R. 262, 265 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (stating in dicta
that unless special circumstances are proved, failure to pay single debt will not prove failure to
pay debts generally); In re Causcus Distribs., Inc., 106 B.R. 890, 921 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989)
(noting in dicta that while courts recognize exceptions to granting of involuntary petitions, no
court has ever granted petition on basis of special circumstances alone); In re Gold Bond
Corp., 98 B.R. 128, 130 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1989) (discussing order for involuntary petition where
no allegation of fraud, trick, or scam arose); In re Charon, 94 B.R. 403, 406 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1988) (upholding view that bankruptcy courts will dismiss claim of sole creditor when there is
no showing of special circumstances); In re General Trading, Inc., 87 B.R. 216, 220 (Bankr.
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Since 1984, courts have been statutorily directed to exclude debts
that are subject to a "bona fide" dispute from the determination of
whether a debtor is generally paying its debts as they come due. 9 9
The Code does not explicitly define the term "bona fide" dispute.1 0 0 With minor variations, however, courts have concluded
that a debt is subject to a bona fide dispute if an objective basis exists from which to infer that a debtor's disagreement as to the validity of a debt is supported by either a substantial question of fact or a
meritorious issue of law.' 0 ' This standard does not require the
bankruptcy court to resolve the dispute, but only to identify its presence or absence.102
S.D. Fla. 1988) (dismissing claim where petitioning creditor failed to show right to relief); In re
J.B. Lovell Corp., 80 B.R. at 255 (finding that where failure to pay single claim is so substantial, debtor will be deemed to be "generally" not paying debts on appraisal of that claim
alone); In re B.D. Int'l Discount Corp., 15 B.R. at 763 (reiterating that nonpayment of single
claim, which is large portion of total debt, can constitute general nonpayment); In re 7 H Land
& Cattle Co., 6 B.R. 29, 34 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1980) (recognizing general rule that nonpayment
of single debt does not constitute general default except in circumstances in which (i) debtor

has only one creditor and that creditor would otherwise be without adequate remedy under
either state or federal law; or (ii) petitioner can show special circumstances, such as fraud,
trick, artifice, or scam on part of debtor); id. at 34 (denying motion to dismiss involuntary

petition filed by single creditor on grounds that genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether petitioner had adequate remedy at state law and as to whether special circumstances
warranted commencement of involuntary case); In re Hill, 5 B.R. at 83 (holding that although
small monthly payments were being made to creditors, large portion of debt remained unpaid, thus qualifying debtor as "generally" not paying debt); In re Kreidler Import Corp., 4
B.R. at 260 (holding that failure to make payments on 97% of company's debt satisfied "generally not paying" standard).
99. See supra note 90 (providing text of 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1)).
100. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 303(b)(1), 303(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (failing to provide
definition of "bona fide dispute").

101. See, e.g., In re Rimell (Rimell v. Mark Twain Bank), 946 F.2d 1363, 1365 (8th Cir.
1991) (following Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits in maintaining that "bona fide dispute"
exists when there is reasonable basis for dispute as to facts or law as related to debt), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 2275 (1992); LaScola v. US Sprint Communications, 946 F.2d 559, 563 (7th
Cir. 1991) (defining "bona fide dispute" as situation in which dispute exists between parties as
to some dispositive factual issue that can only be resolved by finder of fact); B.D.W. Assocs.,
Inc. v. Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 865 F.2d 65, 67 (3d Cir. 1989) (applying standard that
requires dismissal of suit where there exists genuine issue of material fact or contention of law
that is in dispute); Bartmann v. Maverick Tube Corp., 853 F.2d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir. 1988)
(specifying that courts need not determine likely outcome of dispute, only fact that dispute
exists); In re Busick, 831 F.2d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 1987) (formulating standard to determine if
"bona fide dispute" exists which objectively considers whether legal or factual dispute exists
regarding validity of debt). While courts of appeals have largely agreed on the definition of
the term "bona fide dispute," bankruptcy court decisions have not been so uniform. Compare
In re Johnston Hawks, Ltd., 49 B.R. 823, 828-31 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985) (applying balancing
approach that considered, inter alia, debtor's subjective good faith in raising dispute) with In re
Lough, 57 B.R. 993, 997 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986) (dismissing petitioner's complaint because
there existed bona fide dispute as to known facts) and In re Stroop, 51 B.R. 210, 212 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1985) (applying same standard as applicable to motion for summary judgment). See
generally 2 COLLIER, supra note 74, § 303.8[1 1][c], at 303-38 to -40 (highlighting various interpretations of "bona fide dispute," including disagreements as to law or facts, contrary claims
made in good faith, and disputes arising from proper application of law).
102. See Bartmann, 853 F.2d at 1544 (confirming view that court is only required to determine whether bona fide dispute exists); In re Busick, 831 F.2d at 750 (treating determination
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The second basis for involuntary commencement of a bankruptcy
case focuses on the appointment of a custodian to oversee and take
possession of the debtor's property. The Bankruptcy Code's definition of "custodian" includes situations in which an assignment of
the debtor's assets is made for the benefit of its creditors, 10 3 as well
as an appointment of an equitable receivership either for purposes
of enforcing a lien against the debtor's property or for the general
administration of such property. 10 4 Despite the seeming breadth of
this definition, 105 courts have limited its application to instances in
which the debtor has given up both possession and ownership of its
property. 10 6 Moreover, section 303(h)(2) of the Code limits this
ground for commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case to instances in which the custodian was appointed or took possession of
all or substantially all of the debtor's property 10 7 within 120 days
08
before the filing date of the petition.
as to existence of bona fide dispute as paramount concern of court). Nonetheless, some
courts appear unable to resist the temptation to resolve disputes determined to be without
merit. See In re Tikijian, 76 B.R. 304, 316 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that debtor's legal
defenses to liability on guarantee were without merit); In re B.D.W. Assocs., Inc., 75 B.R. 909,
914 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) (determining that accusations between sister corporation and
debtor were not indicative of bona fide dispute).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11)(B) (Supp. III 1991) (defining "custodian" to include "assignee
under a general assignment for the benefit of the debtor's creditors").
104. See id. § 101(11)(A) (defining "custodian" to include "receiver or trustee of any of
the property of the debtor appointed in a case or proceeding not under this title"). The
statute also explains that a custodian may be a:
trustee, receiver, or agent under applicable law, or under a contract, that is appointed or authorized to take charge of property of the debtor for the purpose of
enforcing a lien against such property, or for the purpose of general administration
of such property for the benefit of the debtor's creditors.
Id. § 101(10)(C). Thus, although it appears to have been derived from the fifth "act of bankruptcy" under the former Act (appointment of receiver), § 303(h)(2) also subsumes the fourth
"act of bankruptcy" (assignment for benefit of creditors) as well. See infra notes 116-23 and
accompanying text (delineating "acts of bankruptcy").
105. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 310 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6267 (stipulating that definition of custodian was intended to include
nonbankruptcy court officials having functions substantially similar to those of receiver or
trustee, such as prepetition liquidator of debtor's property); see also S. Rt:p. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5789 (indicating congressional
intent to include other officers of court in definition of custodian if their functions are substantially similar to those of receiver).
106. See In re B.D. Int'l Discount Corp., 15 B.R. 755, 765 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting
that attorney for debtor was not "custodian" although debtor had turned over all of its cash
assets to attorney as escrow agent), aff'd, 24 B.R. 876 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982), affyd on other
grounds, 701 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983); In re North County Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., 13 B.R. 393, 400 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (finding that auctioneer hired by
debtor to conduct sale of debtor's property and remit proceeds to debtor did not fall within
definitional requirements of custodian).
107. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(2) (1988); see 2 COLLIER, supra note 74, § 303.13, at 303-66 (indicating that § 303(h)(2) does not permit involuntary bankruptcy cases when appointment of
state court receiver and subsequent foreclosure amounts to significantly less than whole of
debtor's real property).
108. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(2) (1988). But see 2 COLLIER, supra note 74, § 8103.13, at 303-68
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By contrast, under the former Bankruptcy Act, the commencement standard' 09 for an involuntary liquidation proceeding" 0
against an eligible a debtor 12 required that there be three or more
petitioning creditors" 3 whose provable claims," 4 fixed as to liability
(indicating that failure to meet 120-day period does not preclude creditor from filing involuntary petition, as long as creditor proves that debtor does not pay debts as they come due); S.
REP. No. 989, supra note 105, at 34, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5820 (indicating that
intent of 120-day provision is to abolish concept of proving existence of "act" of bankruptcy
and create instead irrefutable presumption that debtor is unable to pay debts as they become
due).
109. Under the former Bankruptcy Act, Chapters I-VII governed liquidation cases. A liquidation case under Chapter VII of the Act should be distinguished from a reorganization
case commenced under Chapters X, XI, XII, or XIII of the Act. An involuntary reorganization case could commence under former Chapter X against an insolvent corporate debtor or
one unable to pay its debts as they matured, but only if (i) the debtor had committed an "act
of bankruptcy," (ii) a receiver or trustee, or indenture trustee or mortgagee under a mortgage, had taken possession of the greater portion of the debtor's property, (iii) a proceeding
to foreclose a lien against the greater portion of the property of the debtor had been brought,
or (iv) the debtor had been adjudged a bankrupt in a case pending under another chapter of
the Act. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 131(l)-(5), 52 Stat. 840, 886 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 531(1)-(5) (1976), repealedby Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2682 (specifying contents of creditors' or indenture trustees' petitions
for involuntary bankruptcy).
110. Under the former Bankruptcy Act, the filing of an involuntary petition differed distinctly from the adjudication of the debtor as a bankrupt. See MACLACHLAN, supra note 14,

§ 49, at 39-40 (explaining that adjudication of debtor as bankrupt may be entered over verdict for defendant due to supervisory powers of court, and indicating that such adjudication
usually quickly follows filing of voluntary petition); see also 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988) (distinguishing between filing of petition and entry of order for relief).
111. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 4b, 30 Stat. 544, 547 (codified as amended at
11 U.S.C. § 22 (1976)) (repealed 1978) (declaring that certain types of debtors are not amenable to involuntary liquidation or reorganization: farmers, wage earners, corporations that are
not moneyed, and business and commercial corporations owing debts amounting to $1000 or
more). Otherwise, any person who was eligible for voluntary relief under the chapter that the
petition was filed under could have been forced into a similar proceeding through the filing of
an involuntary petition. See MAcLACHLAN, supra note 14, § 36, at 27-28 (discussing types of
debtors that were amenable to involuntary bankruptcy under Act).
112. The former Act generally referred to a "debtor" as a "bankrupt," but Congress removed this terminology with enactment of the current Bankruptcy Code as part of the effort
to diminish the stigma associated with bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (Supp. III 1991)
(defining "debtor").
113. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 59b, 30 Stat. 544, 561 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 95(b) (1976)) (repealed 1978) (allowing three or more creditors with provable claims
against debtor to file involuntary petition, but if debtor had less than 12 creditors, then involuntary petition could have been brought under Act by single creditor holding provable claim
of $500 or more); see id. § 59e, 30 Star. at 561 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 95(e)) (repealed 1978)
(delineating rules governing computation of number of debtor's creditors for purposes of
determining whether three creditors were required to join in petition). Moreover, although
fully secured creditors, employees, and relatives of a debtor were excluded from the count of
creditors, they could have joined in the petition. See 2 COLLIER, supra note 74, § 303.06[3], at
303-14 (indicating that excluded creditors do not necessarily lack standing to join in involuntary petition).
114. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 63a, 30 Stat. 544, 562 (codified as amended at
11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1976)) (repealed 1978) (defining term "provable claim" as including fixed
liability, taxable costs against bankrupt, expressed or implied contracts, right to recover damages, and breach of contract); see also MAcLACHLAN, supra note 14, §§ 133-149, at 124-44 (pro-

viding general discussion of "provable claims"). The term "provable claim" has no
continuing relevance under the current Bankruptcy Code.
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and liquidated as to amount, aggregated $500 or more in excess of
the value of liens held by the creditors."15 Furthermore, this standard of commencement required proof by the petitioning creditors
that the debtor had committed an "act of bankruptcy" ' 16 within four
months prior to the filing of the petition."t 7 The former Bankruptcy
Act identified six different "acts of bankruptcy":
(1) fraudulent transfers under §§ 67 or 70 of the Act (concerning avoidance of certain statutory liens and other fraudulent
transfers); I8

(2) preferential transfers under § 60a of the Act;" 9
(3) the failure to vacate ajudicial lien in a timely manner, within
the later of thirty days after imposition of the lien or five days
before a scheduled judicial sale, if the debtor was insolvent dur-

120
ing that period;
12 1
(4) making a state law assignment for the benefit of creditors;
(5) the appointment under state law of a receiver of property
when the debtor was insolvent or unable to pay its debts; 22 and
(6) the admission in writing of an inability to pay debts and a
3
willingness to be adjudicated bankrupt.12

115. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 59b, 30 Stat. 544, 561 (codified as amended at I1
U.S.C. § 95(b) (1976)) (repealed 1978).
116. Id. § 3a, 30 Star. at 546 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1976)) (repealed
1978).
117. Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 696, § 3(b), 52 Stat. 840, 844 (1938) (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(2) (1976)) (repealed 1978); see I WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANK.
RUPTCY §§ 3.701-.707, at 522-32 (James W. Moore et al. eds., 14th ed. 1976) (explaining measurement of four month filing period and delineating filing periods for six "acts of
bankruptcy"). For a discussion of the complex tests imposed by the Act to determine when
each of the various acts of bankruptcy occur, see MACLACHLAN, supra note 14, § 61, at 51-54.
118. Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 696, § 3(a), 52 Stat. 840, 844 (1938) (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(1) (1976)) (repealed 1978); see also 4, 4A, 4B COLLIER, supra note 117,
§§ 67, 70 (detailing avoidance of certain statutory liens and other fraudulent transfers); MACLACHLAN, supra note 14, §§ 221-246, at 252-82 (explaining various aspects of fraudulent conveyances); MAcLAcHLAN, supra note 14, §§ 282-287, at 327-37 (providing general discussion
of transfers that actual creditors can avoid).
119. Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 696, § 3(b), 52 Stat. 840, 844 (1938) (codified as amended
at I1 U.S.C. § 21(a)(2) (1976)) (repealed 1978); 3 COLLIER, supra note 117, § 60, at 731-738.2;
see also MACLAcHLAN, supra note 14, §§ 247-277, at 283-318 (surveying preference law).
120. Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 696, § 3(c), 52 Stat. 840, 844 (1938) (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(3) (1976)) (repealed 1978); see 2 COLLIER, supra note 74, § 101.36, at 101120 to -121 (defining judicial liens as "lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or
other legal or equitable process or proceeding").
121. Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 696, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 840, 844 (1938) (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(4) (1976)) (repealed 1978); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text
(offering general definition of state law collective insolvency remedy of assignment for benefit
of creditors).
122. Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 696, § 3(e), 52 Stat. 840, 844 (1978) (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(5) (1976)) (repealed 1978); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text
(examining state law collective insolvency remedy of receivership).
123. Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 696, § 3(), 52 Stat. 840, 844 (1938) (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(6) (1976)) (repealed 1978).
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Although it was widely assumed by practitioners, courts, and com24
mentators alike that under the Bankruptcy Act only an insolvent
debtor could be involuntarily thrust into bankruptcy,1 25 a debtor's
solvency was actually a defense only to an involuntary petition
grounded on the first act of bankruptcy. 126 The misconception
arose because many of the acts of bankruptcy implicitly required a
showing of the debtor's insolvency as an element of their proof.
Thus, if petitioning creditors relied on the first act of bankruptcy
and alleged the debtor's commission of a constructive rather than
an actual fraudulent transfer,1 2 7 they were required to prove the
debtor's insolvency at the time of the alleged fraudulent transfer.
Creditors were also required to prove insolvency as an element of
the second (preferential transfers) 128 and fifth (appointment of receiver)1 29 acts of bankruptcy.
C. Voluntary Bankruptcy
Under the Bankruptcy Code, an eligible debtor 30 generally need
not allege or prove its insolvency or inability to pay debts in order to
124. See supra note 14 (defining insolvency).
125. Compare H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 105, at 323, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6279 (stating incorrectly that Act "requir[ed proof of] balance-sheet insolvency and an act of
bankruptcy") with S. REP. No. 989, supra note 105, at 34, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5820 (stating correctly that "[p]roof of the commission of an act of bankruptcy has frequently
required a showing that the debtor was insolvent on a 'balance-sheet' test when the act was
committed").
126. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 3(c), 30 Stat. 544, 547 (codified as amended at
11 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1976)) (repealed 1978) (stating that "[ilt shall be a complete defense to any
proceedings in bankruptcy instituted under thefirst subdivision of this section to allege and prove
that the party proceeded against was not insolvent as defined in this Act at the time of the
filing of the petition against him") (emphasis added). In West Co. v. Lea, 174 U.S. 590
(1899), the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase underscored above as permitting a debtor
to raise its solvency as a defense to an involuntary petition only when the petition had alleged
the first act of bankruptcy. Id at 597. In 1938, Congress codified this ruling by substituting
"under the first act of bankruptcy" for the ambiguous underscored phrase. Chandler Act,
Pub. L. No. 696, § 3(c), 52 Stat. 840, 845 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 21(a)(3) (1976))
(repealed 1978); 1 COLLIER, supra note 117, § 3.109[1], at 430 n.2. See generally Treiman, supra
note 27, at 197-210 (discussing damaging effect of "act" of bankruptcy on form, theory, and
operation of law).
127. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 67d, 30 Stat. 544, 564 (codified as amended at
11 U.S.C. § 107(d) (1976)) (repealed 1978) (including insolvency among possible elements of
constructive fraudulent transfer).
128. Compare id. § 60, 30 Stat. at 562 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 96) (repealed
1978) (requiring proof that transferee had reasonable cause to know of debtor's insolvency)
with 11 U.S.C. § 547(0 (1988) (establishing rebuttable presumption that debtor is insolvent
within 90 days preceding filing of petition for purposes of preference provision).
129. But see 1 COLLIER, supra note 117, § 3.505(1], at 504-06 (indicating that after 1938
amendment to fifth act of bankruptcy, petitioning creditors could commence involuntary case
against debtor whose property was in possession of receiver when debtor was either insolvent
or in general default).
130. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(a)-(g) (1988) (detailing characteristics of entities that constitute
"debtors" for purposes of specific chapters under title 11).
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commence a voluntary bankruptcy case. 131 A voluntary case may be
initiated merely by the filing of a petition by the debtor. 13 2 Regardless of whether the petition is submitted by an individual or a Fortune 500 company, or whether the debtor is commencing a chapter
7 liquidation or a chapter 11 reorganization, a petition is extremely
simple. It need only state the debtor's name, address, and other
33
limited descriptive information.'
The simplicity of the current Bankruptcy Code provisions governing commencement of a voluntary case stand in contrast to the
complex requirements of the former Bankruptcy Act. While section
4a of the former Act broadly provided that "[a]ny [eligible] person
...shall be entitled to the benefits of this Act as a voluntary bankrupt,"' 34 commencing a voluntary case under one of its reorganization chapters was more complex.' 3 5 Under the Act, each reorganization petition required an allegation that the debtor was either
insolvent or unable to pay its debts as they matured. 136 A Chapter X
reorganization petition was required to include:
1. [a statement declaring] that the corporation was insolvent or
unable to pay its debts as they matured;
2. the applicable jurisdictional facts requisite under the Chapter;
3. the nature of the business of the corporation;
4. the assets, liabilities, capital stock, and financial condition of the
corporation;
5. the nature of all pending proceedings affecting the property of
the corporation known to the petitioner or petitioners and the
court in which they were pending;
6. the status of any plan of reorganization, readjustment, or liqui131. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988) (establishing sole requirement for commencement of
voluntary bankruptcy case as filing of petition by debtor) with id. § 303(h)(1) (requiring evidence that debtor fails to pay debts as they come due as prerequisite for commencement of
involuntary bankruptcy case); see also 2 COLLIER, supra note 74, § 301.13, at 301-26 (stating
that voluntary petition of bankruptcy under chapters 7, 11, 12, and 13 does not require allegation of insolvency). But see 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (1988) (requiring that municipality plead insolvency to be eligible for voluntary bankruptcy under chapter 9).
132. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
133. See FED. R. BANKR. P. Form 1 (setting out general form that debtors filing voluntary
petition should follow).
134. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 4a, 30 Stat. 544, 547 (codified as amended at II
U.S.C. § 22(a) (1976)) (repealed 1978); see also id.§ 18f, 30 Stat. at 551 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. § 41(0) (repealed 1978) (providing that filing of voluntary petition operates as
adjudication of bankruptcy with same force and effect as decree of adjudication); id. § 59a, 30
Stat. at 561 (codified as amended at I1 U.S.C. § 95(a)) (repealed 1978) ("Any qualified person may file a petition [under Chapter VII to be adjudged a voluntary bankrupt.").
135. See supra note 109 (discussing distinction between liquidation and reorganization
chapters under Bankruptcy Act of 1898).
136. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 130(1), 323, 423, 623, 52 Stat. 840, 881, 907,
918, 932 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 530, 723, 823, 1023 (1976)) (repealed 1978)
(requiring debtor to allege insolvency or inability to pay debts under reorganization Chapters
X, XI, XII, and XIII of former Act).
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dation affecting the property of the corporation, pending either in
connection with or without any judicial proceeding;
7. the specific facts showing the need for relief under this Chapter
and why adequate relief could not be obtained under Chapter IX
of the Act; and
8. the desire of the petitioner or petitioners that a plan be
37
effected.'
Moreover, the court was required to determine whether the petition
had been filed in good faith before entering an order approving the
Chapter X petition.13 8 A petition under Chapter IX, XI, or XIII was
less cumbersome. In addition to alleging the debtor's insolvency or
inability to pay its debts as they matured, the Chapters XI and XIII
petitions needed only a statement of the debtor's intent to propose
a plan under the applicable provisions. 3 9 Finally, a Chapter XII petition required the debtor to set forth the terms of the proposed
0
arrangement.14

II.

THE COMMON POOL PROBLEM AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS

A common pool problem can generally be described as a situation
in which the self-interested actions of individuals fail to achieve a

socially optimal result. 14 ' This general statement, however, does
not distinguish a common pool problem from many other economic
disequilibria. 14 2 Economists apply a more rigorous definition: A
137. Id. § 130(1-8), 52 Stat. at 886 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 530(1-8)) (repealed 1978).
138. l § 141, 52 Stat. at 887 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 541) (repealed 1978).
139. A petition under Chapter XI required the debtor to allege insolvency and to either
declare its intention to reach an arrangement to pay its debts or set forth the provisions of
such an arrangement to pay debts. Id § 323, 52 Stat. at 907 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 723) (repealed 1978). A petition under Chapter XIII required the debtor to allege
insolvency, as well as declare a desire to effect a composition, extension, or both, out of future
earnings or wages. Id. § 623, 52 Stat. at 932 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1023) (repealed 1978).
140. Id § 423, 52 Stat. at 918 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 823) (repealed 1978).
141. SeeJACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMrrs, supra note 5, at 10 n.9, 12-14 (describing common
pool problems and situations in which each individual is motivated by self-interest).
142. Another example of a situation in which the self-interested actions of individuals do
not achieve a socially optimal result is the prisoners' dilemma game. The prisoners' dilemma
involves two coconspirators who are taken prisoner for committing a crime. In the course of
events, the prosecutor solicits a confession from one or both of the prisoners. Before the
arrest, the prisoners, having foreseen this eventuality, have sworn to remain loyal to each
other by denying involvement. If only one prisoner confesses, then the authorities will strike
a deal with the cooperative prisoner, prosecuting and in turn convicting the other. Under this
scenario the cooperative prisoner goes free and the noncooperative prisoner receives a sixmonth jail term. If both prisoners confess, both will be held for three-month terms. These
three-month terms result because the prosecutor cannot let both go free if both confess; instead, the prosecutor is likely to either strike a plea bargain or recommend leniency as a quid
pro quo for the prisoners' cooperation. Of course, nothing prevents the prisoners from sticking to their nonbinding oath of loyalty. Their attorneys inform them that by sticking together
and denying involvement, the prosecutor's case will be weakened by the lack of corroborative
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common pool problem exists when negative production or contestimony, resulting in a one-month term of imprisonment for each prisoner. A matrix of the
games' possible results is provided in Table 1. The entries in each cell of the matrix represent
the "utility" that prisoners A and B would assign to the various possible results. This "utility"
is assumed to be the negative of the length of their prison terms.
Table 1
The Prisoners' Dilemma
Prisoner B
Confess
Confess

Deny

R= -3, R= -3
Reward for
mutual cooperation

T= 0, S= -6
Temptation to
defect and
sucker's payoff

S= -6, T= 0
Sucker's payoff
and temptation to
defect

P= -I, P= -I
Punishment for
mutual defection

Prisoner A
Deny

Note: The payoffs to Prisoner A are listed first in each cell of the
matrix.
To analyze Table 1, the reader should place him or herself in the position of prisoner A,. If
prisoner B denies involvement in the crime, prisoner A will be better off cooperating, and A
will receive no prison term. If prisoner B cooperates, then prisoner A is still better off cooperating, because the prison term will be only three as opposed to six months. Thus, regardless
of prisoner B's action, prisoner A is better off cooperating. The same result follows from
parallel analysis of prisoner B's position. Game theorists describe this cooperative strategy as
"dominant," meaning that there is only one optimal choice of strategy for each player, no
matter what the other player does. But this result is Pareto inefficient because both prisoners
would be better off if neither cooperated with the prosecution. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE ECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 15-16 (2d ed. 1990) (stating that Pareto efficiency
occurs "if there is no alternative allocation that leaves everyone at least as well off and makes
some people strictly better off"). Thus, a necessary characteristic of the prisoners' dilemma
game is that it involves a dominant equilibrium that is Pareto inefficient.
There is no magic in the assumption that the prisoners will receive three-month terms if
both cooperate with the prosecutor, as opposed to one-month terms if neither cooperates.
Nearly any values can be assigned to these potential outcomes, so long as the temptation to
defect (T) is greater than the reward for mutual cooperation (R), which in turn is worth more
than punishment for mutual defection (P), which is finally worth more than the sucker's payoff(S). By definition, then, a prisoners' dilemma requires that the relative order of the payoff
matrix must be such that T > R > P > S. This relationship must be true in order for the
game result to be both dominant and Pareto inefficient. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUmON OF
COOPERATION 9-10 (1984).
The "dilemma" in the prisoners' dilemma game results because in a noncooperative version of the game, there is no way for the two prisoners to coordinate their actions. The prosecutor has separated the prisoners and made it impossible for them to bind one another to the
agreement not to confess. Either prisoner can deny involvement and hope that the other does
the same, but, especially in the first go around, one prisoner denying involvement runs the
risk that the other will confess. This risk may result in a six-month prison term. Because of
the players' inability to coordinate their actions, the prisoners' dilemma is described by game
theorists as a noncooperative game. See generally RussELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 138,
154 (1982) (describing prisoners' game as strategically rational because each player must take
other's rationality into account); VARIAN, supra, at 465-68, 564-65 (setting out terms of prisoners' dilemma game and discussing conflict between collective action and self-interest).
Jackson initially described the decision between individual and collective collection remedies as analogous to the prisoners' dilemma in that "[e]ach creditor, unless assured of the
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sumption externalities 143 caused by the use of exhaustible resources
cannot be resolved by the definition of property rights. 144 Examples
of common pool problems abound. Baird and Jackson raise the example of a pond of fish owned in common. 145 Collective efforts to
other's cooperation, has an incentive to take advantage of individual collection remedies, and
to do so before the other creditor acts. Unless each creditor individually attempts to 'beat
out' the other, that creditor will fare worse than the other." Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 5, at 862. But, like the prisoners' dilemma, both creditors would
be better off if they cooperated with one another and commenced a collective proceeding. See
id. at 866-67 (stating that it is in creditors' joint interest to act collectively). A matrix of the
possible results of the creditors' dilemma game is given in Table 2. The entries in each cell of
the matrix represent the utility that creditors A and B would assign to the various possible
results; utility is assumed to be the negative of the amount they would receive in collecting
claims against the debtor.
Table 2
The Creditors' Dilemma
Creditor B
Collective

Individual

Collective

R= Y/2, R= Y/2

T= 0, S= X

Individual

S= X, T= 0

P= X/2, P= X/2

Creditor A

Note: The payoffs to Creditor A are listed first in each cell of the
matrix.
If creditor B pursues individual remedies against a debtor that owes both A and B, then
creditor A will prefer to do the same, because under the assumptions inherent in the common
pool model, A and B have an equal chance at winning the race to the courthouse. If B instead
chooses collective action, then A will still prefer to pursue individual remedies because this
enables A to recover the full amount of its debt against the debtor, as opposed to sharing pro
rata with B and thus receiving a lesser amount. In this matrix, Y = the value of dividends
from the bankruptcy estate; X = the value of dividends received pursuant to individual state
remedies. Here, X > 1 /2 > X/2 > 0. In the right lower cell (where both creditors A and B
pursue individual remedies), the X/2, X/2 values are not certain, but rather represent the
probability of recovery that each creditor faces before pursuing its individual remedy. Once
this process is complete, either A or B will be paid in full (depending on the priority rule
followed in the relevant state), while the other creditor receives nothing.
143. See VARIAN, supra note 142, at 537 (indicating that consumption externality occurs
when one agent-individual consumer or business firm-is directly affected by another
agent's production or consumption and similarly, that production externality arises when production possibilities of one agent are influenced by choices of another agent).
144. See VARIAN, supra note 142, at 552-55 (indicating that common pool problem characterized by production and consumption externalities arises where common resource is not
protected by either property rights or by clear, cohesive legal system); Friedman, supra note
19, at 855 (describing common pool problem in natural resource development context of
tendency toward overproduction that arises when competitors exploit exhaustible resources
in which no one has protected rights).
145. BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 39-43 (using
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mine for diamonds or drill for oil or natural gas also present consumption externalities. 4 6 The use of radio, television, and micro147
wave frequencies similarly can create production externalities.
To say that a negative consumption externality exists means only
48
that one's consumption prejudices another's ability to consume.
With respect to the mining of a single vein of minerals, each additional square foot mined by one spells less ground available for
search by the others. In terms of a common pool of fish, each angler's catch represents a diminution of the pool that is available for
those who fish later in the day.
common pool of fish analogy to illustrate ways in which bankruptcy law encourages creditors
to resist self-interest and instead act in concert); see a/Oo JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note
5, at 11 (explaining problems created by innate self-interest of individuals "fishing" in common pool). Much has been written about the common pool problems found in the fishing
industry. See, e.g., FRANCIS T. CHRISTY, JR. & ANTHONY SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTHI IN
OCEAN FISHERIES; SOME PROBLEMS OF GROWTH AND ECONOMICS ALLOCATION 6-16 (1965) (providing overview of fishing as common pool problem); E.N. Anderson, Jr., A Malaysian Tragedy
ofthe Commons, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL
RESOURCES 327, 328-29 (BonnieJ. McCay &James M. Acheson eds., 1987) (describing common pool problems encountered by West Malaysian fishing industry during 1970s); Frederick
W. Bell, Technological Externalities and Common Property Resources: An Empirical Study of the U.S.
Northern Lobster Fishery, 80J. POL. ECON. 148, 148-51 (1972) (arguing for government regulation of fishing industry to cure economic inefficiencies resulting from common pool
problems); H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62
J. POL. ECON. 124, 124, 135-42 (1954) (applying theories of natural resource conservation to
fishing industry); Ralph Turvey, Optimization and Suboptimization in Fishery Regulation, 54 AM.
EcoN. REV. 64, 72-76 (1964) (arguing that fishing industry should explore alternative methods of regulation rather than relying on restriction of access to resolve common pool
problem).
146. See, e.g., MORRIS A. ADELMAN, THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET 43, 44 (1972) (discussing "rule of capture" in oil fields of East Texas and asserting that such competition in
petroleum industry is peculiar to United States); MELVIN G. DE CHAZEAU & ALFRED E. KAHN,
INTEGRATION AND COMPETITION IN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 61, 62 (1959) (describing competition in petroleum industry as speed race with success belonging to fastest participant);
ANTHONY SCOTT, NATURAL RESOURCES: THE ECONOMICS OF CONSERVATION 3-39 (2d ed. 1973)
(applying economic theory to conservation of natural reserves); Paul Davidson, Public Policy
Problems of the Domestic Crude Oil Industry, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 85, 85-86 (1963) (proposing
guidelines for conservation of domestic oil resources); Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins,
ContractualResponses to the Common Pool: Prorationingof Crude Oil Production, 74 AM. ECON. REV.
87, 87, 90-97 (1984) (analyzing ways in which number and heterogeneity of firms affect relative bargaining power of competing firms in petroleum industry).
147. See Arthur S. De Vany et al., A Property System for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic
Spectrum: A Legal-Economic-EngineeringStudy, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1499, 1499-1501 (1969) (proposing potential use of market mechanisms as alternatives to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations and articulating system of property rights for spectrum usage).
148. Externalities can be either positive or negative. That is, the effect that one individual's consumption has on another's consumption may be either good or bad. With common
pool problems, however, the externality is necessarily negative. See VARIAN, supra note 142, at
537 (citing air pollution or neighbor's loud music, as opposed to neighbor's flower gardens,
as examples of negative and positive externalities, respectively).
Negative production externalities may cause common pool problems. Conflicting radio
and television transmissions exemplify such production externalities. Bankruptcy, on the
other hand, clearly resolves a consumptive-type common pool problem. See id. at 552-55 (defining negative externalities as occurring when choices of one firm are influenced by choices
of another, and indicating that legal system may provide solution to many common pool
problems).
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Common pool problems necessarily involve exhaustible goods.
In the case of inexhaustible goods, there are by definition always
enough to "go around." With inexhaustible goods, one person's
consumption cannot possibly affect another's; one individual's selfinterested actions will not conflict either with another's self-interest
or, for that matter, with the interest of the collective. For example,
there can be no common pool problem with bottomless wells of oil
or unlimited quantities of fish. The mere identification of exhaustible resources, however, does not mean that a common pool problem exists. Scarce resources indicate only the potential for such a
problem. Until the use of scarce resources results in an externality,
no common pool problem arises. 149
Moreover, externalities caused by the use of exhaustible resources
do not alone identify a common pool problem. If property rights to
the resources can be defined, then the common pool problem is irrelevant because it is easily resolved through private ownership of
the affected goods. 150 Thus, common pool problems must involve
public goods. 151 Property interests in nonpublic goods may be easily defined and the externalities caused by use of those goods can be
resolved through the market. 152
Public goods are those goods for which consumption cannot be
made exclusive; public goods must be provided in the same amount
or at the same time to all affected consumers or not at all. 153 Classic

examples of public goods include roads, lighthouses, and a system
of national defense. A common pool of oil or of fish are quasi-pub149. For example, ten fish swimming in a restaurant aquarium do not pose a common
pool problem, although the fish constitute an exhaustible resource, until eleven or more diners order fish. Even then no common pool problem results if there exists some way to define
property rights in the fish other than by a rule of capture. See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text (discussing use of property rights to define access to public goods and thereby
prevent common pool problems).
150. See VARIAN, supra note 142, at 541, 552-55 (citing property rights as mechanism to
cure inefficient use of common resources and contending that externalities cause common
pool problems where property rights are poorly defined).
151. See VARIAN, supra note 142, at 559 (defining public goods as goods "that must be
provided in the same amount to all affected consumers"). Russell Hardin refines this definition somewhat when he notes that "[p]ublic goods are defined by two properties: jointness of
supply and impossibility of exclusion." HARDIN, supra note 142, at 17. Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser provide a slightly different definition, suggesting that public goods are identified by three attributes: (i) nonprovision or gross underprovision by individuals if left to
themselves; (ii) nonrivalry to the good in that one person's use does not reduce another's
consumption; and (iii) nonexcludability. STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 1, at 306-07.
152. See HARDIN, supra note 142, at 16-37, 50-66 (contrasting public and private goods in
terms of collective action); RichardJ. Sweeney et al., Market Failure, the Common Pool Problem,
and Ocean Research, 17J.L. & EcON. 179, 181 (1974) (arguing that regulation may be appropriate for fisheries but that private market is best solution for common pool problems in oil and
manganese production).
153. See supra note 151 (providing several commentators' definitions of "public goods").
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lic goods because ownership of these items is defined by a rule of
capture. That is, no individual owns the oil in a commonly owned
vein until the pool is tapped; 54 no individual owns fish until they
are caught. 15 5 The simplest method of resolving these common
pool problems is for the pool of oil or pond of fish to be owned by a
single individual. This solution is unavailable with purely public
goods such as radio wave frequencies, however, because it is not
156
possible to exclude all interferences with this type of good.
Baird and Jackson are correct in contending that bankruptcy may
be relied upon to resolve common pool problems. 157 Jackson is
wrong to suggest, however, that creditors' common pool problems
arise, thus bankruptcy should be available, only when a debtor is
balance-sheet insolvent. This criterion is both too narrow and too
broad a description of the circumstances under which creditors' collection efforts can cause consumption externalities that cannot be
resolved through the definition of property rights. The following
section examines a number of common pool problems that Jackson,
due to his focus on insolvency, has failed to consider.
A.

Mere Potentialfor PrjudiceAmong Creditors Does Not Create a
Common Pool Problem

A debtor's balance-sheet insolvency seemingly presents creditors
with a common pool problem because the debtor has too few assets
to repay all of its creditors in full. Insolvency alone, however, is not
154. See, e.g., Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 671 (1895) (ruling that lease of 10 acres of
land with mineral privileges is valid with respect to natural gas contained in part under adjacent real estate); Clark Oil Producing Co. v. Hodel, 667 F. Supp. 281, 290 (E.D. La. 1987)
(defining "law of capture" as principle that landowner may legally take oil and gas from his or
her land even if in so doing landowner takes oil and gas from neighbor's land); Anderson v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 699 P.2d 1023, 1028-29 (1985) (holding that non-native gas in underground reservoir, absent contract, must be reprocessed in order to separate from real estate
and transform into personalty).
155. See Young v. Hichens, 115 Eng. Rep. 228, 229-31 (Q.B. 1844), reprinted in OLIN L.
BROWDER, JR. ET AL., BASIC PROPERTY LAW 24-26 (4th ed. 1984) (finding for defendant in
action for trespass where plaintiff had encircled fish in nets but failed to fully enclose them
and then had left for many days; holding that capture had not occurred, possession was incomplete, and defendant had right to take fish).
156. See ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 3-5 (1973)
(examining spectrum allocation and FCC regulation of radio and television frequencies for
public use).
157. See BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 39-42 (suggesting that purpose of bankruptcy law is, in part, resolution of common pool problems).
Federal bankruptcy law is not the exclusive method for resolving debtor-based common pool
problems, however. Any collective creditors' remedy will suffice. See Carlson, Creditors' Bargain, supra note 31 (arguing that state law has communitarian elements of creditor equality
and thus comparison of state law to "state of nature" or libertarian "zone of freedom" where
"first in time is first in line" is inaccurate); Carlson, supra note 10, at 1346-47 (criticizing
Jackson's assumption that state law remedies involve individual creditor's sale on ground that
state law also provides creditors with collective remedies).
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indicative of the problem. Although the existence of exhaustible resources identifies a potential for prejudice to creditors, it does not
by itself indicate the occurrence of a common pool problem. Consider the following debtors in varying states of financial difficulty.
1.

Insolvent, but paying debts as they come due

Assume a debtor that is insolvent, with liabilities exceeding its assets, but one that has kept current on its loan obligations by paying
off indebtedness out of earnings. Many individual debtors are insolvent when their liabilities are compared to their assets, but at the
same time, able to pay debts out of regular income. For example, an
individual debtor may be insolvent in that the value of its nonexempt assets is small in comparison to its indebtedness, but nevertheless able to hold ajob that pays enough to meet bills. In community
property states, an individual debtor may be deemed insolvent because aggregate community and individual liabilities exceed aggregate community and individual property, but that debtor may still
be able to pay individual obligations out of earnings. 5 8 In addition,
a general partner of an insolvent partnership may also be found to
be insolvent once its portion of the partnership's debts are added to
its personal balance sheet. 159 If, however, the general partner is
able to pay its individual obligations out of earnings, then it will not
be considered unable to pay debts as they come due. It is also not
uncommon for business debtors to be insolvent in the balance-sheet
sense of the word but able to meet current obligations out of revenue. For example, firms in the business of providing services to
their clients may be insolvent because they own only a few assets
and owe more than the value of what they own. These firms may be
able to pay current obligations out of earnings, however, because
the business' success is unrelated to its asset base.
When an insolvent debtor is able to repay loan obligations out of
current earnings, its creditors do not face a common pool problem.
Under these circumstances, the debtor's exhaustible assets present
only a potential for prejudice to creditors' rights.1 60 If this insolvent
158. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(7) (Supp. III 1991) (defining "community claim" as claim which
arose before commencement of bankruptcy case and for which debtor's community property
is liable, whether or not such property existed at commencement of case); 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(2) (1988) (including community property in estate created by commencement of
bankruptcy case).
159. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(B) (Supp. III 1991) (defining "insolvent" as applied to partnership debtor); see also 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1988) (providing trustee of partnership estate with right
to proceed against general partners for unpaid debts of partnership estate).
160. Cf Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy
System, 1982 Wisc. L. REv. 311, 325 (arguing that desirability of continued operation of business does not depend solely on business' profitability, ability to pay debts, amount of debt
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debtor were to default on several of its obligations, a common pool
problem would still not arise, so long as pursuit by the few wronged
creditors did not affect the debtor's ability to repay other obligations out of earnings or otherwise cause the debtor's particularized
default to become a general default. 16 1 Strategic behavior by creditors may, however, encourage them to "jump the gun" in their race
to pursue individual collection remedies in advance of other creditors. 16 2 As a result, a debtor that is perceived by its creditors as
unable to pay its debts as they come due may truly become unable
to pay all of its creditors within a short period of time. Until that
time, however, a debtor's balance-sheet insolvency creates the mere
potential for a common pool problem. The current bankruptcy provisions are consistent with this analysis in that they do not permit
owed, or relationship between amount of debt and value of assets, but may instead be influenced by public policy justifications).
161. See id at 372 (arguing that choice of pursuing individual or collective remedies
should turn on whether or not debtor's business is "viable"). LoPucki defines "viable" as
"the present value of the future excess of revenues over expenses other than interest on debt
already incurred and depreciation on assets already owned exceeds the resale value of the
assets." Id LoPucki does not propose that the standard for commencement of an involuntary
petition be changed to a viability standard from the current "general failure to pay" standard,
which may or may not coincide with a debtor's viability. See id. at 329-31 (discussing situations
in which issue of viability is relevant to creditors' decision to pursue individual remedies).
Rather, LoPucki argues that creditors ought to be encouraged to file involuntary petitions
through a bounty system that awards successful petitioners with a statutory priority in bankruptcy. Id. at 363-68. Because I have little confidence that creditors are able to assess a
debtor's viability and am uncertain that the number of involuntary filings is too low, I have not
embraced his proposal. See Block-Lieb, supra note 30, at 861 (arguing that number of involuntary bankruptcy petitions filed is not too small considering congressional intent to encourage
creditors to resolve difficulties outside of bankruptcy where resolution isquicker and less
expensive).
162. Commentators explain this phenomenon as presenting "a classic example of the
game theorists' 'prisoner's dilemma.'" Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra
note 5, at 862. Jackson notes:
Unless each creditor individually attempts to 'beat out' the other, that creditor will
fare worse than the other. Yet this race not only creates costs for the individual
creditor (such as frequent checking of the courthouse records for evidence of actions
against the debtor by other creditors), it is also likely to lead to a premature termination of a debtor's business, because each creditor will consider only that creditor's
own advantage from racing, instead of the disadvantages imposed on creditors
collectively.
Id. at 862; see also Baird, World Without Bankruptcy, supra note 6, at 183 ("Without a collective
proceeding, each creditor will tend to rush towards the debtor's assets when the best course is
patience."). William Whitford has also joined the debate, explaining:
[P]riority rules encourage an unsecured creditor, faced with an insolvent, or potentially insolvent debtor, to resort to coercive execution more quickly than would be
necessary if the priority rules did not favor the 'early bird.'. . .To creditors as a class,
quick coercive execution is likely to be counterproductive.... Yet a particular creditor who for any of these reasons delays coercive execution runs the risk that another
creditor will initiate coercive execution, collect what money can be collected and
leave the other creditors with a considerably diminished opportunity to collect
anything.
Whitford, supra note 33, at 1067-68. For a detailed discussion of the prisoners' dilemma game
as applied to debtor/creditor law, see supra note 142.
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creditors to commence an involuntary bankruptcy case based solely
on a debtor's balance-sheet insolvency.
2.

Insolvent, and not paying debts as they come due

Assume an insolvent debtor, but now assume that the debtor has
defaulted on one or perhaps many of its loan obligations. 163 Because the debtor has defaulted, the wronged creditors may coerce
repayment by forcing a sale of the debtor's assets. Because the
debtor is insolvent, however, creditors will not be paid in full
through pursuit of their individual collection remedies. As discussed in the sections that follow, pursuit by even one creditor of an
individual collection remedy may prejudice the debtor's other creditors' rights to payment, depending on the nature of the debtor's
assets and the cause of the default. 164 Irrespective of the composition of a debtor's assets and earning capacity, the creditors of an
163. What of an insolvent debtor, whose ability to pay debts as they come due is sure to
expire? Are creditors prejudiced by an insolvent debtor's payment of current obligations
when the debtor is sure to default in the near future? Probably not. Creditors of an insolvent
debtor in general default are prejudiced by pursuit of individual collection remedies because
the potential for prejudice created by the debtor's balance-sheet insolvency becomes actual
when multiple creditors proceed against these scarce assets. See BAIRD & JACKSON, CASES,
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 39-41 (discussing need for self-restraint among
creditors of insolvent debtor and explaining consequences when self-restraint fails). When
the insolvent debtor has not yet defaulted generally on its obligations, this same prejudice
does not exist. That the prejudice is probable or even imminent does not render this potential for prejudice a common pool problem, although the likelihood that the prejudice will be
realized is heightened.
Under the current bankruptcy provisions, a debtor will be in general default only after its
obligations mature and the debtor fails to pay some or all of them. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1)
(1988) (requiring judge to determine that debtor is generally not paying debts as such debts
become due and that debts are not subject to bona fide dispute before ordering relief against
debtor in involuntary case). Thus, the current "general failure to pay" standard would not
permit creditors to commence an involuntary bankruptcy case in the hypothesized instance of
an insolvent debtor who is presently paying its debts. This is because the current standard
measures a debtor's failure, not its inability, to pay debts as they come due. Compare REPORT
ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS, supra note 30, pt. II, at 74-75 (proposing involuntary case commencement when debtor is "generally unable to pay his [or her] current liabilities as they become
due" or "generally failed to pay his [or her] debts as they become due") and H.R. 8200, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(h)(1) (1977) (proposing that standard for commencement of involuntary bankruptcy case include allegation that "debtor is generally unable to pay such debtor's
debts as such debts become due") and S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 303(h) (1978) (proposing that grounds for commencement of involuntary case include fact that debtor "is generally
unable to pay or has failed to pay a major portion [of its debts as they come due]") with I1
U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (1988) (reflecting evolution in congressional thinking with respect to involuntary commencement standard by presenting "generally not paying such debtor's debts
as such debts become due" test as new standard).
164. Whether creditors of an insolvent debtor will suffer from even the first collection
effort will depend on both the nature of the debtor's assets (that is, whether the assets are
replenishable or not) and the cause for the debtor's default (that is, whether the debtor is
unable to pay debts because it has lost its job or ceased operations, or simply because creditors are depleting its scarce liquid resources more quickly than it can replace them). See infra
notes 172-87 and accompanying text (discussing causes and composition of bankruptcy and
their interrelationship with common pool problem that creditors will face).
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insolvent debtor that is generally not paying its debts as they come
due will be prejudiced by other creditors' collection efforts. 16 5 In
the event of prejudice, all the debtor's creditors will be better off if
the debtor's assets are liquidated in a collective proceeding in which
the proceeds of the liquidation are divided equally among the creditors. Thus, creditors' pursuit of individual collection remedies in
this instance presents a common pool problem.
The current bankruptcy provisions are consistent with this analysis. One of the standards for commencement of an involuntary case
is a debtor's general failure to pay debts as those debts come due.' 6 6
Courts have interpreted this standard flexibly, and in extraordinary
circumstances have held that the debtor "generally is not paying its
debts as they come due" as a result of the debtor's failure to pay a
67
single debt. 1
3.

Solvent, but not paying debts as they come due

Under current Bankruptcy Code provisions, petitioning creditors
are entitled to commence involuntary bankruptcy cases based solely
on debtors' general default.16 8 A debtor in general default need not
be insolvent to be subject to a creditor's involuntary bankruptcy petition. 169 The question remains as to whether the creditors of a solvent debtor that is not paying debts as they come due face a
common pool problem.
Consider a solvent debtor that owns assets in excess of its liabilities, but that, for one reason or another, cannot pay current obligations out of earnings. Perhaps the debtor is a business and is
suffering from a seasonal cash-flow problem. Perhaps the debtor is
an individual who has incurred an unexpected medical expense or
lost a job. Creditors of a solvent debtor in general default are
prejudiced by other creditors' pursuit of individual collection remedies, but not solely, as Jackson contends, because a debtor's cash
poverty is indicative of balance-sheet insolvency.' 7 0 Creditors of a
solvent debtor in general default face a common pool problem, both
165. See infra notes 191-245 and accompanying text (analyzing effect of collective versus
individual creditors' remedies in relation to common pool problem).
166. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (1988).
167. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text (describing courts' "totality of circumstances" test to be applied in determination of insolvency for purposes of involuntary bankruptcy proceeding).
168. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (1988) (describing debtor's failure to pay debts as they
mature as valid basis upon which creditors may file involuntary petitions).
169. Id.
170. Cf JACKsoN, LoGiC AND LIMiTs, supra note 5, at 198 (stating that liquidity crisis,
where assets exceed liabilities but cash is unavailable to pay debts as they come due, is merely
another form of insolvency for bankruptcy purposes).
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because the debtor's earnings represent a scarce resource and because the collection efforts of a single creditor can prejudice the
ability of the debtor's other creditors to be repaid in full.
B.

When Are a Debtor's Assets Exhaustible Resources?

Baird and Jackson refer to an insolvent debtor's situation as creating a common pool problem. When insufficient assets are available
to repay an insolvent debtor's creditors in full, the balance-sheet insolvent debtor's assets plainly represent an exhaustible resource. 17'
This is an incomplete description of a debtor's exhaustible resources, however. Baird and Jackson do not address the fact that
creditors can be repaid either through a forced sale of the debtor's
assets or by garnishing the debtor's earnings. For a debtor that has
earnings accruing more slowly than debt obligations, earnings also
constitute a scarce resource. By ignoring this point, Baird and Jackson fail to include an additional exhaustible resource in their bankruptcy model: the earnings of a debtor who is unable to repay its
debts as they come due. Thus, a debtor's inability to pay debts as
they come due can be described as itself causing a common pool
problem, not merely evidence that a common pool problem has
been caused by a debtor's balance-sheet insolvency.
C.

When Do Collection Efforts Involve Consumption Externalities?

Baird andJackson argue that an insolvent debtor's creditors face a
common pool problem because the creditors have incentives to "try
to catch as many fish as possible" from the debtor's pool of resources. 17 2 This analogy is too narrow a view of the circumstances
surrounding creditor collection efforts, however. A closer look at
the circumstances that create externalities for collecting creditors
reveals additional reasons why creditors of a debtor in default are
prejudiced by another creditor's collection efforts.
1.

Prejudice caused by creditors' levies againsta debtor's replenishable
assets

The use of both oil and fish can create common pool problems,
even though oil is not replenishable and fish are, because common
pool problems exist whether or not the exhaustible resources are
171. See supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text (analyzing whether debtor's balancesheet insolvency alone creates common pool problems, as opposed to potential for such
problems).
172.

BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 39.
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replenishable. 173 In the mining example, an externality exists because the resources are not replenishable: one individual's mining
today means that less mineral will be available for another to mine
tomorrow. This sort of externality is termed a "pure consumption
externality." 174 In the case of a common pool of fish, the externality
is more subtle because fish reproduce. One individual's fishing today does not necessarily mean that fewer fish will be available for
another individual at some later date, so long as a sufficient number
of fish are born in the interim. An externality arises in this situation
from a failure to coordinate the rate at which the different individuals fish, relative to the rate at which the fish reproduce. This sort of
externality represents a "rate consumption externality."' 7 5 If both
anglers coordinated their efforts, they would catch fish no faster
than the fish could reproduce, and as a result, they would be assured
of having fish available forever. Working separately in their own
self-interest, however, each has an incentive to catch fish faster than
the other (and thus to fish as fast as they can), which over time will
likely ensure extinction of the fish.
Rate consumption externalities may be further complicated when
consumption involves both an asset and its product.17 6 For example, assume a common herd of wild goats from which farmers seek
to obtain either fresh milk or fresh meat. While milk is preferred,
meat will suffice. Under these circumstances, the self-interested
consumption of one farmer may run counter to that of another, but
the calculus is more complex. One farmer's milking today may or
173. See Friedman, supra note 19, at 856 n.8 (noting that replenishable stocks may be exhaustible and that optimal yield may be determined by calculating population size, reproduc-

tion rate, and recruiting rate).
174. Moreover, this "pure consumption externality" will exist regardless of whether a
mining company has incurred nonrefundable expenses in its mining enterprise (which, in this
context, economists refer to as "sunk costs"). See Friedman, supra note 19, at 856 n.8, 866-67
(describing finite, nonreplenishable resources as those which do not augment themselves
before end of contemplated use, and describing "lift" and "storage" externalities as inherent
to mining).
175. See Friedman, supra note 19, at 856 (describing fish, and biologic resources in general, as either replenishable or nonreplenishable depending on intersection of rate of use and
rate of reproduction). This "rate consumption externality" may be affected by sunk costs,
depending on the length of time during which the subject of the sunk cost remains valuable
and whether the sunk cost relates to the capture itself or more generally to the processing or
marketing of the subject of capture. If, for example, A spends $1 million on fishing bait that
will turn sour within 24 hours, A will have increased incentive to fish as fast as possible and to
thus ignore the rate at which the fish spawn. If, alternatively, B spends $1 million on a dock
and fish processing plant, B may seek to maintain the fish population in perpetuity irrespective of the useful life of the improvements.
176. The term "product" is used in this Article to include all derivative assets, such as
proceeds, offspring, profits, and rents. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 552 (1988) (stating that security interest created by security agreement and attachable after commencement may extend to rents
and profits). Necessarily, all replenishable assets beget product to some limited extent because the replenished asset will itself constitute a product.
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may not mean that there will be insufficient milk for another farmer
tomorrow. The potential for depletion will depend on the rate at
which the first farmer milks, as compared to the rate at which the
goats replenish their milk supplies. In the same manner, one
farmer's hunting today may or may not mean that there will be insufficient meat for another farmer tomorrow. Once again the availability of goat meat is dependent on the rate at which the farmers
hunt as compared to the rate at which the goats reproduce. In addition to these two rate consumption externalities, one farmer's hunting today will also affect the other's ability to gather milk because
there will be fewer goats to supply that product. The effect that one
farmer's hunting has on another farmer's milk supply is termed a
"product consumption externality." This effect also can be reversed. By selling all the milk, rather than retaining enough of it to
offer to the herd's offspring, the herd will not reproduce at its optimal rate. And opportunities for hunting will diminish as the herd
diminishes in size. The effect that one farmer's milking has on another farmer's meat supply also is termed a "product consumption
177
externality."
Baird and Jackson do not explicitly address whether a debtor's
assets are replenishable, despite the fact that a debtor is generally
able to acquire or produce additional assets. Nor do Baird andJackson consider the income producing qualities of some debtors' assets, despite the fact that many debtors' assets do generate a
byproduct of some sort. Moreover, the debtor's ability to augment
its pool of assets is often interrelated to its ability to earn wages or
revenue. Identification of a debtor's assets as replenishable or related to earning capacity has no clear effect on the common pool
model, but it does complicate the externalities caused by creditors'
collection efforts.
a.

Insolvent, with unreplenishable assets and no earningcapacity

Consider an insolvent consumer debtor 78 with assets consisting
solely of household goods.' 7 9 Assume that the debtor cannot aug177. Sunk costs will influence product consumption externalities in the same way that they
affect rate consumption externalities, because a product consumption externality is an indirect rate consumption externality.
178. This Article refers to an individual debtor whose assets are primarily household
goods as a "consumer debtor." Compare 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (Supp. III 1991) (defining "consumer debt" as debt incurred by individual primarily for personal, family, or household purposes) with id. § 101(9)(A)-(B) (defining "corporate debtor" for purposes of chapter 11 as
including certain associations, joint-stock companies, and business trusts).
179. This Article uses the terms household goods and consumer goods interchangeably to
refer to goods purchased or used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Cf
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ment this pool of goods, perhaps because the debtor has lost a job,
and that as a result of the job loss the debtor defaults on a single
debt and will inevitably default on all other debts. Under these circumstances, creditors forcing a sale of the debtor's household
goods will cause the pure consumption externality identified by
Baird and Jackson. That is, at any one point in time, only so many
assets are available for distribution to creditors, and a single creditor's collection efforts will affect all others. This pure consumption

externality arises at the time of the debtor's first default. Because
the debtor's household good assets are not replenishable, the prejudice from a single default is irreversible.

This kind of common pool problem is not limited to consumer
debtors. Consider instead an insolvent business debtor' 8 0 holding
noncash assets. Operations have ceased; the cessation of operations

spells a cessation of revenue. As a result, the debtor defaults on one
of its debts and will default on the remainder of its loan obligations.
Although in the past this debtor's pool of assets may have been aug-

mented by incoming revenue, in its current defunct state assets will
not be replenished. Like the creditors of the out-of-work consumer

debtor, this debtor's creditors face a common pool problem caused
by a pure consumption externality.
b.

Insolvent, with earning capacity unrelated to composition of
replenishable assets

Recall the insolvent consumer debtor in the prior hypothetical,
but instead assume that the debtor earns sufficient wages to be able
to purchase additional household goods from time to time. The
debtor's ability to earn wages does not depend upon the number or
type of household goods that the debtor owns. If creditors commence collection efforts by levying against these household goods,

their efforts may or may not prejudice the ability of the debtor's
other creditors to be repaid in full, depending on whether the

debtor can replenish its stock of household goods more quickly than
the creditors can levy against them. Furthermore, because the
debtor's earning capacity is assumed to be unrelated to the amount
or type of household goods owned by the debtor, one creditor's collection efforts should not have adverse effects on the debtor's other
creditors. 18 ' In this situation, prejudice may not occur with a first or
U.C.C. § 9-109(1) (1981) (defining consumer goods as goods used or bought for personal,
family, and household uses).
180. See supra note 39 (defining business debtor).
181. This assumption is roughly accurate but depends on the scope of the exemptions to
which the debtor is entitled under state or federal law. Exemption statutes are a diverse con-
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second default, because the debtor's assets are replenishable. The
prejudice occurs when collection efforts occur more rapidly than replenishment. A rate consumption externality is sure to occur when
the debtor has defaulted on most of its debts, but is likely to occur at
an earlier point in time.
Solvent or insolvent, and earning capacity dependent on
composition of assets

c.

The concept of a rate consumption externality is further complicated when a debtor's earning capacity is contingent on the composition of its assets. Consider a viable business debtor. 18 2 The
debtor's assets may include multiple types of resources such as inventory,18 3 equipment,' 8 4 and accounts receivable,' 85 as well as proceeds' 8 6 from these assets. Moreover, unlike the consumer debtor
with earning potential unrelated to the household goods it acquired
in the past, a business debtor's earning capacity directly depends on
the quantity and type of assets it has accumulated. Inventory generally does not beget inventory, nor does equipment create additional
equipment, but in the ordinary course of operations the debtor may
use its equipment in combination with labor and raw materials to
create a finished product. The debtor may then sell this completed
product for cash or on credit. The profits that the debtor ultimately
glomeration of state and federal laws that place certain types and amounts of assets beyond
the reach of an individual debtor's creditors. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(I)-(11) (1988) (exempting motor vehicles, jewelry, insurance, employee benefits, and real property from creditors' reach in bankruptcy, absent state law opting out of federal exemption scheme); CAL. CIrV.
PROC. CODE §§ 703.010-706.010 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) (delineating exemptions applying
to all procedures for enforcement of money judgments); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.425-.470
(Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1992) (delineating exceptions such as wearing apparel, tools or implements of mechanics trade; 10 head each of choice hogs, sheep, cows, and products thereof;
bibles and books of family; arms and military equipment, and certain real and personal property); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 282-84 (McKinney 1990) (citing permissible exemptions in
bankruptcy as including motor vehicles, social security benefits, unemployment compensation, certain personal and real property, alimony, and payments from pension plans). See
generally KING & COOK, supra note 43, at 439-534 (analyzing diverse body of state exemption
laws). One important purpose of exemption provisions is to insulate from creditors those
assets that peculiarly affect the earning capacity of an individual debtor. See id. (stressing
importance of maintaining self-sufficiency of debtor as policy goal underlying exemption

statutes).
182.

See supra note 161 (discussing definition of "viable" in context of debtor/creditor

law).
183. See U.C.C. § 9-109(4) (1981) (defining "inventory" as goods for sale or lease).
184. See id. § 9-109(2) (defining "equipment" as goods used or purchased primarily for
business use but not falling within definition of inventory).
185. See id. § 9-106 (defining "accounts receivable" as any right to payment for goods sold
or leased, or services rendered).
186. See id. 9-306(1) (defining "proceeds" as including whatever is received upon sale,
exchange, collection, or other disposition of collateral or proceeds).
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earns from the sale may be used to purchase new raw materials and
possibly new equipment.
Collection efforts by the creditors of a viable business may generate externalities in multiple ways. Creditors that force a sale of an
insolvent business debtor's assets will face a pure consumption externality only if operations cease and assets are not replenished. In
this event, there are only so many assets available for distribution to
creditors, and one creditor's collection efforts will affect all others'.
If on the other hand the debtor's business continues to operate, the
"grab" of assets may affect other creditors' abilities to be repaid in
two ways. First, the grab may cause a rate consumption externality
if the insolvent debtor cannot replace assets as fast as creditors levy
against the assets. Second, the grab may cause a product consumption externality, even if the debtor is solvent at the time the collection efforts commence, by negatively affecting the debtor's ability to
continue operations and thereby reducing the debtor's earning potential. Whether the grab of assets causes this product consumption
externality will depend on the type and amount of assets that are
affected by the grab, as well as on the sort of business engaged in by
the debtor. A product consumption externality may occur as early
as the initial default and the resulting collection effort if the debt is
relatively large or the levied asset is particularly important to the
87
debtor's operations.1
Assume a debtor in the business of renting video cassettes. Other
than its inventory of cassettes, the debtor's assets consist only of the
premises it has rented under a short-term lease, shelving, and a cash
register. This inventory and equipment are valued at $1000. The
debtor owes $100 to each of its ten suppliers, from whom it has
purchased cassettes on credit. If this solvent debtor were to refuse
to pay Supplier 1, Supplier l's collection efforts may affect Suppliers
2 through 10, if, for example, Supplier 1 levied against the debtor's
shelving, making it difficult for the debtor to remain in business
without replacing this means of display. If, alternatively, Supplier 1
levied against 10 video cassettes worth $100, l's collection efforts
187. Of course, if the debt is small enough, the debtor may simply redeem its property
within the time permitted by state law. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 9.35.250 (1983) (allowing
debtor right to redeem property before sale is confirmed by paying purchase amount); CAL.
Civ. PROC. CODE § 2903 (West 1987) (allowing anyone with interest in property subject to
lien right to redeem after claim is due but before right is foreclosed); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 602414 (1983) (providing debtor with right of redemption for real property for one year); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 355.960 (Baldwin 1981) (allowing debtor to redeem at any time before
secured interest has disposed of, contracted to dispose of, or discharged debt); see also U.C.C.
§ 9-506 (1981) (providing debtor with right to redeem if secured party has not disposed of or
contracted to dispose of collateral or discharged obligation).
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may not affect the debtor's business, and thus the likelihood that
Suppliers 2 through 10 are repaid in full and on time, if the remainder of the debtor's inventory of cassettes is sufficiently competitive
with that of other local video stores.
2. A debtor's repayment out of earnings as cause for prejudice
In the cases of both the business and the consumer debtor, consumption externalities also are created when creditors are repaid
out of earnings rather than out of assets. When a debtor has insufficient liquid assets to pay current liabilities, "consumption" of the
debtor's scarce cash by creditors whose claims are due will directly
affect, if not the likelihood, then at least the ease of subsequent collection efforts by creditors whose claims are not yet due. If the
debtor is repaying creditors voluntarily out of earnings but earns
too little to timely repay all creditors in full, then the debtor's payment of one creditor necessarily affects its ability to repay the
others. Thus, payments out of scarce liquid assets, whether voluntary by the debtor or forced by creditors, can cause a rate consump88
tion externality.'
Repayment out of earnings may also have indirect effects. For example, if one creditor is garnishing a debtor's wages, then the
debtor's other creditors will be affected not only because there may
not be enough money left over after the garnishment to repay them
in full and on time, but also because the garnishment may itself affect the debtor's earning potential. The consumer debtor may quit
or lose a job, and the business debtor may cease operations as a
result of missed business opportunities, lost suppliers, or depleted
sources of credit. This indirect effect is the result of a product consumption externality. 18 9
3.

Creditors' collection options as a causefor externalities

In identifying the circumstances under which creditors face common pool problems, Baird and Jackson do not recognize the differences between individual and collective collection remedies or
between state and federal remedies. Irrespective of the type of
debtor or the composition of the debtor's assets, consumption ex188. See supra notes 175, 181-82 and accompanying text (defining rate consumption externality and applying term to insolvent consumer debtor whose earning capacity is unrelated to
composition of her replenishable assets).
189. See supra notes 176-77, 182-87 and accompanying text (defining product consumption externality and applying term to solvent or insolvent business debtor whose earning capacity is dependent on composition of its replenishable assets). The product consumption
externality involved in creditors' garnishment of a debtor's liquid assets is the effect that one
farmer's milking has on another farmer's meat supply, and not the reverse.
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ternalities are created when creditors pursue individual state law
remedies of execution and levy rather than collective measures of
relief such as assignment for the benefit of creditors under state law
or federal bankruptcy protection.190 Moreover, consumption externalities may result when creditors pursue state law collective remedies rather than the federal bankruptcy option.
a. Individual versus collective remedies
Recall the solvent debtor who cannot pay current obligations out
of earnings. 19 Jackson suspects that in this situation a consumption
externality results solely because the debtor's general default is indicative of its balance-sheet insolvency.' 9 2 Creditors of a solvent
debtor in general default may also be prejudiced by the pursuit of
individual collection remedies because of the differences in the efficacy of the procedures for liquidation of the debtor's assets. 193 For
example, if the potential proceeds from a sale of all a debtor's assets
were essentially equal, regardless of whether the liquidation occurred in the context of an execution and levy or a sale in a bankruptcy case, then creditors of a solvent debtor in general default
should be indifferent to pursuing either individual or collective

remedies. 194
Creditors should not be indifferent, however, because bankruptcy
190. See supra notes 37-70 and accompanying text (discussing state law remedies for
debtors).
191. It makes no difference here whether the debtor is a consumer or a business, or
whether the debtor's assets are replenishable or related to its earning capacity.
192.

See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMrrs, supra note 5, at 198 (stating that solvent debtor that

cannot pay debts as they become due is likely to be insolvent in bankruptcy sense and may be
unable to borrow due to uncertainty of its financial status). A debtor's general default is
probably evidence of its insolvency, but the default would not increase the probability of the
debtor being insolvent. If the prejudice that follows from a debtor's general default were
limited to an increase in the probability of the debtor's insolvency, as Jackson argues, then
creditors' interests would be served by a standard for commencement of an involuntary case
that assigned merely a rebuttable presumption of insolvency to the debtor's failure to pay its
debts as they mature. See John C. McCoid III, The Occasionfor Involuntary Bankruptcy, 61 AM.

BANKR. LJ. 195, 217-18 (1961) (proposing that irrebuttable presumption of insolvency should
attach to debtor's inability to pay debts as they come due because prejudice is not so limited);
cf Block-Lieb, supra note 30, at 854 n.236 (arguing that presumption of insolvency should be
rebuttable by showing of payment of debts as debts become due).
193. Cf. Warren, supra note 12, at 782-89. Professor Warren writes:
The state collection scheme occasionally deals with complete collapse, but overall it
is rationalized in order to serve a wide variety of collection needs. The federal bankruptcy scheme, by contrast, reckons with a much more limited factual context, and
with very different legal devices such as discharge of debt and distribution of unavoidable losses.
Id

194. Except to admit that collective proceedings are better than individual ones in preserving the going concern value of a debtor's assets,JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5.
at 14; Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, supra note 5, at 864-65,Jackson appears

to assume this relative efficacy. Cf Jackson & Scott, supra note 7, at 156 n.2 (noting that
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sales more often result in higher proceeds than do sales following
an execution and levy. This difference arises for several reasons.
First, the state law remedies of execution and levy proceed on a
piecemeal basis, one creditor at a time.1 9 5 Because of this, executing creditors cannot ensure that the assets of a business debtor are
sold in a way that preserves the goodwill or "going concern" value
of the assets.1 9 6 Even if a single creditor's claim were to approach
the going concern value of a firm's assets, thus justifying a sale of
the entire business, an execution and levy would nonetheless result
in the loss of going concern value because levying sheriffs are required either to take physical possession of the debtor's property or
otherwise to render it unusable, thus ensuring the cessation of the
19 7
debtor's business.
Second, a bankruptcy sale of a debtor's business is far more likely
to realize going concern value than is an execution sale of the business. The Code enables creditors to commence an involuntary
chapter 11 reorganization case' 98 as a remedy specially crafted to
preserve the going concern value of a debtor's business. 19 9 And to a
lesser extent even a chapter 7 liquidation case is calculated to preserve going concern value. 2 00 The automatic "stay," effective upon
creditors' bargain model seeks "to minimize the distinctions in treatment of individual claimants between the two debtor-collection regimes").
195. See Warren, supra note 12, at 782-85 ("State law swings into action on the complaint
of a single creditor ....
In enforcing the rights of one creditor, state collection law does not
address the possible consequences that the collection will render the debtor unable to pay its
remaining creditors.").
196. See LoPucki, supra note 160, at 331 (noting that "state remedies subsystem will tend
to close or fail to close businesses without regard to their viability").
197. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 700.030 (West 1987) ("T]o levy upon tangible personal property in the possession or under the control of the judgment debtor, the levying
officer shall take the property into custody."); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:26-12 (West 1987) ("Personal property of a defendant attached as provided by this chapter shall remain in the safekeeping of the attaching officer to answer and abide the judgment of the court."); N.Y. Civ.
Pic. L. & R. 5232(b) (McKinney 1978) (stating that "[t]he sheriff shall levy upon any interest
of the judgment debtor in personal property ... capable of delivery by taking the property
into his [or her] custody"); see also Knapp v. McFarland, 462 F.2d 935, 940 (2d Cir. 1972)
(noting that when judgment debtor's property is deliverable, sheriff usually must levy by taking property into custody); LoPucki, supra note 160, at 317 (explaining that sheriff must take
possession of subject property in most states in performing execution and levy).
198. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1988) ("An involuntary case may be commenced only under
chapter 7 or 11 of this title, and only against a person, except a farmer, family farmer, or a
corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, that may be a debtor
under the chapter under which such case is commenced.").
199. See Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2201 (1991) (finding that congressional intent
underlying chapter 11 was to maximize value of debtor's estate).
200. See infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text (detailing provisions protecting going
concern value that are applicable to chapter 7 liquidation cases); see also LoPucki, supra note
160, at 331 (arguing that federal bankruptcy provisions expressly should consider business
enterprise's "viability" to determine whether business should be closed and noting that interim trustee may be appointed upon filing of chapter 7 petition to operate business if it is in
best interest of estate).
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the filing of either a liquidation or reorganization petition, holds all
the debtor's creditors in place while the debtor-in-possession, or the
trustee-in-bankruptcy, negotiates a sale.2 0 l In addition, a debtor-inpossession or trustee can operate the debtor's business until a sale
is consummated, 20 2 borrow funds if necessary to ensure continued
operations, 20 3 and negotiate a sale free and clear of all liens, claims,
and interests. 20 4 Finally, in the context of a bankruptcy case, individual creditors cannot defeat the preservation of going concern
value by negotiating a clause that would effect an automatic termination of the contract or lease upon the debtor's filing of a petition in
bankruptcy, the debtor's insolvency or other failure to meet some
financial test, or the appointment of a receiver or other custodian. 20 5 No state law collection remedy, whether collective or individual, can claim the same measures for the preservation of going
20 6
concern value.
Bankruptcy also may yield greater returns than state individual
collection remedies even when there is no going concern value to
preserve, because the bankruptcy system is more effective than state
201. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(I)-(8) (1988) (proscribing "all entities" from attempting or continuing to attempt to collect debts, enforce liens, or exercise control over property once petition filed under any chapter of title 11).
202. ld §§ 721, 1108.
203. Id. § 364.
204. It § 363(f).
205. Id. § 365(b)(2)(A)-(C), (e)(l)(A)-(C). Under the former Act, these bankruptcy or
"ipsofacto" clauses were generally upheld, although courts stretched to invalidate them. See,
e.g., Queens Blvd. Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum, 503 F.2d 202, 204-07 (2d Cir. 1974) (declining to enforce ipsofacto clause in lease due to possible injury such arrangement might cause to
debtor and debtor's creditors); Weaver v. Huston, 459 F.2d 741, 742-44 (4th Cir. 1972) (denying enforcement of forfeiture provision in lease conditioned upon tenant passing any interest in premises to trustee or receiver on ground that enforcement would eviscerate chapter I I
and be unjust to tenant); Davidson v. Shivitz, 354 F.2d 946, 947-49 (2d Cir. 1966) (denying
petition for order to surrender fractional interests in property because trustees for
propertyholders were estopped from asserting right to terminate lease pursuant to ipsofacto
clause). Legislative history reflects that Congress invalidated ipsofacto clauses in bankruptcy
because such clauses often thwarted a debtor's reorganization efforts. H.R. REP. No. 595,
supra note 105, at 348, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6304. This explanation, however,
does not justify invalidation of these clauses in chapter 7 cases, nor does it justify invalidation
where the debtor has not established the necessity of the subject lease or contract to its effective reorganization. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B) (1988) (allowing relief from stay because
debtor has no equity in property or because such property is not pertinent to reorganization
plan).
206. Nor could state law be improved simply by incorporating these protections. Individual state collection procedures are inherently incapable of preserving going concern value
because they proceed on a piecemeal basis and require the levying sheriff to render the subject property unusable pending the execution sale. See infra notes 207-20 and accompanying
text (summarizing differences between individual and collective remedies and concluding that
individual remedies are less able to preserve going concern value), Moreover, state collective
measures are also inherently less effective than the federal Bankruptcy Code in realizing going
concern value. See infra notes 224-45 and accompanying text (summarizing differences between state and federal collective remedies and concluding that federal bankruptcy law is
more efficient and effective).
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remedies -systems in maximizing the proceeds from a sale of a
debtor's assets. 2 0 7 State law often requires sheriffs to make only
perfunctory efforts to advertise the time and place of an execution
sale 20 8 and to do little or nothing to assist prospective bidders in
207. See infra notes 208-20 and accompanying text. When there is no going concern value
to preserve, creditors secured with a U.C.C. Article 9 security interest may not prefer that a
liquidation of their collateral proceed in a bankruptcy forum. Secured lenders need not pursue state law remedies of execution and levy to collect on a delinquent obligation. See U.C.C.
§§ 9-503, 9-504 (1981) (providing secured creditors with option of repossessing collateral
without judicial process, and selling, leasing, or disposing of all or part of collateral). Moreover, the Article 9 requirements surrounding a secured party's sale of collateral after default
may be better designed to maximize the proceeds from a sale of the debtor's assets than are
the requirements of an execution sale. See id §§ 9-501 to -506 (detailing secured creditor's
power to take possession of and/or dispose of collateral). In addition, secured creditors enjoy
little of the benefit that bankruptcy spells for other creditors, because their security interests
would generally protect them from the common pool problems that bedevil unsecured creditors. See Bowers, Loss Distribution,supra note 23, at 57-68 (noting that secured interests are
first to be paid upon liquidation of collateral in bankruptcy); Picker, supra note 23, at 669-75
(noting value that security interest provides by "minimiz[ing] the opportunities for end-ofgame efforts to subvert the pro rata rule that defines common pool problems"). But see infra
notes 254-91 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances in which grant of secured
credit does not resolve common pool problems). Bankruptcy also contains disadvantages for
secured creditors, however. Unless fully secured, postpetition interest will cease to accrue
upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(b)(2), 506(b) (1988) (prohibiting courts generally from allowing claims for "unmatured" interest, but specifically permitting secured claim to include claim for postpetition interest if collateral valued higher than
debt outstanding on filing date). Nor will undersecured creditors be entitled to compensation
for their "lost opportunity costs" as adequate protection for the debtor's use of their collateral. See United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 369-82 (1988)
(denying claim for compensation due to delay in foreclosure on collateral caused by stay). In
addition, the automatic stay prevents exercise of the self-help remedies of repossession and
sale, absent bankruptcy court permission. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (3), and (d) (1988). Furthermore, the debtor may foreclose these remedies altogether by converting an involuntary chapter 7 case (as a matter of right) to a chapter 11 reorganization case. Id. § 706(a). Once in
chapter 11, the debtor may be able to confirm a plan that reinstates the security interest and a
schedule of repayment, even though the secured creditor does not consent to the arrangement. Id. § 1129(b)(1)-(b)(2)(A)(i).
208. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 700.010, 700.015 (West 1987) (requiring levying
officer to place with county recorder property's location and notice of levy that describes
property, as well as notice that debtor's interest has been levied and copy of execution); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 56.21 (West 1988) (requiring that notice of execution sale be placed in newspaper published in county in which sale is to take place, for four consecutive weeks prior to sale;
that notice be mailed to attorney of record ofjudgment debtor or to judgment debtor's last
known address ifjudgment debtor does not have attorney of record; and that provisions for
other means of notice be made where no newspaper is published in affected county); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 426.160 (Baldwin 1991) (requiring posting of written notice of execution sale of
personal property at three most public places in vicinity of place of sale for ten days preceding
sale, and by newspaper in certain other circumstances); idL § 426.200 (compelling written notice of execution sale of real property to highest bidder to be posted on courthouse door, at
three other places in vicinity of land for 15 days preceding sale, and by newspaper in certain
circumstances); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-33 (West 1987) (requiring posting of notice of execution sale of personal property for five days before time appointed for sale in office of sheriff in
county in which property is located); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. 5233 (McKinney 1978) (requiring posting of printed notice of execution sale six days before sale in three public places in
town or city where sale is to take place, except that in City of New York notice may be advertised in auction columns of any morning paper published daily that appears on newsstands
previous night and has circulation of at least 300,000 readers). See generally LoPucki, supra
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assessing the worth of the property to be sold. 20 9 Moreover, state
law generally does not protect bona fide purchasers at execution
21 0
sales against defects in title, including preexisting encumbrances.
Many states providejudgment debtors with lengthy redemption periods during which the execution sale purchaser's right to remain in
possession or to convey will be subject to question. 2 1' At worst,
these deficiencies result in unfair bidding at execution sales. 2 12 At
best, execution sales are not conducted in a manner intended to
21 3
maximize the proceeds of the liquidation.
note 160, at 317 (describing state advertising process as perfunctory and formulated to satisfy
formal requirements of procedure as opposed to attracting bidders).
209. See LoPucki, supra note 160, at 317-18 (opining that state sales usually do not allow
prospective bidders to view or test property or equipment). But see Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 426.200(3) (requiring that prior to execution sale, officer have real property appraised by
two appraisers); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:17-20 to -25 (directing that following levy, sheriff must
inventory and procure appraisal of personal property).
210. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 701.640 (West 1987) (stating that purchaser at cxCcution sale gains interest of judgment debtor); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:17-41, :26-14 to -15
(stating that execution sale has same effect as voluntary sale of subject property by debtor as
sheriff conveys all judgment debtor's title to such property); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5233
(McKinney 1978) (providing that defects in notice of execution sale do not affect title of
buyer); Flagship State Bank v. Carantzas, 352 So. 2d 1259, 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(holding that buyer at invalid execution sale acquired only interest ofjudgment debtor whose
interest was subject to appellant bank's liens), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1978); see also
LoPucki, supra note 160, at 318 (noting that purchasers at execution sale buy property subject
to all liens and title defects whether specified in sale notice or not). But see U.C.C. § 9-504(4)
(1981) (stating that property disposed of by secured party conveys to purchaser title that is
superior only to security interests or liens subordinate to reselling secured creditor).
211. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.220 (stating that debtor holds right to redeem
land sold at execution sale for less than two-thirds of appraised value for period of one year
after sale; indicating that redemption is accomplished by payment of original purchase money
plus 107o interest to purchaser); id. § 426.230 (providing that land sold at execution sale is
subject to right of redemption and cannot be conveyed by purchaser during redemption period); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3131(4) (West 1980 & Supp. 1991) (furnishingjudgment
debtor with 90-day right to redeem real property sold at execution sale). But see U.C.C. § 9506 (1981) (limiting time period in which debtor may redeem collateral to "time before the
secured party has disposed of collateral or entered into a contract for its disposition ... or
before the obligation has been discharged under [the provision governing retention of the
collateral)," unless waived in writing by secured party after default).
212. See LoPucki, supra note 160, at 318 (noting that creditor is usually sole bidder at
execution sale and, as result, is able to purchase property at nominal price).
213. See, e.g., House v. Lalor, 462 N.Y.S.2d 772, 774-76 (N.Y. Sup. C1. 1983) (upholding
execution sale of $200,000 cooperative apartment for $15,000 to enforce $350 small claims
court judgment); see also LoPucki, supra note 160, at 321 n.52 (noting that few states establish
minimum prices for which property can be sold at execution sales); Whitford, supra note 33, at
1055 (stating that while private sales of repossessed collateral yield greater returns, states
usually require execution sales in form of public auctions with resulting lower returns). Some
courts permit the avoidance of nonjudicial foreclosure sales as constructive fraudulent transfers because the proceeds received in such sales are notoriously paltry. Compare, e.g., Durrett v.
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 202-64 (5th Cir. 1980) (voiding nonjudicial foreclosure sale because amount paid did not qualify as "fair equivalent" for property under § 67(d)
of former Bankruptcy Act and thus comprised constructive fraudulent conveyance) with, e.g.,
Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. (In re Madrid), 725 F.2d 1197, 1199-1204 (9th Cir. 1984)
(upholding nonjudicial foreclosure sale despite claims that sale constituted constructive
fraudulent conveyance under current Bankruptcy Code, because transfer occurred at time of
perfection of trust deed). But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3131(5) (requiring sheriff to
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In contrast, the sales procedures of the federal bankruptcy system
are generally perceived as "vastly superior to those employed in the
state remedies subsystem. ' 2 14 A trustee rather than a sheriff is ap2 16
pointed 2 15 to sell the property of the estate in a bankruptcy case.
Before sale, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy require extensive public notice of the terms and conditions of the sale. 2 17 The sale may
be conducted either as a public auction or a privately negotiated
transaction. 21 8 Moreover, the trustee is empowered to sell the property free and clear of interests, including encumbrances and claims
to title.21 9 Purchasers of property from a bankruptcy estate are proconduct commercially reasonable public or private execution sale of levied property, whether
real or personal). By contrast, the sales procedures set forth in Article 9 of the U.C.C. are
intended to maximize the proceeds of the liquidation. See U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1981) (providing that "every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms
must be commercially reasonable").
214. LoPucki, supra note 160, at 320; see Whitford, supra note 33, at 1054 (contrasting
consensual debtor payments with coercive execution and describing low prices usually obtained from execution sales). But see Carlson, supra note 10, at 1354-55 ("It is possible to
imagine systems in which the sheriff has the motive to maximize the sales price, as where her
poundage fee is directly related to the sales price. After all, how is the bankruptcy trustee's
motive any different? Her fee too is based upon maximizing the sales price."). The point,
however, is not that a sheriff has no incentives to maximize the proceeds of a forced sale, but
rather that the trustee-in-bankruptcy is better equipped than her state law counterpart to
bring those incentives to fruition.
215. 11 U.S.C. §§ 702, 1104 (1988).
216. Id. §§ 704(1), 1106(a)(1); see LoPucki, supra note 160, at 320 (discussing role of
trustee in bankruptcy cases). Of course, in a chapter 11 reorganization case a trustee need not
be appointed. Absent "cause," the debtor would remain in possession of the chapter 11 estate and perform the functions of a trustee, including conducting sales of assets of the estate.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1107, 1123(b)(3)(B) (1988) (describing duties and limitations imposed on debtor-in-possession as akin to those of trustee).
217. See FED. R. BANER. P. 6004(a) (requiring compliance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
2002 for use, sale, or leasing of property). Rule 2002 requires 20 to 25 days notice to parties
of interest of any proposed use, sale, or leasing of property of the bankrupt estate. See FED. R.
BANKR. P. 2002 (establishing timing and content requirements for notice to creditors of proposed uses of property outside of ordinary course of business of bankrupt estate). By contrast, the U.C.C. requires only that a repossessing secured creditor give notice of a public or
private sale of repossessed collateral to the debtor (unless waived in writing after default, or
unless the "collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type
customarily sold on a recognized market") and possibly to any other secured party from
whom the secured party has received written notice of a claim of interest in the collateral.
U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1981).
218. FED. R. BANKR. P. 6004(0(1); accord U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1981) (permitting either public or private sale of repossessed collateral).
219. 11 U.S.C. § 363(0 (1988). The Bankruptcy Code is qualified, however, as follows:
The trustee may sell property.., free and clear of any interest in such property of an
entity other than the estate, only if(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such

interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is greater
than the aggregate value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a
money satisfaction of such interest.
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tected by statute unless they have purchased in bad faith, or have
220
participated in an agreement to control the course of the bidding.
b.

State versus federal remedies

Although state law provides for the appointment of an equitable
22 2
receiver 2 2 1 or an assignment of assets for the benefit of creditors,
the Federal Bankruptcy Code currently permits creditors to commence an involuntary petition within 120 days of the appointment
of a custodian over a substantial portion of the debtor's assets, without proof of the debtor's general default. 22 3 The Code's definition
of "custodian" is broad enough to include the appointment of an
equitable receiver or the appointment of an assignee for the benefit
of creditors. 2 24 A question therefore arises as to whether creditors'
interests may be prejudiced by the appointment of such a custodian
under state law as opposed to federal bankruptcy law. The most
probable answer to this question is that creditors' interests indeed
may be prejudiced.
Creditors may be prejudiced through the state appointment of an
equitable receiver because their interests are better served by coerced repayment through the federal bankruptcy scheme rather
Id.
A sale of repossessed collateral under Article 9 of the U.C.C. similarly "discharges the security interest under which it is made and any security interest or lien subordinate thereto."
U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (1981). Such a sale, however, does not affect superior security interests or
liens. In the event that the superior secured creditor enforces its claim against collateral in
the hands of the buyer from the subordinate secured creditor (that was first to repossess and
resell), the buyer will have a cause of action against its seller for breach of the warranty of title.
U.C.C. § 2-312 (1981).
220. 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (1988) ("The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization... of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such
authorization to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith .... "); see, e.g.,
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Miller (In re Stadium Management Corp.), 895 F.2d 845, 847-49 (1st
Cir. 1990) (holding objections to court-approved sale of debtor's assets moot because good
faith purchasers are protected from sale reversal absent stay pending appeal under § 363(m)
of Code); Gilchrist v. Westcott (In re Gilchrist), 891 F.2d 559, 560-61 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating
that § 363(m) of Code protects good faith purchasers at authorized sale when sale not stayed
pending appeal); In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying § 363(m) of Code to
protect good faith purchaser by finding appeal ofsale moot due to failure to obtain stay). The
U.C.C. also protects purchasers at sales from the senior security interest and any interests
and/or liens subordinate thereto under Article 9,
even though the secured party fails to comply with the requirement of this Part [5 of
Article 9] or of any judicial proceedings (a) in the case of a public sale, if the purchaser has no knowledge of any defects in the sale and if he does not buy in collusion
with the secured party, other bidders or the person conducting the sale, or, (b) in any
other case, if the purchaser acts in good faith.
U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (1981); see also id. § 1-201(19) (defining good faith as "honesty in fact").
221. See supra note 69 (discussing law of equitable receivership).
222. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (describing state law assignment for benefit
of creditors).
223. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(2) (1988).
224. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (Supp. III 1991).
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than through a state collective proceeding. Filing an involuntary petition under the federal bankruptcy laws better protects creditors'
interests in bringing a collective proceeding than do state collective
remedies.2 25 While both the state and federal schemes distribute
dividends to unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis, the federal law
is better equipped to prevent prejudice to creditors. 2 26 Federal
bankruptcy law derives from its state law counterparts, 2 27 but the
22 8
federal remedy generally provides greater benefits to creditors.
For example, if a debtor continued to pay its debts after it became
insolvent, these payments may be avoidable in bankruptcy as preferential transfers.2 29 In contrast, only a handful of states permit as230
signees for the benefit of creditors to avoid preferential transfers,
225. Id.
226. See KING & CooK, supra note 43, at 604. Lawrence King and Michael Cook argue:
General receiverships may, as a practical matter, no longer be important because of
the flexible voluntary and involuntary reorganization procedure now available under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.... The major practical function of the receiver
today is the enforcement of a real property mortgagee's rights in a state court mortgage foreclosure proceeding. Moreover, the motion for a receiver seeks only ancillary relief incidental to a request for more substantive relief, such as foreclosure.
Id. But see Carlson, supra note 10, at 1346 (doubting that federal bankruptcy law is superior to
state collective remedies in absence of empirical proof, but nevertheless assuming for purposes of argument "that state courts today see relatively few receiverships or assignments for
the benefit of creditors," which may indicate less-than-strenuous challenging of theory).
227. See, e.g., BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 31-36
(describing historical development of federal bankruptcy law).
228. See infra notes 229-41 and accompanying text. That the federal remedy of bankruptcy currently provides greater remedies to creditors than state collective remedies does
not necessarily mean that state laws could not be made more effective. See infra notes 229-34.
For example, this could be achieved by expanding the powers of an assignee for the benefit of
creditors or by expanding preference and other avoidance provisions. Even these changes
would not wholly ameliorate the relative success of the state collective system as opposed to
the federal collective system, due to the limited jurisdiction of state law. See infra notes 23541 and accompanying text (discussing limits of state stay actions and other constraining characteristics of state creditor law based on jurisdictional constraints).
229. See supra note 42 (defining preference). Indeed, for purposes of the preference provision, the Code presumes that the debtor was insolvent during the 90-day period preceding
the filing of the petition. Id. § 547(f). Of course, any single preference avoidance action may
work to the detriment of the creditor-defendant, but collectively the debtor's preference actions serve to benefit all the debtor's creditors. See Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874
F.2d 1186, 1194 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that laws requiring creditors to "hold back" benefit
all creditors by protecting debtor's aggregate value).
230. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1800 (West 1982) (providing that assignee may recover any transfer of property made within 90 days of assignment); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:19-3
(West 1987) (voiding preferential transfers made within four months of general assignment
and allowing assignee to recover property); N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. Law § 15(6-a) (McKinney
1990) (allowing assignee to recover preferential transfers made within four months of assignment); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, §§ 151-154 (1990) (requiring preferential transfers to inure to

benefit of all creditors if assignment of insolvency proceedings are commenced within four
months). But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 727.109 (West 1988) (omitting mention of power to avoid
preferential transfers). See generally BURRILL, supra note 45, at 438-43 (failing to specify avoidance of preferential transfers as right of assignee). Moreover, an assignee's ability to avoid
preferential transfers will be of little comfort to creditors that are unable to convince their
debtor to commence an assignment for their benefit.
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and only one state provides generally for avoidance of such transfers. 23 1 Other transfers made by an insolvent debtor may be
avoided in bankruptcy 2 32 but generally are not avoidable under state
law. 28 3 Finally, a trustee appointed under federal law may investigate the debtor's financial affairs and thereby chill prepetition trans23 4
fers that work to deplete the debtor's assets.
More importantly, federal bankruptcy law is a better coercive remedy than state law collective remedies because of the jurisdictional
limitations that state laws face. For example, under federal law an
automatic stay prevents creditors from coercing repayment outside
231. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, §§ 151-154 (stating that preferential transfers are avoidable by
any creditor if assignment for benefit of creditor or insolvency proceedings are commenced
under Pennsylvania law within four months after such transfer occurred). Under Pennsylvania
law, standing to recover preferential transfers is not limited to equitable receivers, assignees
for the benefit of creditors, or the like. Id.
232. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544-553 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (allowing avoidance of certain
unperfected, improperly perfected security interests and other secret liens, statutory liens,
preferential transfers, fraudulent transfers, and postpetition transactions).
233. Fraudulent transfers are avoidable under both state and federal law, however. Compare U.F.C.A. §§ 4-7 (1985) (describing conveyances considered fraudulent and avoidable)
and U.F.T.A. §§ 4, 5 (1985) (allowing creditors to avoid certain transfers that are or are
deemed fraudulent) with 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988) (allowing trustee to avoid actual and constructive fraudulent transfers). Although both the U.F.C.A. and the U.F.T.A. expressly permit
only creditors of the debtor standing to sue, many state statutes governing assignments for
the benefit of creditors permit an assignee to assert fraudulent transfer actions on behalf of
creditors. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 727.109 (West 1989) (allowing assignee to bring action
to avoid "any conveyance void or voidable by law"); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 379.070 (Baldwin
1981) (permitting assignee to institute proceedings to recover property fraudulently conveyed); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1313.58 (Anderson 1979) (ordering assignees to commence
suits to recover possession of property fraudulently conveyed). A receiver might also enjoy
the same right. See ALDERSON, supra note 68, § 248, at 317 (stating that receiver is only party
who may attack fraudulent conveyances on behalf of creditors). In addition, state assignees
for the benefit of creditors have the same power as a trustee in bankruptcy to avoid unperfected security interests. See U.C.C. § 9-301(c) (1981) (stating that unperfected security
interest is subordinate to interest of lien creditor, which includes interest of both assignee for
benefit of creditors and trustee-in-bankruptcy); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 727.10(a)-(b) (West
1989) (allowing assignee to bring suit to avoid unperfected security interest).
234. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(4)-(5), 1106 (1988). A trustee is appointed in every chapter 7 liquidation case. See id. § 701, 702 (requiring appointment of interim trustee and subsequent
election of permanent trustee). Trustees are only appointed in chapter 11 reorganization
cases "for cause," however, or if such an appointment is in the best interests of those with
interests in the estate. Id. § 1104. Under state collective proceedings, an assignee for the
benefit of creditors or an equitable receiver may be appointed and provided with statutory or
common law powers akin to those that a trustee enjoys. See generally BURRILL, supra note 45, at
325-26 (stating that assignee can defeat levy attempts and that relationship is that of trustee);
ALDERSON, supra note 69, § 249, at 317 (stating that receiver has rights of trustee, which could
be retained by bankrupt estate to which receiver is assigned). The general rule is that the
powers of a trustee in bankruptcy are far broader than those of his or her state law counterparts. BURRILL, supra note 45, at 325-26, 438-43 (stating that assignment will not defeat preexisting liens and operates as quitclaim conveyance to assignee); KING & COOK, supra note 43,
at 604 (stating that receivers only provide relief that is ancillary to more substantive relief.
For example, receiverships ordinarily are available only for corporate debtors, and not individuals. KING & COOK, supra note 43, at 604.
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the bounds of the federal collective proceeding. 23 5 A federal bankruptcy court's power to enforce such a stay extends beyond state
lines. 23 6 On the other hand, the commencement of a state collective

remedy may stay individual collection efforts, 23 7 but such a stay can
only enjoin measures subject to the state court's limited jurisdiction. 238 Similarly, assignees and receivers have little power to affect

assets located beyond the jurisdiction of the state court that appointed the assignee or receiver. 23 9 Although the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution 240 may in theory provide extraterritorial effect to these state remedies, this theoretical benefit may
prove too time consuming and expensive in implementation to be of
practical assistance. Finally, federal bankruptcy law is a better collective remedy than state law because of the constitutional limitations that any state law insolvency scheme would face in attempting
241
to mirror the provisions of the federal bankruptcy laws.

Creditors may also be prejudiced through the state appointment
235. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 105, at 340, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297
(stating that automatic stay prevents creditors from pursuing own remedies).
236. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) (1988) (providing that bankruptcy jurisdiction extends to "all of the property wherever located, of the debtor").
237. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 727.105 (West 1989) (prohibiting levy, execution, or attachment against assets, excluding real estate, not in control of assignee, upon filing of state
collective action); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 77 (1990) (allowing stays for executions of liens or
claims); see also ALDERSON, supra note 69, § 227, at 278-79 (positing that court may stay other
proceedings at its discretion); BURRILL, supra note 45, at 325-26 (explaining that assignments
are conveyances that are not subject to creditor's levy).
238. See Pusey &Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491, 497 (1923) (prohibiting creditor
from bringing suit in federal court for appointment of receiver based on state statute); Shoemaker v. Wiley, 13 A.2d 212, 213 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1940) (holding that creditor cannot challenge
result of assignment made in Pennsylvania in courts of NewJersey even if subject property is
located in New Jersey); Judd v.J.W. Forsinger Co., 186 A. 525, 526-27 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1936)
(declaring that assignment under insolvency statute is enforceable only as to property in state
of assignment); Green v. Wallis Iron-Works, 23 A. 498, 499-501 (N.J. Ch. 1892) (finding that
assignments in one state have no effect as to creditors and property in another); see also ALDERSON, supra note 69, § 228, at 279-87 (stating that discretion to recognize appointment of receiver in another state rests with court and will not be granted at expense of local creditors);
BURRILL, supra note 45, at 334-45 (describing ways in which assignments of real and personal
property in one state have effect in another); KiNG & CooK, supra note 43, at 604 (stating that
receiver's powers are limited by state court's jurisdiction); ThomasJ. Schwartz, Termination of
SEC Receiverships in the FederalCourts, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 163, 193-95 (1974) (describing limits on receiver's power as function ofjurisdictional limit of appointing court). Of course, the
appointment of an equitable receiver under federal common law would resolve this question
of comity with regard to the collective remedy of receiverships, but there exists no federal
common law assignment for the benefit of creditors.
239. See BEACH, supra note 69, at 203 (stating that receivers cannot represent creditors in
foreign jurisdictions); KING & COOK, supra note 43, at 604 (explaining that receivers are officers of state court and are limited by its jurisdiction).
240. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 (asserting that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State").
241. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (contracts clause); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (bankruptcy
clause); see also International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 263-68 (1929) (holding that
bankruptcy clause invalidated state assignment for benefit of creditors that provided debtor
with discharge from indebtedness); Denny v. Bennett, 128 U.S. 489, 491-99 (1888) (finding
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of an equitable receiver or other custodian for a debtor's assets. 2 42
The appointment is indicative of a debtor's failure to pay debts as
they come due, in part, because the standards for commencement of
an assignment for the benefit of creditors243 or receivership 244 often
require proof of the debtor's general default. Moreover, under
either remedy, the custodian is likely to freeze payments to creditors
pending resolution of the equitable basis for the appointment. The
custodian may even have been appointed to supervise the liquidation of some or all of the debtor's assets; indeed, Congress implicitly
justifies this ground for the commencement of an involuntary case.
Legislative history indicates that creditors waiting more than the
statutory period after such an appointment should have little difficulty in filing an involuntary petition by proving equity
24 5
insolvency.
that state cannot make or enforce law that impairs contracts or extends to person outside of
state).
242. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 105, at 323, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6280
(noting that if custodian has been appointed, irrebuttable presumption of debtor's inability to
pay debts as they mature arises). Jackson questions the wisdom of this standard because it
might serve as a substitute for determining insolvency, rather than as evidence of insolvency,
unless the standard were rebuttable by the debtor with proof of its solvency. Jackson explains
that:
Instead of having bankruptcy follow suit [after commencement ofa nonbankruptcy
collective proceeding], it would be better to dismiss both kinds of proceedings (if the
nonbankruptcy one was brought for suspicious reasons]. Perhaps the appropriate
way to accomplish that is to have the proceeding transferred to the bankruptcy forum
and then have it dismissed, on application of the insolvency tests-which suggests
that the propriety of this path into bankruptcy should not be resolved without resort
to bankruptcy's insolvency tests as well.
JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMrrs, supra note 5, at 201-02.
243. See, e.g., ARI. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1031 (1989) (discussing only assignments by
insolvent debtors); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 727.104 (West 1988) (providing assignment remedy for
creditors that is based on allegation that debtor is unable to pay debts as they mature). Conversely, many state statutes do not find a debtor's inability to pay debts as they become due a
criterion for a general assignment. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-117-401 to -407 (Michie
1987); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 493-010 (West 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2101 (1991); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 28-301 to -320 (Harrison 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 426.010-.410 (Vernon
1992); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:19-1 to -50 (West 1987).
244. See BAXTER DUNAWAY, I THE LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 7.02[8][a], at 7-9
(1988) ("Courts normally require some, if not all, of the following elements before an appointment of a receiver will be granted: (1) that there is a risk that the security will be inadequate to cover the loan balance upon foreclosure; (2) that there exists danger of physical
waste; and/or (3) that the borrower be insolvent."); 75 CJ.S. Receivers § 18, at 683 (1952) ("It
is a general rule that, in order to obtain the appointment of a receiver, applicant must show
that the possession of the property by defendant was obtained by fraud, or that the property
itself, or the income arising from it, is in danger of loss from neglect, waste, misconduct, or
insolvency."); see also 75 CJ.S. Receivers § 27, at 690-91 (refining circumstances under which
showing of insolvency entitles applicant to appointment of receiver).
245. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 105, at 324, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6280; S.
REP. No. 989, supra note 105, at 34, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5820.
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When Are a Debtor's Assets Public Goods?

Economists define common pool problems not just as negative
consumption externalities caused by exhaustible resources, but also
as externalities that cannot be resolved through the establishment of
private property rights. 2 46 When resources in dispute involve public
or quasi-public goods, private property rights by definition cannot
resolve the common pool problem. 24 7 Thus, common pool
problems involve only those externalities caused by exhaustible
public or quasi-public goods.
This conclusion raises a question as to whether the assets of a
debtor that is insolvent, but able to pay debts as they come due, are
public goods. Such a debtor would create at least the potential for a
consumption externality because by definition a balance-sheet insolvent debtor's assets are insufficient to satisfy all outstanding
claims. 248 This potential may never result in an externality, however, for mere balance-sheet insolvency does not present the need
or opportunity for any sort of collection remedy, whether individual
or collective, because the debtor has not defaulted on its
obligations.
This insolvent but cash-rich debtor does not pose a common pool
problem for another reason. 24 9 Rather than inquire into whether
the debtor holds exhaustible resources, which it does, the focus
should be on whether the debtor's exhaustible resources involve
public goods. The characterization of a balance-sheet insolvent
debtor's assets as public goods is not readily obvious because a
debtor owns its assets and can therefore exclude its creditors from
the assets' possession or use.
1.

Default

Upon default, however, a debtor loses this ability to exclude creditors' access to its assets. Once a debtor defaults, the holders of
246. As used here, "property rights" refers to the right to exclude others. Under this
definition, a rule of capture such as that applicable to wild animals, oil and gas, or debtor's
assets under individual collection remedies is not viewed as creating a property right.
247. See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (explaining that public goods are those
for which consumption may not be made exclusive).
248. See supra notes 158-67 and accompanying text (discussing potential common pool
problems associated with insolvent debtor able to pay debts as they come due).
249. This same analysis regarding the resemblance of a defaulting debtor's assets to public goods applies whether the debtor is insolvent or not. This Article emphasizes an insolvent
debtor only because Jackson focuses on a debtor's balance-sheet insolvency as creating the
common pool problem. SeeJAcKSoN, LOGIC AND LIMrrs, supra note 5, at 197-98 (stating that
debtor's lack of assets to satisfy debts results in likelihood of claimants exercising individual
collection remedies, thereby creating common pool problem).
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delinquent unsecured 250 and secured claims are entitled to coerce
repayment by forcing a sale of a sufficient amount of the debtor's
assets to repay the claims. 2 5- But it is creditors' competing claims to
collateral rather than a creditor's competition with the debtor that
causes a debtor's assets to resemble public goods. Absent the existence of a contractual acceleration clause, the debtor's default on
one claim does not provide other creditors access to the debtor's
assets. 25 2 If the debtor were to default on multiple unsecured debts
or on multiple debts secured by competing interests in the same
collateral, these creditors could then proceed against the debtor's
assets. None of the creditors, however, would have the right to exclude the others until the process was complete.2 53 Thus, a debtor's
assets become public goods only after a debtor defaults on more
than one obligation. Until the debtor is in default, the assets are
privately owned by the debtor and the debtor is able to exclude
creditors from reaching the assets.
2.

The effect of secured debt

In the abstract, it seems reasonable to argue that a debtor's assets
are not public goods if they are encumbered by security interests,
because secured creditors are entitled to exclude2 5 4 other credi250.

See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text (discussing individual collection reme-

dies of attachment, garnishment, execution, and levy). Unsecured creditors may not be entitled to reach even a defaulting debtor's assets if the assets are encumbered by a security
interest. See U.C.C. § 9-201 (1981) (stating that even unperfected security interests are effective against unsecured creditors).
251. See id. §§ 9-501 to 9-505 (establishing right of secured creditors to take possession of
property and to sell, dispose, or lease property upon debtor's default).
252.

See LYNN M. LoPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS

§ 16.4.10 (1985) (explaining that acceleration clause allows creditor to declare entire balance
due and owing). Use of this type of clause would allow a creditor to claim that a debtor is not
paying its debts as they are becoming due (in accelerated form) and consequently, the creditor could join with other creditors to institute an involuntary bankruptcy case.
253. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing characterization of individual
collection remedies as "grab laws"); infra notes 279-91 and accompanying text (discussing
inability of competing secured creditors to exclude each other from their share of collateral).
254. See U.C.C. § 9-201 (1981) (mandating enforcement of security interests as against
unsecured creditors).

1993]

CLARIFYING THE COMMON POOL ANALOGY

399

tors25 5 from reaching their collateral until they are paid in full. 25 6
The common pool problems of collecting creditors are not wholly
resolved, however, by the grant of a security interest. A secured
creditor's right to exclude others from its collateral does not extend
to the debtor's surplus in the collateral. 25 7 Moreover, where more

than one secured creditor holds a competing claim to the same collateral, one secured creditor may not be able to exclude the
other.258 Whether encumbered assets constitute public goods will
depend on the value of the assets as compared to the value of the
secured debt or, in other words, on whether the assets are fully or

only partially encumbered, as well as on the number of secured
creditors and the structure of the secured transaction.
a. Fully encumbered assets-one secured creditor
If the defaulting debtor is indebted to a creditor holding a lien
against all the debtor's assets and the debt owed to this creditor
equals or exceeds the value of these assets, then the debtor's fully
encumbered assets are not public goods. The secured creditor can
exclude all others from collecting against its collateral. 259 Thus, if
there are no unencumbered assets, then there are no public goods
2
and no common pool problem. 60
Imagine a debtor who holds $1000 in assets. The debtor's assets
consist of 1000 widgets, each worth one dollar. On day 1, the
debtor grants a security interest in all its assets to secured creditor A
in exchange forA's loan to the debtor of $1000. The debtor agrees
to repay A in ten equal installments of $100 plus accrued interest.
255. Often, secured creditors permit their debtors to remain in possession of, and possibly even to sell, encumbered collateral. Cf id. § 9-306(2) (explaining that security interest in
property remains, notwithstanding sale or other disposition of property). This right would
lapse after default when a secured creditor has the right of self-help repossession. Id § 9-503.
The Bankruptcy Code continues a debtor's right to use, sell, or lease collateral in the ordinary
course of business. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988) (allowing trustee to use, sell, or lease property
other than that used in "ordinary course of business"). If the secured creditor wishes to
repossess collateral during the pendency of a bankruptcy case, it must show justification for
relief from the automatic stay. See id. § 362(d) (allowing relief from stay for cause, or upon
showing of cause that debtor has no equity in property and that property is not needed for
bankruptcy reorganization).
256. See Bowers, Loss Distribution, supra note 23, at 57-68 (discussing secured creditor's
scope of control over secured collateral).
257. See U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1981) (stating that secured creditor must account to debtor
for surplus). Unsecured creditors, however, will be forced to await a repossession and resale
by the affected secured creditor before gaining access to this equity.
258. See infra notes 279-91 and accompanying text (discussing inability of competing secured creditors to prevent each others' efforts to repossess and sell collateral as distinct from
issue of secured creditors' relative priority).
259. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1981).
260. See Picker, supra note 23, at 669-75 (discussing ways in which security interests obviate need to supplant pro rata rule that is hallmark of common pool problem).

400

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:337

On day 30, the first installment falls due but the debtor defaults. At
the same time, A is 'told that the debtor's business is sound, that
default should not recur in future months, and that the collateral
has diminished in value by $100 so that $900 in assets now secures
A's $1000 loan.
What should A do? Should it do nothing? Should A repossess a
sufficient number of widgets to satisfy the $100 delinquent debt?
Or would A be better off accelerating the entire debt and repossessing all $900 in assets? The answer will depend onA's determination
of the likelihood that the debtor will earn sufficient wages or revenue to repay its obligations in subsequent periods 26 1 and that the
262
value of the debtor's assets will increase or at least remain stable.
Although the debtor is insolvent, A need not worry about other
creditors' responses to the debtor's financial difficulties because, by
virtue of its secured status, A is assured priority in the debtor's
3
assets. 26
To a limited extent, however, a defaulting debtor's assets may involve public goods even where the debtor has granted a blanket lien
to a single secured creditor. First, it is never perfectly clear whether
the debtor has equity in the collateral until after a commercially reasonable sale of the collateral by the secured creditor or after some
judicial determination of the value of the debtor's assets. If the
debtor has equity in the collateral and more than one unsecured
creditor, a common pool problem may arise. 264 Second, the
debtor's unencumbered collateral may be its earning potential as
opposed to its existing store of assets, and neither a consumer nor a
business debtor can grant a foolproof security interest in all its future income. Business debtors can approach a complete encumbrance of their earning capacity by granting a security interest in
261. The debtor's obligations to the secured creditor are two-fold: the debtor must repay
both principal and accrued interest. Secured lenders are, ofcourse, in the business of lending
money, with their "profit" measured by the interest owed by the debtor. Thus, if the collateral used to secure a loan is sufficiently valuable to protect the loan amount or is at least stable
in value, a lender may be willing to delay repossession of the collateral based on the debtor's
ability to keep current on its obligation and pay accrued interest.
262. Valuation of the collateral at any given point in time is inherently difficult because,
ultimately, value is assigned either by a buyer at a commercially reasonable resale of the collateral or by a court with jurisdiction over the property.
263. See U.C.C. § 9-201 (1981) (stating that security agreements are effective "between
the parties and ... against creditors").
264. Cf infra notes 278-79 and accompanying text (discussing common pool problem created by partially encumbered assets).
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accounts, 2 65 chattel paper, 26 6 and general intangibles, 267 by assigning contractual rights excepted from the scope of Article 9 of
the U.C.C.,268 and by agreeing that all cash receipts flow through a
"lockbox" arrangement 26 9 or a special purpose finance subsidiary. 27 0 Even then, however, some income may slip through and ac27
crue to the business debtor. '
In the case of consumer debtors, an encumbrance of earnings is
even more difficult to ensure. Many states scrutinize an assignment
of future income; 27 2 important sources of income are often either
nonassignable or exempt. 27 3 Moreover, federal law limits the por265. See U.C.C. § 9-106 (1981) (defining account as "any right to payment for goods sold
or leased, or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper,
whether or not it has been earned by performance").
266. See id, § 9-105(1)(b) (defining chattel paper as "writing or writings which evidence
both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods").
267. See id. § 9-106 (defining general intangibles as "any personal property [including
things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, and
money," as well as contract rights).
268. See id § 9-104 (excluding certain transactions such as leases and government contracts from scope of Article 9); see also 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (establishing requirements for
assignment of governmental contracts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 (1981)
(defining assignment of contractual rights; rights may be assigned unless: (1) assignment
would impair third party's contractual right; (2) assignment is forbidden by statute or public
policy; or (3) terms of contract preclude assignment).
269. Because the U.C.C. requires that a security interest in money be perfected by possession, U.C.C. § 9-304(1) (1981), lenders have devised "lockbox" arrangements to perfect security interests in the cash receipts of a debtor. In a lockbox arrangement, the debtor is
required to deposit all cash receipts, or all cash receipts of a certain sort, in a particular location under the lender's control such as a deposit account with the lender banking institution.
See Jeremy W. Dickens, Note, Equitable Subordination and Analogous Theories of Lender Liability:
Toward a New Model of "Control", 65 TEx. L. REv. 801, 832 n.173 (1987) (describing accounts
receivable lockbox collection established at creditors' bank for purposes of controlling
debtor's cash flow).
270. See Richard E. Mendales, The New Junkyard of CorporateFinance: The Treatment ofJunk
Bonds in Bankruptcy, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1137, 1169-70 (1991) (describing ways in which corporation can structurally subordinate claims of unsecured creditors by creating subsidiary whose
creditors are superior in right to creditors of parent company).
271. Usually, the income that will "slip through" is that which is derived from transactions
ungoverned by Article 9 of the U.C.C. Some of the assets excluded from the scope of Article
9 remain subject to the creation of a voluntary encumbrance under state law, but state law
may preclude the creation of a lien against certain of such assets either by prohibiting an
assignment of the asset or by exempting it from the reach of creditors. See generally KING &
Coox, supra note 43, at 515-34 (describing assets that are immune to creditors because not
subject to assignment or transfer). Federal bankruptcy law broadly reaches the same result
regarding certain income earned by a debtor after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. See I1
U.S.C. § 552 (1988) (invalidating security interests in property of estate acquired after filing
of petition, so long as property is not proceeds, profits, or rents from property acquired by
debtor prior to filing of petition).
272. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 300 (West 1989) (listing prerequisites for assignment of
wages, including spousal or parental consent and limitations on assignments of wages to 50%
per pay period); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 154, § 2 (West 1992) (exempting debts under
$3000 from assignment, as well as limiting wage assignment agreements to one year); NJ.
REv. STAT. § 34:11-25 (1988) (prohibiting assignments of wages that reflect usurious interest
rate).
273. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8346 (1988) (prohibiting assignment of civil service retirement
benefits); 10 U.S.C. § 1035(d) (1988) (prohibiting assignment of military personnel's savings
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2 74
tion of an individual's wages that can be garnished after default,
and many states impose even more stringent limitations on creditors' abilities to garnish wages. 2 75 In addition, an assignment or
garnishment of an individual debtor's wages probably will not survive the bankruptcy discharge, even if it would have been effective
outside of bankruptcy.2 76 Finally, courts have uniformly invalidated,
on public policy grounds, any waivers of the right to file a voluntary
2 77
petition in bankruptcy.

b.

Partially encumbered assets

Assume the same debtor that grants a security interest to creditor
A in exchange for a $1000 loan. On day 2, when the debtor defaults, A is told that the debtor has incurred $500 in unsecured trade
debt to suppliers B and C.278 Do A, B, and C face a common pool
problem? The answer depends in part on the value of the debtor's
assets, because as a practical matter, the debtor's assets are not pubdeposits); 33 U.S.C. § 916 (1988) (prohibiting assignment of longshoremen's benefits); 38
U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1988) (prohibiting assignment of veterans' benefits); 45 U.S.C. § 352(e)
(1988) (prohibiting assignment of railroad employees' benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1988)
(prohibiting assignment of social security benefits); 46 U.S.C. § 11109(a) (1988) (prohibiting
assignment of sailors' wages).
274. See Consumers Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988) (providing that no
more than 25% of aggregate disposable earnings for any workweek or other pay period may
be garnished).
275. See, e.g., CAL. Cxv. PROC. CODE § 706.051 (West 1987) (exempting from garnishment
that portion of debtor's wages necessary to support debtor or debtor's family); N.Y. Civ.
PRtc. L. & R. 5231 (B) (McKinney 1992) (allowing maximum of 10% of wages to be garnished
absent special application of garnishing creditor).
276. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 243-45 (1934) (holding that federal bankruptcy filing discharges individual debtor's assignment of future wages even if assignment is
considered lien under state law); see also In reMiranda Soto, 667 F.2d 235, 237 (Ist Cir. 1981)
(applying Local Loan and ruling that assignment of wages only creates bankruptcy lien if wages
have already been earned by individual debtor).
277. See, e.g., Klingman v. Levison, 831 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.3 (7th Cir. 1987) ("For public
policy reasons, a debtor may not contract away the right to a discharge in bankruptcy."); In re
DiPierro, 69 B.R. 279, 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987) ("A debtor cannot contract away the right
to a bankruptcy discharge in advance of the bankruptcy filing."); In re Markizer, 66 B.R. 1014,
1018 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986) ("An agreement to waive the benefit of a discharge in bankruptcy
is wholly void, as against public policy."). Baird and Jackson question the wisdom of these
cases as applied to debtors that are not individuals. See BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS
AND MATERIALS, supra note 6,at 756-62 (arguing that individuals need protection from impulsive decisions, while marketplace promotes rational decisionmaking for businesses); JAcKsON,
LOGIC AND LIMrrs, supra note 5, at 253-79 (describing "fresh-start policy" fbr individuals as
being rooted in desire to protect human capital that is threatened by impulsive behavior,
incomplete heuristics, and externalities that are common to all individuals and can be addressed by uniform rule).
278. The same common pool problem would exist with one supplier if the secured creditor were undersecured, because the undersecured creditor will hold both a secured and an
unsecured claim against the debtor. In effect, the undersecured creditor will be secured up to
the value of the collateral and unsecured as to the deficiency amount. See 1I U.S.C. § 506
(1988) (declaring that creditor holding either lien on debtor's property or offset due to debt
owed by creditor is secured creditor for value of property or offset, and unsecured creditor for
remaining amount of claim).
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lic goods until the secured creditors have been paid in full. Until
that time, the debtor's assets are not available for unsecured creditors to exclude each other from reaching.
If as in a prior example the widgets decrease in value, then A
holds a secured claim equal to the entire value of the widgets, and it
is irrelevant that B and C each hold unsecured claims against the
debtor because there are no unencumbered assets to support this
debt. On the other hand, if the widgets have increased in value to
$1100, then B and C face a common pool problem with regard to
their efforts to levy against the $100 in unencumbered assets. A is
generally not affected by this common pool problem because, as a
secured creditor, A's interest in the first $1000 of widgets cannot be
adversely affected by the unsecured claims of B and C.279
c.

Fuly encumbered assets-more than one secured creditor

Assume instead that the debtor granted ten security interests to
secured creditors A throughJ in exchange for these creditors' extensions of credit to the debtor. Together, A through J loan the
debtor $1000. The debtor agrees to repay A, with interest, at the
end of the first month, B at the end of the second month, and so on.
In each creditor's agreement with the debtor, the parties agree that
the debtor's default on any single debt amounts to a general default.
At the end of the first month, however, the debtor is insolvent, fails
to repay A on time, and thus is in general default. The creditors are
assured by the debtor that its business is sound and that the default
will not recur.
Do A throughJ face a common pool problem? The answer depends on the composition of the collateral and the structure of the
loans. If each creditor holds a security interest in the same body of
widget collateral, distinguished only by the priority in which their
collateral interest is recoverable, 280 then one creditor's repossession
and resale of the widgets will directly affect only the claims of
subordinate creditors. This is so because collateral is conveyed free
from the claim of the selling creditor and all subordinate claims, 2 81
279. A may be indirectly affected by B and C's garnishment of the debtor's liquid assets,
however. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (describing debtor's repayment out of
earnings as cause for product consumption externality).
280. Priority generally will be governed by the order in which the financing statements
were filed or the security interests perfected, whichever is earlier. U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a)
(1981). Of course, creditors can alter this general rule by agreement. See U.C.C. § 9-316
(1981) ("Nothing in this article prevents subordination by agreement by any person entitled
to priority."); see also 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (1988) (validating subordination agreements under
Bankruptcy Code when such agreements would be enforceable under nonbankruptcy law).
281. See U.C.C. § 9-504(4) (1981) ("When collateral is disposed of by a secured party after
default, the disposition transfers to a purchaser for value all of the debtor's rights therein,
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although senior security interests in the collateral continue despite
the sale.28 2 If, on the other hand, each creditor holds a security in-

terest in a specific widget rather than in the widgets as a group, then
an individual creditor's concern about the actions of fellow creditors
will depend on factors such as whether the debtor's earning capacity
is related to the assets it retains, whether the resale captured the
going concern value of the assets, and so on.
For example, assume that the debtor is an individual who owns
ten video cassette tapes. If the debtor granted ten security interests
in the tape collection to creditors A through J, and if A throughJ
each file financing statements on ten consecutive dates (A first, B
second, and so on) describing the collateral as "ten video cassette
tapes," then A would hold a first priority security interest in the collection, B a second priority security interest in the collection, and so
on.2 8 3 If the debtor defaults on her obligations to C, C would be
entitled to repossess the ten video cassette tapes 2 84 and resell them
after notice to the debtor and to "any other secured party from
whom [C] has received... written notice of a claim of an interest in
the collateral." 28 5 Even ifA and B do not receive or are not entitled
to receive notice of the sale from C, however, their senior interests
are not expunged as a result of the sale; the sale is subject to these
prior security interests.2 8 6 Therefore, A and B can repossess the collateral in the hands of C's buyer.28 7 D throughJ have some protecdischarges the security interest under which it is made and any security interest or lien
subordinate thereto.").
282. Id § 9-306(2) (providing that security interest continues unless senior secured party
authorized disposition of collateral).
283. Id § 9-312(5)(a); see also supra note 280 (delineating Article 9 rule of priority for security interests).
284. This claim assumes that the repossessing secured creditor repossesses and sells the
entire body of widget collateral. Nothing in Article 9 of the U.C.C. requires this result. See
U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1981) ("A secured party after default may sell, lease or otherwise dispose
of any or all of the collateral in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable
preparation or processing.") (emphasis added). And the possibility of proceeding against
only a portion of the collateral admits of the possibility of the externalities discussed below.
See infra notes 290-91 and accompanying text (describing product consumption externalities
that may be caused by repossession and resale of portion of debtor's assets).
285. Id. § 9-504(3).
286. See id § 9-504(4) (providing that purchaser from second creditor takes free of rights
and interests of secured creditor and any subordinate security interests); see also Chadron Energy Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 459 N.W.2d 718, 731-33 (Neb. 1991) (finding that junior secured party rightfully may dispose of collateral and need not retain proceeds 'orsenior party,
but that senior secured party retains security interest in collateral in hands of purchaser);
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-9 (3d ed. 1988)
(interpreting U.C.C. § 9-504(4) as preserving senior secured party's claim on collateral sold
by junior secured party and in possession of purchaser).
287. C's buyer would of course have a right of action against C,presumably for breach of
the warranty of title. See U.C.C. § 2-312 (1981) (providing that contract for sale includes
implied warrant of title that guarantees title is free of any security interest, lien, or encumbrance of which buyer had no actual or constructive knowledge).
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tion, although their subordinate security interests will have been
released in the event of a sale. 2 8 D throughJ no longer can look to
the collateral for repayment, but they are entitled to receive satisfaction out of the proceeds of the sale if the proceeds are sufficient and
if the remaining creditors notify C before the distribution of the proceeds is complete. 28 9 Of course, if A and B cannot locate C's buyer
or if D throughJ do not notify C in time, then these creditors will be
adversely affected by C's repossession and resale of the collateral.
These creditors may be able to prevent this contingency from occurring by sending C and every other secured creditor "written notice
of a claim on an interest in the collateral," which in turn requires C
to notify the other creditors of its intent to sell the collateral. 290
A more effective way for creditors to avoid this thicket of externalities is to structure the transaction differently. For example, A could
have been granted a security interest in Gone with the Wind, B could
have been granted a security interest in E.T., C a security interest in
Ghost, and so on. When C repossesses and resells Ghost, A, B, and D
throughJ may be indifferent to the transaction. But even when the
transaction is structured as ten distinctly collateralized loans, there
still are circumstances under which creditors other than C will be
affected by C's repossession and resale of Ghost. First, C's actions
may impinge on the going concern value of the debtor's assets if, for
example, the debtor's video cassettes comprise a collection that is
more valuable when sold as a group than when sold individually.
Second, C's actions may impinge on the debtor's earning capacity.
If the debtor were in the business of renting the video cassettes, C's
repossession of Ghost may cause the debtor's customers to take their
business to another establishment with a more complete collection.
Both the effect that C's actions may have on the going concern value
of the debtor's assets, and on the debtor's earning capacity, are
29 1
product consumption externalities.
288. Id. § 9-504(4) (providing that disposition of collateral by secured party discharges
secured party's interest and any interest "subordinate thereto").
289. Id. § 9-504(l)(c) (describing secured party's obligation to apply surplus proceeds of
sale of collateral to claims of subordinate creditors that have notified senior party of their
claims in writing).
290. Id. § 9-505. Upon notice, the nondisposing secured creditors can protect their interests by bidding at the sale. l. § 9-504 cmt. 5. On the other hand, this protection may be of
limited usefulness to A, B, and D through J. The notification of sale requirement does not
exist when the collateral involves consumer goods. See id. § 9-504(3) (declaring that for consumer goods, only debtor need be notified of sale of collateral).
291. See supra notes 176-77, 182-87, 189 and accompanying text (defining product consumption externality and applying term to unsecured creditors' collection efforts against
replenishable assets of debtor whose earning capacity depends on composition of its assets,
and to unsecured creditors' garnishment of debtor's earning or debtor's repayment of unsecured creditors out of earnings).
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E. Summary
Baird and Jackson have developed a powerful metaphor by comparing creditors of an insolvent debtor to anglers in a common pool
of fish. With this analogy, they focus on the need for bankruptcy as
resulting from competition among creditors rather than from competition between a debtor and its creditors. 2 92 This focus has important normative implications for the circumstances under which
bankruptcy becomes a necessary remedy, as well as for the scope of
actions appropriately pursued in the context of a bankruptcy case.
Baird and Jackson's description of the circumstances under which
the common pool problem arises needs refinement. Their assertion
that insolvency gives rise to this problem is too broad a view; a
debtor's balance-sheet insolvency alone does not create a common
pool problem. 2 93 Insolvency by definition presents an example of
exhaustible resources 2 94 but creates merely the potential for a consumption externality to arise among creditors. 295 Balance-sheet insolvency creates a common pool problem only when the insolvent
debtor defaults and creditors are entitled to pursue collection ef2 96
forts against its unencumbered, nonexempt assets.
Their reference to a debtor's insolvency as generating common
pool problems is also too narrow a view, because a solvent debtor's
financial difficulties may create a common pool problem for several
reasons. First, a debtor's illiquid assets do not represent the only
exhaustible resource to which creditors can look for repayment.
Creditors are more likely to be repaid out of a debtor's liquid assets,
such as wages earned by a consumer debtor or revenue earned by a
business debtor. 29 7 Because debtors can only earn a limited amount
of money in a given period of time, these liquid assets similarly represent an exhaustible resource. A debtor's voluntary or involuntary
payments out of earnings to some but not all of its creditors causes a
consumption externality if either the solvent or insolvent debtor is
292. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (describing Jackson's model of bankruptcy as ix ante agreement that creditors would make among themselves).
293. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text (describing situations in which balance-sheet insolvency exists but in which no common pool problem arises, such as where
debtor is able to pay debts out of earnings as such debts come due).
294. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text (outlining common pool problem associated with competing claims to exhaustible resources such as fish and analogizing problem to
situation presented by insolvent debtor).
295. See supra notes 157-70 and accompanying text (distinguishing mere potential for
common pool problems from problem itself).
296. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text (discussing prejudice to creditors of
insolvent debtor that is not paying debts as they come due).
297. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (identifying situations in which insolvent consumer debtors meet debts out of income, and businesses that are balance-sheet insolvent meet debts out of operating revenue).
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generally unable to pay its debts as they come due. 29 8 This externality is much more difficult to resolve ex ante by the grant of a security interest for reasons of public policy. 29 9 Thus, a debtor's inability
to repay debts as they come due creates a common pool problem
whether or not the debtor has sufficient assets out of which to repay
3
its liabilities. 00
Second, a solvent debtor's assets will present a common pool
problem if the debtor is viable and its assets are replenishable because both levy and garnishment can affect a debtor's earning capacity. Depending on the type of debtor and the nature of the assets,
levy may limit or incapacitate a business debtor's ability to continue
operations.3 0 1 Even in the case of an individual debtor, collection
efforts, such as garnishment, may make it difficult for a debtor to
30 2
retain its employment position.
Finally, unsecured creditors' collection efforts against a solvent
debtor's assets cause consumption externalities because of the differences between state individual collection remedies and the federal collective remedy of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is able to preserve
a debtor's going concern value, whereas this value is very nearly always lost in a levy.3 03 Even where there is no going concern value to
preserve, the Bankruptcy Code is better at maximizing the proceeds
30 4
of dispositions than are state remedies.
Baird and Jackson's analogy comparing an insolvent debtor's assets to a common pool of fish is further flawed in its failure to con298. See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text (describing both situations as common
pool problems because both illiquid and liquid assets are exhaustible resources and are subject to competition among unsecured creditors).
299. See supra note 277 and accompanying text (reviewing case law setting aside prebankruptcy agreements between creditor and debtor as void on public policy grounds).
300. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text (arguing that inability to pay debts as
they come due rather than balance-sheet insolvency is proper starting point for common pool
problem analysis, because such inability to pay maturing debts reflects scarcity of earnings,
which are most likely source of debt extinguishment).
301. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text (discussing situation where debtor's
earning capacity is dependent on certain assets, which when seized by one creditor cause
common pool problem for other creditors dependent on future earnings for repayment).
302. See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text (discussing prejudicial effect garnishment of debtor's income may cause to other creditors dependent on this income for
repayment).
303. See supra notes 195-206 and accompanying text (noting that levy normally requires
physical seizure or incapacitation of debtor's assets, which results in cessation of business,
while bankruptcy allows debtor or bankruptcy trustee to continue operation of business if to
do so would increase going concern value and thus pool of assets available to creditors).
304. See supra notes 207-20 and accompanying text (detailing superiority of Bankruptcy
Code to state collection remedies in liquidation situation, which results in part because state
laws require only perfunctory efforts to advertise sale and make potential bidders aware of
value of auctioned property, whereas federal bankruptcy laws require "extensive public notice
of the terms and conditions of the sale").
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sider resolution by definition of property rights.3 05 In the case of a
debtor, the potential for prejudice caused by a debtor's insolvency
or general default might be resolved ex ante by the debtor's grant of
a blanket security interest. While the creation of a security interest
does not always assure that common pool problems will not occur, it
30 6
does make such problems less likely.
A focus on a debtor's insolvency as the cause of creditors' common pool problems is more than an imperfect description, however;
it reflects a limited view of bankruptcy. Baird andJackson ignore the
fact that a debtor's resources are of two types, earnings and assets,
that both types of assets are replenishable, and that the ability of a
debtor to replenish its wealth depends on its continuing ability to
earn income. As a result, Baird and Jackson picture a lifeless debtor
and a still pool. Their analysis is static; it ignores the effect of time.
It also ignores the complexity of events that may unravel through
the course of time. By failing to address replenishable assets in
their model, Baird and Jackson seem to assume either that the insolvent debtor has no financial viability or that bankruptcy necessarily
spells a liquidation of the debtor's assets. This picture is inaccurate
as applied to the determination of the proper standard for commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case. When their model is
applied to the standard for voluntary commencement, however, the
results are analogous to legs growing out of a stick figure's ears.
III.

THE PROPER STANDARD

FOR COMMENCEMENT OF BANKRUPTCY

Jackson identifies only a debtor's balance-sheet insolvency as creating common pool problems for its creditors, and thus opines that
the standard for commencement of both involuntary and voluntary
bankruptcy cases (at least those voluntary cases commenced by
30 7
debtors that are not individuals) should be one of insolvency.
The prior section argued that Jackson's vision of the circumstances
in which a debtor's financial difficulties create a common pool prob305. See supra notes 149-57, 246-53 and accompanying text (arguing that by definition
common pool problems must involve allotment of public goods because goods that can be
made exclusive may be removed from common pool by assigning ownership to specific
individual).
306. See supra notes 254-91 (discussing ways in which security interests and Article 9 of
U.C.C. may eliminate common pool problems by making secured creditors' claims to collateral exclusive, but indicating that common pool problems may continue to exist between
either competing secured creditors or competing unsecured creditors).
307. SeeJAcKsON, LoGIc AND LIMrrs, supra note 5, at 199-203 (discussing various possible
tests for commencement of bankruptcy case and concluding that "most cases can be handled
reasonably well by creating a rebuttable presumption of appropriateness upon showing that
there are multiple creditors and a reasonable prospect of insolvency").
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lem is both too narrow and too broad.308 The section showed that
for a variety of reasons, common pool problems may exist when a
solvent debtor defaults on multiple claims. 30 9 If the only goal of
bankruptcy legislation was to resolve the common pool problems
identified in Part II of this Article, how would the Bankruptcy Code
fare?
The Code currently does not require a showing of balance-sheet
insolvency for either an involuntary or voluntary bankruptcy filing.
In the case of a voluntary commencement, the debtor need not show
any financial need.310 Debtors need not establish their own insolvency or the occurrence of their own general default in order to file
a voluntary petition under the Code. 31 '
With an involuntary petition, petitioning creditors are required to
show either that the debtor generally is not paying its debts as they
come due, leaving aside the nonpayment of debts subject to bona
fide disputes, or that a custodian has been in possession of all or
308. See supra notes 157-70 and accompanying text (rejecting notion that common pool
problem in bankruptcy only exists in cases of balance-sheet insolvency).
309. See supra notes 168-245 and accompanying text (arguing that solvent debtors in default may present common pool problems because (1) earnings are exhaustible resource; and
(2) single creditor's collection effort may prejudice chances of other creditors to be repaid
depending on composition of assets and nature of collection effort).
310. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109, 301 (1988). But see 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (1988) (permitting dismissal of chapter 7 case filed by individual debtor owing primarily consumer debts upon finding
that granting of relief "would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of the chapter").
Courts have interpreted this provision to permit dismissal of a chapter 7 case if an individual
debtor's future income would be sufficient to permit repayment of its debts. See, e.g., In re
Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126 (6th Cir. 1989) (affirming bankruptcy court holding that debtor
with ample future income that exceeds monthly debt payments may be denied chapter 7 relief; In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that debtor with yearly surplus
of $5964 and unsecured debts of $26,484 could be denied chapter 7 relief because all debts
could be extinguished in five years); In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 915 (9th Cir. 1988) (deciding
that couple who could repay 99% of their unsecured debt out of disposable income within
three years had substantially abused chapter 7).
311. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109, 301 (1988). Only individual debtors seeking access to chapters 12
and 13 are required to allege financial criteria, and then not as to a particular form of financial
distress but rather as to unsecured and secured debt limitations. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(18)-(20)
(Supp. III 1991) (defining financial criteria for qualifying as "family farm" as farming operation with less than $1.5 million in debts, 80% of which must arise from farming operations);
11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988) (setting unsecured debt limitation of $100,000 and secured debt
limitation of $350,000 for individuals filing under chapter 13); id. § 109(o (delineating that
one must be "family farmer" to file under chapter 12).
Indeed, consumer finance groups have criticized the Code as insufficiently restrictive, contending that only insolvent individuals, individuals in general default, or individuals that flunk
some other financial test should enjoy access to bankruptcy protection. See House Comm. on the
Judiciary, Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law, Oversight Hearings on Personal Bankruptcy,

97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 274-321, 404-13, 4145-58 (1984) (providing testimony of various
consumer finance groups that bankruptcy is too readily available to individuals who are able
to pay off large percentages of their debts, and that not enough disincentives exist to motivate
people to avoid bankruptcy). By contrast, a municipality seeking access to chapter 9 of the
Code must allege, among other things, that it is "insolvent." 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (1988).
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substantially all of the debtor's assets for less than 120 days.Al 2
Common pool problems exist under both of these standards. Even
creditors of a solvent debtor in general default face consumption
externalities because a debtor's liquid assets are exhaustible resources. 31 3 Although the preceding section concluded that a common pool problem may arise before a debtor defaults on a majority
of its debts, and possibly as early as when the debtor defaults on
more than one obligation,3 14 the current "general failure to pay"
standard 31 5 is flexible enough to sanction creditors' efforts to avoid
any common pool problem. This is so because courts have interpreted the standard on a case-by-case basis3 1 6 and have in limited
312. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1988).
313. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text (arguing that debtor's assets and earnings potential both represent exhaustible resources).
314. See supra notes 172-245 and accompanying text (discussing externalities caused by
creditors' collection efforts and noting affect of composition of debtor's assets, and differences between state and federal bankruptcy remedies, on such occurrences).
315. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (1988); see also supra note 90 and accompanying text (quoting
general failure to pay standard).
A simpler mechanism for permitting commencement of an involuntary case as early as the
first or second default by the debtor would be to permit creditors to thrust a debtor into
bankruptcy upon proof that the debtor has failed to pay petitioning creditors' obligations, or
that petitioning creditors' efforts to collect on their delinquent debts have been unsuccessful.
Some civil law countries provide for the commencement of an involuntary case in such circumstances. See John Hansberger, Failure to Pay One's Debts Generally As They Become Due: The
Experience of France and Canada, 54 AM. BANKR. LJ. 153, 154-55 (1980) (describing French
standard for involuntary proceeding as cessation of payments combined with act or acts consistent with refusal of debtor to meet financial obligations); Joachim Kilger, Bankruptcy Laws
Under Review: Germany, 8 INr'L Bus. LAw. 24, 24-25 (1980) (noting that current as well as
proposed German bankruptcy law is based on proof of debtor's inability to meet financial
obligations). While this type of standard would be easiest for creditors to prove because petitioning creditors will always know whether the debtor is in default on their loans and whether
collection efforts have been unsuccessful, it suffers from other problems. Requiring creditors
to show that they have pursued individual collection remedies and that these efforts have been
unavailing will give creditors even greater incentives to race to the courthouse and "grab"
assets out of the debtor's estate. These incentives run counter to congressional intent, see
infra note 336 (discussing Congress' rejection of notion that creditors must exhaust nonbankruptcy remedies before filing involuntary petition), and encourage creditors to file petitions
before these destructive races begin. For these reasons, courts that refuse to permit involuntary cases to be commenced before petitioning creditors have pursued their individual state
remedies should not be followed. See supra note 77 (discussing split in bankruptcy courts over
requiring creditors to pursue state collection remedies before filing for bankruptcy proceedings). Requiring petitioning creditors to show their own default is more defensible in terms
of the incentives it creates, because the current standard requires creditors to show that the
debtor has generally defaulted on its obligations. But because there can be no assurance that
creditors suffer a common pool problem after the debtor has defaulted on three claims (even
if some dollar floor were specified, such as the debtor's default on three claims in excess of
$5000), see supra notes 173-87 (describing relationship of composition of debtor's assets to
occurrence of common pool problem and noting that in some instances such problem may
arise with single creditor's collection effort), this standard would, in some instances, permit
creditors to commence a bankruptcy case too soon.
316. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (describing flexible "totality of circumstances" standard that courts use to determine "general failure to pay" as concentrating on
both quantity and magnitude of claims, as well as debtor's general handling of financial
affairs).
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circumstances found the standard satisfied by the nonpayment of a
single obligation. 317 Moreover, creditors of a debtor with assets in
the possession of a custodian are likely to face consumption externalities either because the debtor is insolvent in some respect, or
because state remedies are less effective than federal ones.318
Commencement of an involuntary petition is more complicated,
however, than simply showing that the debtor is either in general
default or ousted from possession of the bulk of its assets. Petitioning creditors also must show their own standing.3 19 Here, the Code
is less defensible because it prohibits commencement of an involuntary case unless petitioning creditors' unsecured claims aggregate at
least $5000.320 An involuntary petition brought only by fully secured creditors will be dismissed.3 21 The preceding section showed
that common pool problems exist when multiple creditors claim security interests in the same body of collateral, or when multiple secured creditors claim interests in separate but interrelated parcels of
collateral, whether or not there also exist unsecured creditors or
unencumbered collateral.3 22 Moreover, the Code generally requires
that three or more creditors join in an involuntary petition. 323 Common pool analysis alone cannot explain the three creditor requirement. Common pool problems can arise with as few as two
3 24

creditors.
Clearly, more than mere resolution of common pool problems is
317. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (citing circumstances where involuntary petition, which alleged only one default, was allowed to continue, including cases in which (1)
debtor had only one creditor who otherwise would be without remedy; or (2) creditor can
show extraordinary circumstances, such as fraud).
318. See supra notes 224-45 and accompanying text (describing advantages inherent in
collective nature of federal proceeding, including recovery of prebankruptcy payment to preferred creditors and nationwide federal court jurisdiction).
319. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1)-(4) (1988).
320. See id. § 303(b)(1) (requiring three or more petitioning creditors whose claims are
more than $5000 in excess of any lien held by same creditors). Proposed amendments to this
provision would increase this threshold figure to $10,000. S. 1985, 102d Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 402(a)(1) (1991).
321. See supra note 80 (citing cases in which involuntary petition brought by one fully
secured creditor and two unsecured creditors was upheld, and petition brought by single fully
secured creditor was dismissed).
322. See supra notes 279-91 and accompanying text (discussing common pool problems
created by competing secured creditors' claims to pool of collateral and suggesting possible
solution to this problem).
323. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1988); see supra note 76 (discussing circumstances under
which single creditor is permitted to commence bankruptcy case).
324. See supra notes 173-87 (discussing circumstances under which single creditor's collection effort could cause common pool problem). Case law dismissing involuntary petitions
filed in the context of a single-creditor dispute with a debtor seems justifiable on this ground.
See supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting courts' reluctance to find "general default"
standard met where only one creditor alleges default but citing examples of cases in which
standard satisfied by debtor's default on single claim).
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involved in defining the proper standards for commencement of a
bankruptcy case. The remainder of this section develops some of
the other policy purposes Congress legitimately identified in establishing bankruptcy commencement standards. The examination
first reviews the policies behind the standard for commencement of
an involuntary case and then for a voluntary one.
A.
1.

Involuntary Bankruptcy

Congress' diverse policy purposes

Although it may not have been thinking in precisely these terms,
Congress certainly intended to alleviate the common pool problem
that confronts creditors of a financially troubled debtor. 32 5 The resolution of this common pool problem, however, was not Congress'
only policy purpose in structuring the standard for commencement
of an involuntary case. Other goals included: (i) an intent to simplify creditors' evidentiary burdens in establishing cause for commencement; (ii) an effort to create incentives for creditors to
commence an involuntary case sooner so distributions would exceed historically low levels; and (iii) a desire that debtors and creditors would pursue nonbankruptcy resolution of collection disputes,
unless prejudicial.326
a. Recognizing creditors' informational disadvantages
Under the former Bankruptcy Act, 32 7 creditors were required to
show that a debtor had committed an "act of bankruptcy" in order
to bring an involuntary case.3 28 Recognizing that this former standard, often based on proof of the debtor's balance-sheet insolvency,
was very difficult for creditors to establish,3 2 9 Congress sought to
325. See REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAws, supra note 30, pt. I, at 188 (noting preference for
proceedings that benefit all creditors, as compared to individual creditor actions that benefit
only aggressive creditors).
326. REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAws, supra note 30, pt. I, at 14-15; see also Block-Lieb, supra
note 30, at 805-06, 835-37 (arguing that congressional goals underlying enactment of § 303
include facilitating procedure for commencement of involuntary cases while discouraging bad
faith involuntary filings).
327. See supra note 34.
328. See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying text (detailing six acts of bankruptcy under
former Bankruptcy Act).
329. See REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAws, supra note 30, pt. I, at 14 (noting that smallness of
distributions to creditors in bankruptcy can be explained by delay in institution of cases, and
opining that creditors delayed bringing involuntary petition because elements of acts of bankruptcy, including debtor's insolvency, were difficult to prove and because debtor is entitled to
jury trial on these questions); see also Block-Lieb, supra note 30, at 813-15 (noting that insolvency, as defined under former Bankruptcy Act, was difficult to prove because it described
internal financial condition, depended on ambiguous statutory definition, and permitted jury
to decide this issue).
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simplify this burden of proof.3 3 0 With the enactment of the 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act,33 1 Congress repealed the "litigation-pro-

ducing" acts of the bankruptcy standard and replaced the acts with
the "general failure to pay" standard, which Congress determined
33 2
would be easier to prove.
b.

Increasing dividends to creditors by encouragingearly filings

Not content merely to streamline the standard for commencement of an involuntary case, Congress also hoped that by adopting
the "general failure to pay" standard, creditors would be encouraged to file involuntary petitions earlier than under the prior
standard, before the debtor's financial situation deteriorated further. 33 3 In creating incentives for creditors to commence an involuntary case sooner, Congress hoped to increase the total
33 4
distributions available to creditors.
c.

Increasingdividends to creditors by encouraginginformal resolution
of disputes

Bankruptcy is costly and time-consuming, and not every debtor's
financial difficulties require this extreme measure. Indeed, more assets may be made available to creditors if a formal proceeding is
avoided. Congress sought to increase dividends to creditors by encouraging informal resolution of a debtor's financial difficulties,3 3 5
either through a voluntary workout arrangement or through nonbankruptcy collective remedies like receivership or assignment. 3 36
330. See REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAWs, supra note 30, pt. I, at 188 ("It is time to abandon
the complex, litigation-producing constraints and substitute the test of inability to pay debts
as the basis for initiating voluntary bankruptcy."); see also Block-Lieb, supra note 30, at 815-18
(noting Congress' acceptance of view that information required to prove old standard was not
easily available to creditors).
331. Seesupra note 22.
332. REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAWs, supra note 30, pt. I, at 188; see also Block-Lieb, supra
note 30, at 816 (detailing how "general failure to pay" standard may be proven by information available to creditors, while proving insolvency often depends on debtors' internal information that is unavailable to creditors).
333. See REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAws, supra note 30, pt. I, at 14 (describing, as commonplace under old Bankruptcy Act, debtors' reluctance and creditors' inability to file bankruptcy
petition before assets were largely depleted).
334. See REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAws, supra note 30, pt. I, at 186 (reporting findings of
1930s bankruptcy study that concluded that Bankruptcy Act had ceased to present any benefit
to creditors seeking payment in all but small percentage of cases); see also Block-Lieb, supra
note 30, at 816-17 (describing payments to creditors under prior bankruptcy laws as "abysmally low").
335. See I1 U.S.C. § 305(a) (1988) (allowing court to dismiss bankruptcy claim where interests of debtors and creditors would be better served by dismissal); see also Block-Lieb, supra
note 30, at 827-29, 835-36 (citing disincentives in 1978 law to filing of premature or abusive
involuntary claims, with effect of promoting settlement of claims).
336. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 105, at 325, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6281
(discussing situations where courts should abstain from hearing bankruptcy case, such as
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Congress also indicated that courts may properly abstain from a
case brought by recalcitrant creditors to upset an ongoing negotiation or collective proceeding,3 3 7 and courts have followed this
338
directive.
d.

Tempering strategic behavior

Cautious of its interest in encouraging creditors to file early petitions or to obviate the need for petitions by resolving disputes informally, Congress in 1984 added several provisions to the reforms
enacted in 1978 that were designed to prevent creditors from using
involuntary petitions for unfair advantage in negotiations. These
provisions included prohibiting creditors from filing an involuntary
petition if the debtor could raise a bona fide dispute as to their
claim3 3 9 and excluding all debts arising from a bona fide dispute
from the calculation of whether a debtor is generally failing to pay
its debts.3 40 Congress also granted bankruptcy courts discretion to
require petitioning creditors to post a bond pending a hearing on a
contested involuntary petition,3 4' and to award damages in the
event an involuntary petition is dismissed.3 4 2 Congress' intent to
temper creditors' strategic use of involuntary petitions is consistent
with its intent to encourage informal resolution of a debtor's finanwhen less expensive workout would better serve interests of creditors and debtors). This last
purpose is not inconsistent with a recognition that a debtor's financial difficulties can cause a
common pool problem among creditors. Congress sought to encourage only those nonbankruptcy debt collection measures that are collective in nature. See id. (stressing that courts
should abstain from involuntary proceedings only where rights of creditors are not prejudiced
by nonbankruptcy workouts). Congress did not seek to encourage creditors to pursue individual remedies of execution and levy before commencement of an involuntary case. Cf In re
Win-Sum Sports, Inc., 14 B.R. 389, 392-93 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (declaring that requiring
foreign creditors to pursue individual collection remedies before allowing bankruptcy filing
would "unnecessarily chill" creditors' aid to debtors). And although several courts have required creditors to exhaust their individual remedies before commencing an involuntary case,
this precedent is questionable. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing lack of
requirement that creditors exhaust state remedies before seeking federal relief).
337. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 105, at 325, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6281
(empowering courts to abstain from bankruptcy case brought by "recalcitrant" creditors seeking to undermine ongoing debtor-creditor negotiating in order to receive full payment of
debts in future).
338. See, e.g., In re Bioline Lab. Inc., 9 B.R. 1013, 1022 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (ruling that
where 60% of unsecured creditors agreed to negotiated settlement, involuntary proceeding
brought by remaining creditors should be dismissed); In re Luftek, 6 B.R. 539, 547-48 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that where most creditors agreed to negotiate settlement and where
administrative costs of involuntary proceedings would consume debtors' assets, best interests
of debtors' and creditors' would be served by dismissal of involuntary proceeding).
339. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1988) (disallowing creditors whose claims were subject to
bona fide dispute from joining in involuntary petition).
340. Id. § 303(h)(1).
341. Id. § 303(e).
342. Id. § 303(i)(1), (2); see also Block-Lieb, supra note 30, at 828-30 (contrasting damages
permissable under 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(1), which does not require showing of bad faith, with I1
U.S.C. § 303(i)(2), which does).
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cial difficulties, but its policy may chill creditors from filing petitions
at an early stage in these difficulties.
Even if Jackson is correct in identifying a debtor's balance-sheet
insolvency as the occasion for creditors' common pool problems, his
proposal that insolvency constitutes the primary standard for commencement of an involuntary case nevertheless fails to address Congress' alternative goals in formulating the proper standard, which
include ease of proof,3 4 3 temperance of creditors' strategic use of
bankruptcy,3 4 4 and increased bankruptcy dividends to creditors. 345
Of course, Jackson could be right and Congress wrong about the
purposes for bankruptcy. It all depends on the robustness of Jackson's model; it depends on whether the creditors' bargain model
analogizing a debtor's financial difficulties to a common pool problem can withstand the relaxation of some of its basic premises.
343. In some circumstances, depending on the definition of insolvency, creditors may
have fewer problems of proof with an insolvency standard than they would with a standard
that requires them to show that the debtor has generally failed to pay its debts as they come
due. See Block-Lieb, supra note 30, at 856-57 (discussing external signs of insolvency that
would be detectable through public filings and proposing that this new definition of insolvency be added to grounds for filing involuntary petition). Jackson does not address these
necessary issues in proposing that insolvency be made the standard for commencement of
involuntary cases, however.
344. See supra notes 339-42 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent to
prevent creditors from using filing of involuntary petition to gain unfair advantage in negotiations with debtor). Interestingly, Jackson does propose that insolvency be made a rebuttable
standard for commencement of a bankruptcy case. He would rebut the presumption of insolvency when creditors' motives were strategic and not in good faith, which would occur when
creditors file an involuntary petition solely to secure some benefit of bankruptcy law that
would not be available under state law. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITs, supra note 5, at 197-203.
Jackson's willingness to rebut the presumption of the existence of a common pool problem in
this event is inconsistent with his assumption that creditors act out of self-interest because
they may perceive their self-interest furthered by strategic behavior. Moreover, it is this pursuit of strategic behavior that creates the common pool problem in the first place. See Picker,
supra note 23, at 647-48 (comparing common pool problem to strategic prisoners' dilemma
game where actions that are in interest of one party run contrary to interest of group, and
parties have ability to structure relationship with each other but must implement relationship
agreements without information as to each others' activities).
345. See supra notes 333-38 and accompanying text (describing Bankruptcy Code provisions that allow courts to dismiss or abstain from hearing claims in situations where parties'
interests would be better served by negotiated settlement). Jackson contends that bankruptcy
dividends are greater than dividends under the state law system because the costs of administration are greater in the state law system than in bankruptcy. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS,
supra note 5, at 16. But see Carlson, supra note 10, at 1354-55 (discussing legal costs, such as
those incurred in challenges to secured creditors by junior creditors, which exist in federal but
not state proceedings). Whether or not administrative costs are greater in the federal or state
system, Jackson does not consider the effect this disparity has on costs except as it relates to
the willingness of creditors to enter into ex ante agreements to create the remedy of bankruptcy. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LiMrrs, supra note 5, at 17. In identifying the externalities that
creditors face, for example, he ignores this disparity. Id. But see supra notes 190-245 and
accompanying text (discussing externalities caused by differences in federal and state collection laws).
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Relaxing the premises of the model

Part II already relaxed several implicit premises ofJackson's creditors' bargain model by discussing the implications of identifying a
debtor's exhaustible resources as both its assets and its earning capacity, the interaction of assets and earning capacity with some
debtors, and the incapacity of individual collection remedies to protect the value associated with earning capacity. The relaxation of
these premises indicates that Baird and Jackson's model is unnecessarily static due to its failure to recognize the complexities associated with different types of debtors, the sorts of assets they own, the
types of creditors they owe, and the variety of collection options that
debtors and their creditors enjoy. When Congress identified multiple reasons for reforming the standard for commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case, it implicitly relaxed two other premises
of Baird and Jackson's model: creditors' perfect access to information and creditors' incentives to execute and levy against a defaulting debtor's assets.
a. Relaxing the assumption of perfect information
First, creditors often do not have ready access to the information
necessary to determine whether a debtor is insolvent in the balancesheet sense of the term.3 46 Because insolvency describes an internal
financial condition of the debtor, most creditors have no way of
knowing whether the debtor will have sufficient assets to cover the
defaulted liabilities. Such knowledge would require the creditors to
be cognizant of what property belonging to the debtor is exempt or
the degree to which a debtor has encumbered its most valuable assets, as well as assessing whether the collateral is more valuable than
the indebtedness owed to the lien creditors.3 47 As a result, Congress explicitly recognized the difficulty creditors have in gaining access to the sort of information necessary to prove a debtor's
balance-sheet insolvency, and therefore chose to repeal the "acts of
bankruptcy" as the standard for commencement of an involuntary
case precisely because it often required proof of this internal finan3 48
cial condition.
346. See Block-Lieb, supra note 30, at 811-12, 837-44 (describing creditors' problems of
proof as resulting from internal nature of conditions necessary to demonstrate insolvency); see
also Baird, Initiation Problem, supra note 24, at 226 ("The collective action problem that the
creditors face is largely an informational one. Each creditor individually has no way of knowing that the debtor has no assets and cannot meet its obligations.").
347. While a creditor's claim of a security interest is generally public knowledge, U.C.C.
§ 9-302, the value of the collateral claimed by the secured creditor is not.
348. See REPORT ON BANKRUPTTCY LAws, supra note 30, pt. I, at 186-87 (discussing difficulty
creditors face in proving old bankruptcy "act" standard and explaining need for newer, easier
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Relaxing the assumption that collection efforts are costless to
creditors

Congress also recognized that creditors often prefer not to seek
the aid of the courts and their officers to coerce repayment of delinquent debts. 3 49 This preference for extralegal solutions to resolve a
debtor's nonpayment may follow from the simple fact that collection
efforts are not without expense. Creditors may reasonably determine not to pursue judicial remedies simply because it may be
cheaper and easier to collect a debt informally than to sue the
debtor in court. 350 In addition, any coercive collection method that
relies on repayment from proceeds of a forced sale of the debtor's
assets will be less efficient and effective than a method that relies on
repayment out of liquid funds, because forced sales of assets generally result in a loss of value. 3 5 1 Finally, creditors' preferences for
extrajudicial resolution of payment disputes also may be explained
by recognizing that litigation may have costly effects on the relationships between debtors and creditors.3 52 All collection remedies are
likely to harm the profitability of a debtor's firm and except in involstandard to promote bankruptcy filings before depletion of debtor's assets occurs); see also
supra notes 326-34 and accompanying text (describing Bankruptcy Commissioners' conclusions that old Bankruptcy Act was not useful in distribution of debtors' assets to creditors, and
that new Code would reduce litigation, increase payments to creditors, encourage negotiation, and discourage bad faith filings).
349. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 105, at 35-36, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 582122 (allowing courts under § 305 of Bankruptcy Code to decline jurisdiction when less expensive out-of-court workout would better serve interests of creditors and debtors); see also BlockLieb, supra note 30, at 827-36, 844-49 (examining congressional reform of standard for commencement of involuntary cases that discourages bad faith filings and encourages creditors to
pursue less expensive and more expeditious nonbankruptcy solutions for debtors' financial
problems).
350. See Block-Lieb, supra note 30, at 844 (suggesting that creditors may prefer not to
pursue coercive collection remedies because debtors' assets are mostly exempt or subject to
liens); see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988) (permitting individual debtors benefits of state
and federal exemption laws); U.C.C. §§ 9-110, 9-203 (1981) (validating grant of "blanket
lien" against all of debtors' assets).
351. See Whitford, supra note 33, at 1060, 1097 ("This 'lost value' phenomenon is a result
both of the inadequate prices typically obtained at execution sales and of the underdeveloped
state of most used goods markets."); see also Block-Lieb, supra note 30, at 844-46 (stating that
creditors may be reluctant to rely on repayment from receipts of foreclosures of debtor's
nonexempt, unencumbered assets due to small proceeds generally received from forced
sales).
352. See Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 465, 467-68
(suggesting that business persons often perform disadvantageous contracts because performance is beneficial to maintenance of relationship, and that relatively few contract cases are
litigated because litigation generally ends relationship); William C. Whitford, Ian MacNeil's
Contribution to Contracts Scholarship, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 545, 546, 550 (commenting that relational contract theory is based on idea that contracting takes place not at single point in time,
but rather "emerges over time in the context of ongoing relationships" and that parties to
relational contracts try to preserve relationships as way of maximizing wealth); see also BlockLieb, supra note 30, at 849-52 (suggesting that when creditors and debtors are involved in
complex or long-standing relationship they will tend to resolve their disputes through informal means such as negotiation rather than through courts).
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untarily commenced chapter 11 cases, often result, at least by the
conclusion of the proceeding, in the cessation of the business 5 3
Thus, a creditor with a long-term or otherwise important relationship with a debtor, be it contractual or otherwise, is even less likely
to coerce repayment through a collective remedy than through an
individual one and is less likely to coerce repayment through a court
s54
sanctioned collection remedy than through negotiation.
B.
1.

Voluntary Bankruptcy

Congress' diverse policy purposes

In contrast to the standard for commencement of an involuntary
bankruptcy case,3 5 5 the Code permits debtors virtually unfettered
discretion to commence a voluntary case. 3 56 Congress clearly envisioned distinct policy purposes for these two standards. When examined in light of these goals, the congressional distinction between
the standards for commencement of involuntary and voluntary cases
makes sense.
a. Recognizing debtors' informational advantages
Debtors do not suffer from the same informational difficulties that
creditors do because debtors are in a much better position than
creditors to determine their own risk of general default or insolvency. 3 57 Elimination of financial tests for purposes of a debtor's
353. See Block-Lieb, supra note 30, at 849-52 (stating that collection remedies may not
only hurt debtor's business operations, but may also impact on individual debtor's earning
capacity). Macaulay makes a similar point when he states, with regard to contract law, that
"there are relatively few contracts cases litigated and . . . [wihen final judgments are won,
often they cannot be executed because of insolvency." Macaulay, supra note 352, at 468.
354. See Block-Lieb, supra note 30, at 849-52 (stating that creditors with long-term, important relationships with debtors are less likely to seek repayment of delinquent debts through
collective remedies than through individual remedies because collection remedies often harm
profitability of debtors' firms and result in cessation of business); cf Whitford, supra note 352,
at 550 (discussing emotional and wealth costs of cessation of business relationship).
355. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b), (h) (1988) (stating that involuntary bankruptcy cases may be
commenced against debtor only after petitioning creditors fulfill complex standing requirements, and show either that debtor is generally failing to pay debts as they come due or that
custodian appointed within preceding 120 days possesses all or substantially all of debtor's
assets).
356. See id. §§ 109, 301 (stating generally that voluntary cases can be brought by any eligible debtor).
357. But see supra notes 327-32 and accompanying text (noting that Congress understood
that Bankruptcy Code's "general failure to pay" standard was easier for creditors to prove
than "acts of bankruptcy" standard required by Bankruptcy Act). At times, however, even
debtors can make mistakes. When a debtor fails to dispute any of its obligations, the debtor
should not be mistaken as to whether it satisfies the "generally failing to pay" standard. On
the other hand, when the debtor disputes a significant portion of these obligations, the debtor
may not be able to determine whether a court would find that these disputes are bona fide as a
matter of law, because the existence of bona fide disputes is governed by an objective standard and not by what the debtor represents to be its state of mind. See supra notes 100-02 and

1993]

CLARIFYING THE COMMON POOL ANALOGY

419

eligibility simplifies the bankruptcy petitioning process and eliminates the need for a hearing before entry of an order for relief. This
streamlines the process and provides voluntary debtors with few
procedural impediments to the protections offered them by the
Bankruptcy Code. 358 Debtors' access to information, however, does
not alone indicate the proper standard for commencement of a voluntary case. Indeed, a recognition that debtors do not face the same
problems of proof as creditors might support Jackson's recommendation that insolvency act as the standard for commencement of voluntary cases.3 5 9 Certainly, other policy purposes are at work.
b.

Increasing dividends to creditors by encouraging early filings

Congress' concern about paltry distributions to creditors influenced not only its choice to liberalize the standard for commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case, but also affected its
decision to leave the commencement of voluntary cases within the
discretion of debtors.3 60 By streamlining the relevant standard and
permitting debtors to seek the protection of the Bankruptcy Code
whenever they deem it necessary, Congress intended to encourage
debtors to file petitions before they became insolvent or suffered a
general default. By allowing debtors to file at this earlier stage of
financial difficulty, Congress hoped that bankruptcy proceedings
would come early enough to arrest and resolve debtors' financial
3 61
deterioration.
accompanying text (stating that courts apply objective standard to determine whether debts
are "bona fide"). In addition, unless its assets are peculiarly liquid, the debtor may calculate
its balance sheet differently than would a creditor or a bankruptcy court. Cf JACKSON, LOGIC
AND LIMrrs, supra note 5, at 197 ("The value of assets depends on their value in use which, in a
world of imperfect information, is itselfa 'best guess' about the likelihood of future courses of
action.").
358. See Baird, Initiation Problem, supra note 24, at 226 (arguing that creditors' informational disadvantages justify Code's reliance on debtors to commence voluntary cases because
bankruptcy petitions allow debtors to "surrender" and tell creditors to "stop their pursuit" of
debtor). Baird states further that "[a] Chapter 7 petition is the easiest way for the managers
who are being constantly harassed to convince creditors that the firm has no assets and that
their lawsuits are pointless. The filing of a Chapter 7 petition sends creditors an effective
signal." Id. at 226.
359.

See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LiMrrs, supra note 5, at 200 (stating that most bankruptcy

cases "can be handled reasonably well by creating a rebuttable presumption of appropriateness upon showing that there are multiple creditors and a reasonable prospect of
insolvency").
360. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
361. See REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY LAws, supra note 30, pt. I, at 14, 187, 188 (arguing that
dividends to creditors would be increased if bankruptcy cases were brought earlier in debtors'
downward financial spiral); Block-Lieb, supra note 30, at 816, 835 (commenting on Congress'
intent to encourage ealier filings). Although Congress does not talk in economic jargon in the
legislative history when explaining changes to the voluntary standard, the legislators can be
described as intending to encourage debtors to file for bankruptcy even before a common
pool problem arises.
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Increasingdividends to creditors by encouraginginformal resolution
of disputes

Consistent with its intent to increase dividends to creditors, Congress sought not only to encourage debtors to commence bankruptcy cases before their financial difficulties became irreversible,
but also tried to reduce bankruptcy administration costs by ensuring
that the difficulties become resolved, where reasonable, through informal means. 3 62 For example, the Code permits bankruptcy courts
to abstain from hearing voluntary cases where the interests of the
debtor and its creditors would be best served by dismissal.8 63 Following Congress' policy, courts often actually do abstain in these
circumstances. 3, 4
d. Little fear that debtors'filings are strategic
Congress' desire to encourage creditors to file involuntary petitions at an earlier time when debtors are suffering financial difficulties was countered by fear that creditors would unfairly use such
filings to gain negotiating leverage or a competitive edge, or simply
out of spite. 36 5 This fear arose from the fact that the mere filing of
an involuntary petition may have a devastating effect on the debtor's
reputation as a sound credit risk. This fear, however, is irrelevant as
applied to voluntary filings.3 6 6 If anything, insolvent debtors proba362. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 105, at 35, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5821-22;
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 105, at 325, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6281 (allowing
courts under Code § 305 to decline jurisdiction when less expensive out-of-court workout
may better serve interests of creditors and debtors).
363. See 11 U.S.C. § 305 (1988) (permitting courts to decline jurisdiction in some cases);
see also Block-Lieb, supra note 30, at 832 n. 148 (stating that courts have dismissed chapter II
filings on grounds of bad faith and when there is no hope of reorganization relief).
364. See, e.g., Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 700-01 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that
to warrant dismissal of voluntary chapter 11 petition for lack of bad faith in filing, both objective futility of any possible reorganization and subjective bad faith of debtor must be considered); Phoenix Piccadilly v. Future Fed. Say. Bank (In re Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd.), 849 F.2d
1393, 1393-95 (11th Cir. 1988) (dismissing voluntary chapter 11 petition as filed in bad faith
where there was intent to delay or frustrate creditors' efforts to enforce liens); Natural Land
Corp. v. Baker Farms, Inc. (In re Natural Land Corp.), 825 F.2d 296, 297-99 (1 lth Cir. 1987)
(dismissing chapter I 1 petition due to bad faith filing); Albany Partners, Ltd. v. Westbrook (In
re Albany Partners, Ltd.), 749 F.2d 670, 674-75 (11 th Cir. 1984) (dismissing chapter 11 petition for bad faith filing upon showing that there existed no realistic prospect of effective reorganization for debtor and that debtor sought reorganization relief to delay or frustrate
creditors' efforts to enforce their rights); see also Block-Lieb, supra note 30, at 832 n.148 (suggesting that courts have regularly dismissed voluntary petitions under chapter 11 for bad faith
and on ground that no realistic prospect of effective reorganization exists for debtor).
365. See supra notes 339-42 and accompanying text (discussing congressional concern that
creditors will use involuntary petitions as unfair advantage in negotiations). Creditors of ndividual debtors are not likely to file an involuntary petition out of spite because these creditors
have much to lose by filing, including the exclusion of postpetition wages from property of
the bankruptcy estate and a debtor's discharge. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(6), 727(a)(1) (1988).
366. Recall thejoke involving the thief who holds a gun to his head and says, "Give me all
of your money or I'll shoot."
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bly face greater incentives to postpone the decision to file a bankruptcy petition than to jump the gun. Roughly speaking, an
insolvent debtor that is not an individual should be indifferent to
voluntary preferential repayment versus coerced repayment
through either individual or collective collection remedies, 367 because a debtor is entitled to claim only the surplus that exists after
full payment is made to all creditors.3 68 Indeed, an insolvent debtor
367. An individual debtor would never be so completely indifferent because only the federal collective remedy of bankruptcy can provide a debtor with a discharge from its unpaid
liabilities. 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 727(a)(1) (1988). See International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S.
261, 265 (1929) (holding that Supremacy and Bankruptcy Clauses of U.S. Constitution preclude state insolvency laws from providing for discharge of indebtedness). In addition, only
in the context of bankruptcy can individuals protect their postpetition earnings from creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1988); see id.§ 727(a)(1) (stating that only individual debtors are
entitled to discharge in chapter 7 liquidation case); cf.Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S.Ct. 2197, 21992202 (1991) (holding that protection of postpetition earnings and availability of discharge in
context of chapter 11 reorganization applies to both nonbusiness and business debtors alike).
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1988) (limiting discharge in chapter 7 case to individuals) with
id. § 1141(d) (providing generally for discharge as result of confirmation of chapter 11 plan,
whether debtor is individual or not).
Individual debtors are unlikely to be motivated to file for bankruptcy in order to enjoy the
benefits of exemption laws because exemption laws are largely creatures of nonbankruptcy
law. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 703.010-706.010 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) (delineating exemptions applying to all procedures for enforcement of money judgments); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 513.425-.470 (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1992) (allowing exemptions for such things as
tools or implements of mechanics' trade, wearing apparel, family books and bibles, arms and
military equipment, and certain other personal and real property); N.Y. Civ. PPAc. L. & R.
§ 5205 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1992) (citing permissible exemptions from satisfactions of
money judgments as including stoves, family bibles, wearing apparel, and certain other personal property). True, Bankruptcy Code § 522 permits debtors to choose between their state
exemptions and the federal scheme set forth in that provision, but any state legislature that
determines that the federal exemptions are more generous than those provided by state law
can opt out of the federal exemptions by passing a law to that effect. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)
(1988); see also WARREN & WESTBROOK,supra note 58, at 204 (stating that 39 states have opted
out of federal scheme so that debtors filing for bankruptcy in most states can only exempt
property under that state's laws).
368. A debtor's entitlement to only the surplus that remains after payment of creditors'
claims in full exists regardless of whether the debtor is an individual or not. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 726(a)-(b) (1988) (stating that any surplus after all claims are paid out ispaid to debtor).
This point is clearest in the case of a corporate debtor. In that case, the insolvent corporate
debtor's owners will not be repaid their equity investments because their investments are
subordinate in priority to the claims of all the debtor's creditors. As a result, directors and
managers of a corporate debtor may try to influence bankruptcy decisions as a way of keeping
their jobs and maintaining continued control over the corporation. See Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 17-18 (Jan. 29, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
("[S]enior interests are often in sharp conflict with juniors as to the level of risk the company
should accept in its investment policy."); see also Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 23, at 1045
(stating that managers of corporations prefer chapter 11 reorganizations to chapter 7 liquidations because chapter 11 allows them continued control, as well as continued operation of
business, without constraints ordinarily imposed by creditors); Jeremy I. Bulow & John B.
Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision, 9 BELLJ. ECON. 437, 437-56 (1978) (arguing that before making bankruptcy choices, several variables must be taken into account, including structure of
firm, priority structure, and ownership of firm's debt, all of which influence division of proceeds of firm between negotiating coalition and unnegotiating creditors); Michael C.Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,
3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 334 (1976) (providing that owner-managers of firms will have strong
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may delay filing for bankruptcy through whatever means necessary
on the slim chance that as assets increase in value, revenue will also
increase, or a high-risk investment will pan out, because creditors
rather than debtors bear all the downside risk.
This generalization is not without exception, however, largely due
to the distinctions between state and federal collection schemes.5 69
For example, even insolvent debtors may prefer bankruptcy if bankruptcy is better able to maximize the proceeds of a sale of its assets.
The insolvent debtor may prefer to maximize the amount of proceeds received in the disposition of its assets, if insiders3 70 of the
debtor have guaranteed all or some of the debtor's indebtedness.
Insiders of the debtor, and thus the debtor as well, will prefer to
maximize the proceeds received from a liquidation sale, because the
more indebtedness the debtor's assets cover, the les; indebtedness
for which they will be personally liable. Moreover, a business
debtor may file a chapter 7 petition because it knows that it cannot
make the business run profitably but does not know whether or not
it is insolvent. Utilizing bankruptcy's superior ability to dispose of
assets, the debtor may harbor a realistic hope of providing some
return on the investments of the shareholders, partners, or others
holding ownership interests in the debtor. Other distinctions between the state and federal systems exist. Debtors of all types prefer
bankruptcy due to the benefits of the automatic stay. 3 7' Furthermore, individual and business debtors benefit from their ability to
use, sell, or lease property of the estate.3 7 2 Similarly, both individuals and firms may be motivated to file for bankruptcy by the possibility of a discharge, although corporate and partnership debtors are
unable to obtain a discharge in a liquidation case.3 73 Business debtincentives to engage in investments that promise very high payoffs even if there is less
probability of success); LoPucki, supra note 160, at 321-22, 333 (suggesting that when debtors
have liabilities in excess of their assets they will be motivated to make high-risk investments
and will more than likely be unable to keep current in their debt repayment, forcing debtors
to liquidate their assets for less than their market value; and that similarly, many debtors
utilize "bankruptcy planning" to remove as many assets as possible from pools available to
pay creditors); Bruce M. Stiglitz, Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of CorporateFinance: Bankruptcies
and Takeovers, 3 BELLJ. ECON. MGMT. ScI. 458, 460 (1972) (noting that firms may choose debtequity ratio that avoids high probabilities of bankruptcy and that firms approaching insolvency may consider takeovers and mergers over high costs associated with bankruptcy).
369. See supra notes 191-245 and accompanying text (discussing differences between state
and federal collection schemes).
370. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (Supp. III 1991) (defining "insiders").
371. See id. § 362(a)-(b) (1988) (allowing stays in bankruptcy for enforcement of judgments or liens against debtors and property of their estates).
372. See id. § 363 (providing that trustees may use, sell, or lease property of estate in
ordinary course).
373. See id. § 727(a)(1) (granting discharge in liquidation cases to individuals only). The
legislative history indicates that "individual" does not include corporations or partnerships,
but only includes natural persons. S. REFP. No. 989, supra note 105, at 98, reprintedin 1978
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ors are more likely than individual debtors to benefit from the ability
to reject executory contracts and unexpired leases 3 74 and obtain

postpetition financing. 375 Consumer debtors, on the other hand,
are exclusively benefitted by the stay of collection actions against codebtors, 376 the federal exemptions,3 77 the right to redeem certain
property, 37 8 and the ability to avoid certain liens against household
79

goods.3
Jackson argues that voluntary filings should be dismissed if they
are made for strategic purposes. 380 To support this argument, he
refers to case law in which petitions have been dismissed as having
been submitted in bad faith when the debtor filed in order to obtain
some advantage from bankruptcy but did not actually suffer from
serious financial difficulty. 38 ' Jackson provides no economic explanation for this departure from his reliance on the actions of selfinterested debtors and creditors. Why should debtors' self-interested actions be trusted as less strategic than creditors'? In addition, why should some self-interested actions be viewed as strategic
while others are commended as consistent with the good of the collective body? Reference to the metaphor of the common pool does
not alone justify dismissal of strategic filings. Instead, courts are
relying on diverse policy purposes when they dismiss either voluntary or involuntary petitions that are filed in bad faith. Sometimes,
the dismissals can be justified on the grounds that creditors did not
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5884; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 105, at 384, repinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6340. But see infra notes 398-400 and accompanying text (describing ability
of nonindividual debtor and nondebtor to obtain discharge through chapter 11 plan of
reorganization).
374. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (Supp. 111 1991) (stating that subject to court's approval, trustees
may assume or reject any executory contracts or expired leases of debtors).
375. See idL § 364 (limiting circumstances under which trustees are able to incur unsecured
and secured debt after commencement of bankruptcy case).
376. See id. § 1301 (stating that creditors may not commence civil action to collect any part
of debtor's consumer debts from any other party liable on such debt or securing such debt).
377. See id § 522(d) (providing limited exemption for individual debtors' property, including residences, motor vehicles, and household goods).
378. See id. § 722 (providing individual debtors with right to redeem tangible personal,
family, or household use items from liens securing dischargeable consumer debts).
379. See id § 522(0-(h) (allowing individual debtors to avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money liens against certain exempt property); see also id § 522(e) (invalidating certain
waivers of exemptions).
380. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LtMrrs, supra note 5, at 193-97.
381. See, e.g., In re 2218 Bluebird Ltd. Partnership, 41 B.R. 540, 544 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1984) (finding that debtor acted in bad faith when created entity to receive property from
existing entity for sole purpose of avoiding foreclosure); In re Thirteenth Place, Inc., 30 B.R.
503, 505 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (holding that purpose of creating corporation and filing bankruptcy was to delay seizure of assets by secured creditors); In re Tinti Constr. Co., 29 B.R. 971,
974 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983) (dismissing voluntary petition as filed in bad faith when debtor's
sole purpose was to reject collective bargaining agreement); see also In reJohns-Manville Co.,
36 B.R. 727, 732-43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (denying motion to dismiss petition for bad faith
filing because debtor was found to suffer from financial problems).
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face a common pool problem, and consequently no need for bankruptcy existed. 38 2 At other times, the dismissals can be justified
more broadly on grounds of equity, fairness, and fair play or, in
other words, on the notion that self-interested actions cannot always
83
be trusted.3
e.

Encouragingthe rehabilitationof business debtors

By encouraging creditors to file involuntary petitions before a
debtor becomes insolvent, Congress sought to maximize distributions to creditors. 3 84 By encouraging debtors to file voluntary petitions before they either become insolvent or are unable to pay debts
as they come due, Congress sought to do more than merely increase
dividends to creditors: it also hoped to facilitate the rehabilitation
of financially troubled business debtors.3 85 The goal of rehabilitation is distinct from that of increasing distributions to creditors, but
not necessarily inconsistent. Dividends to creditors will increase
when the Code succeeds in preserving the going concern value of a
business debtor by facilitating the rehabilitation of its ailing operations. Even if creditors receive no more than they would have received in a chapter 7 liquidation case,3 8 6 this goal of rehabilitation
will have been fulfilled if a business debtor's reorganization facilitates the preservation of jobs, specialized expertise, and other
38 7
goodwill.
382. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (noting that majority of courts do not find
that debtor's failure to pay single debt constitutes failure generally to pay debts as they come
due).
383. See supra notes 94-98 (listing cases that have been dismissed for reasons of equity and
fairness).
384. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 105, at 32-35, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 581821; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 105, at 321-24, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6278-81
("Because the assets of an insolvent debtor belong equitably to his [or her] creditors....
involuntary cases [should be permitted] in order that creditors may realize on their assets
through [chapter 11] reorganization as well as through [chapter 7] liquidation.").
385. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 105, at 31, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5817;
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 105, at 321, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6277 (making no
distinction between individual debtors and business debtors as to who may commence chapter 11 reorganization cases). Like a business debtor, an individual debtor may file for bankruptcy in order to rehabilitate itself and thereby preserve its standing in the financial
community. If the debtor believes that its financial troubles are short-term, or if it has substantial nonexempt assets it wants to protect, it will be motivated to file either a chapter 12 or
13 petition and adjust its indebtedness by making reduced payments to creditors out of its
regular income. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (delineating differences between
chapters 12 and 13).
386. See I1 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1988) (stating that each impaired class of claims or
interests will receive or retain property or value that is not less than amounts that such holders would receive or retain if debtor's assets were liquidated under chapter 7).
387. See Korobkin, Jurisprudenceof Bankruptcy, supra note 31, at 763-66 (concluding that
business debtor's financial distress not only affects company's bottom line, but also affects
management, employees, and community). In economic terms, Congress' rehabilitative goal
can be described as an effort to account for some of the costs of a liquidation that are not
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Congress' goal of encouraging the rehabilitation of business debtors cannot be accomplished through creditors' involuntary filings,
for several reasons. First, creditors may be indifferent to a debtor's
rehabilitation 8s and may prefer to avoid the time and expense of
the rehabilitation process unless it is clear at the commencement of
the case that they will receive greater dividends under an alternative
plan than they would in a chapter 7 liquidation. 389 Second, while
debtors are imperfect in their ability to determine whether and at
what point in time their business difficulties should be resolved
under the protection of a bankruptcy court, creditors' abilities to
make this determination are far worse. Creditors often do not enjoy
access to the sort of information necessary to evaluate whether a
debtor is insolvent or whether it generally has failed to pay its debts
as they have come due.3 9 0 Determinations as to a debtor's financial

viability are qualitatively quite difficult for creditors and other outsiders to make.391 Once information about the debtor's cash flow is
made available to creditors and the court determines whether any of
borne directly by either the debtor or its creditors, but which are incurred by others related to
the debtor such as its employees and the community in which the debtor is located. Id
388. This is true barring the existence of other factors such as a long-term relationship
between debtors and creditors that creditors have an interest in preserving. See supra notes
350-54 and accompanying text (stating that creditors may prefer extralegal solutions because
of desire to minimize costs and preserve long-standing relationships).
389. Creditors of an individual debtor usually can make this calculation fairly simply and
would probably prefer a chapter 12 (debt adjustment of a family farmer) or 13 (debt adjustment of an individual with regular income) filing to that of a chapter 7 liquidation, but they
are prohibited from commencing an involuntary petition under these chapters. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 303(a) (1988) (permitting commencement of involuntary cases only under chapters 7 or
11). Legislative history indicates that although a creditor may want to commence an involuntary chapter 12 case against a farmer for delinquent debts, the nature of a farmer's business,
where one drought year or one year of low prices may result in a farmer's temporarily being
unable to pay his or her creditors, should not subject the farmer to involuntary bankruptcy. S.
REP. No. 989, supranote 105, at 32, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5818; H.R. REP. No. 585,
supra note 105, at 322, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6278. Also, a creditor may prefer a
repayment plan to adjust the debts of an individual with regular income by commencing an
involuntary chapter 13 case, with hopes of getting paid back in full, rather than by commencing a chapter 7 case that reduces a debtor's assets to cash and then allows a debtor, if eligible,
a fresh start through discharge. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 105, at 98, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5884; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 105, at 384, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6340. Legislative history, however, indicates that "chapter 13 only works
when there is a willing debtor that wants to repay his [or her] creditors. Short of involuntary
servitude, it is difficult to keep a debtor working for creditors when he [or she] does not want
to pay them back." S. REP. No. 989, supra note 105, at 32, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5818; H.R. REP. No. 585, supra note 105, at 322, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6278.
390. See supra notes 329-32 and accompanying text (indicating that Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 has made it easier for creditors to prove debtor's bankruptcy using "general
failure to pay" standard rather than proving specific "acts of bankruptcy" as required under
1898 Act).
391. See Baird, Initiation Problem, supra note 24, at 228 ("Those best positioned to know
both the financial condition of the firm and the likelihood that creditors will assert their
nonbankruptcy rights are the managers of the firm. Individual creditors lack a sense of the
overall, day-to-day health of the firm.").
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the debtor's obligations are the subject of a bona fide dispute, there
would be little dispute among experts about whether the debtor was
generally paying its debts as they came due. Similarly, once information about the debtor's assets and liabilities becomes known, experts might quibble about how best to assign values to the assets
and liabilities, but there would be no dispute about whether the
value of assets exceeds liabilities, or vice versa. An analysis of the
desirability of the debtor's continued operations is altogether different, however, because it requires not only a projection of the
debtor's future revenue and expenditures, but also judgments about
how the debtor's future operations are best pursued. Corporate law
defers to the judgment of management and boards of directors in
this regard, and there exists no convincing reason for a departure
from the "business judgment" rule3 9 2 simply because three of the
debtor's creditors determine to file an involuntary chapter 11
petition.
Finally, a standard that encourages creditors to force a debtor
into chapter 11 in order to rehabilitate the debtor is probably unworkable because the success of a reorganization plan often depends on the debtor's commitment to the rehabilitation effort.
Congress apparently understood the importance of a debtor's commitment when it precluded creditors from filing involuntary chapter
12 or 13 petitions against family farmers or individuals earning regular income.3 9 3 The rule permitting creditors to commence an involuntary chapter 11 case is not inconsistent with this basic notion
because creditors can effect a liquidation of all or substantially all of
39 4
a debtor's assets pursuant to a chapter 11 reorganization plan.
f

Promoting the debtor'sfresh start

Although Congress generally favors a negotiated resolution of a
debtor's financial difficulties, this goal may, in the case of individual
debtors, run counter to the legislature's desire to promote a
392. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996-1005 (N.Y. 1979) (discussing "business judgment" rule as applied to decision of corporate board of directors). See generally
BLAcx's LAW DICIONARY 200 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "business judgment rule" as rule that

"immunizes management from liability in corporate transaction undertaken within both
power of corporation and authority of management where there is reasonable basis to indicate that transaction was made with due care and in good faith").
393. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1988) (permitting commencement of involuntary cases only
under chapters 7 and 11 of Bankruptcy Code); see also supra note 74 (describing inability of
creditors to commence involuntary chapter 12 or 13 cases).
394. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121(c), 1123(b)(4) (1988) (permitting any party in interest to file
reorganization plan after expiration of 120-day period during which only debtor may file plan;
providing that reorganization plan may effectuate sale of all or substantially all of debtor's
assets).
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debtor's fresh start after bankruptcy, because a discharge is available
only through participation in bankruptcy. The two goals are reconcilable. The Code provides numerous ways for debtors to repay obligations voluntarily even after a bankruptcy petition has been
filed.

2.

395

Reassessing the relevance of the model

Jackson's contention that voluntary cases should not be commenced unless the business debtor shows its insolvency takes the
analogy of the common pool beyond its useful limits. With involuntary bankruptcy cases, one could reasonably argue that the primary
explanation for the existence of the remedy is the need to resolve
the common pool problem created by a debtor's financial difficulty.
One could quibble about whether the common pool problem arises
at the time of the debtor's balance-sheet insolvency or at some other
time depending on a multiplicity of complex factors. One could
tinker with the standard of commencement by looking at other secondary goals associated with the remedy of bankruptcy: ensuring
ease in proof, encouraging earlier access to the remedy, facilitating
negotiated resolution of financial disputes, and creating disincentives for harmful strategic behavior. But in the end, our understanding of the need to thrust a debtor into bankruptcy against its
wishes would have been advanced by our reliance on economic theory and the metaphor comparing creditors' collection efforts to a
common pool problem. Congress' policy goals regarding voluntary
cases, however, go far beyond mere resolution of the harm caused
by competition among collecting creditors. With voluntary cases, it
is not enough simply to relax the assumptions lurking behind the
analogy of the common pool. The analogy itself is of limited usefulness in assessing the circumstances in which debtors should be encouraged to seek voluntary bankruptcy relief.
Jackson limits his discussion of the standard for commencement
of voluntary cases to cases that do not involve individual debtors,
explicitly admitting that as to individual debtors there exists an "independent social policy," namely the right to a fresh start through a
discharge in bankruptcy.3 96 As to nonindividual debtors, Jackson
395. See id. § 524(c) (permitting but regulating reaffirmation agreements, which are private agreements between holders of claims and debtors, consideration for which, in whole or
in part, is based on debts that are dischargeable under Code); id. § 524(d) (requiring bankruptcy court to scrutinize reaffirmation agreements and inform debtors that such agreements
are optional); id. § 524() (providing that nothing in Code precludes debtor from voluntary
repayment); see also id § 722 (permitting redemption of certain collateral by consumer
debtors).
396. JACKsoN, LoGIc AND Lsimrrs, supra note 5, at 201 (suggesting that individuals seek
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contends that there exists "no independent social policy.., being
served by bankruptcy," other than resolution of creditors' common
pool problems. 397 This contention crisply focuses Jackson's very
limited view of bankruptcy because in making this remark he ignores
two interrelated policy purposes of federal bankruptcy law as it applies to businesses.
First, while Jackson technically is correct to note that only individuals are entitled to a discharge in bankruptcy, he neglects to acknowledge that the correctness of this remark depends on narrowly
defining bankruptcy as a chapter 7 liquidation, or "straight bankruptcy," case. 398 In a chapter 11 reorganization case, however, both
individuals and nonindividuals generally are entitled to receive a
discharge upon the confirmation of the reorganization plan.3 99 And
the principals of a debtor-corporation or partnership may be able to
structure the plan so that the principals will be discharged from
their secondary liability on the debtor's liabilities to creditors. 400
bankruptcy in order to obtain right of fresh start). Indeed, in justifying the fresh start goal on
economic grounds, Jackson does not rely on common pool analysis. See id. at 225-52 (sug-

gesting that individuals' right to discharge "raises a series of questions that the notion of
bankruptcy as a response to a common pool problem will not answer," and justifying right of
discharge on other grounds); see also Carlson, supra note 10, at 1356-76 (criticizing Jackson's
contractarian model of bankruptcy as unable to account for individual debtors' right to
discharge).
397. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMrrs, supra note 5, at 201.
398. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1988) (providing that debtor shall not be granted discharge in chapter 7 case if "debtor is not an individual"). Legislative history explains that this
limitation was intended to "avoid trafficking in corporate shells and in bankruptcy partnerships." S. REP. No. 989, supra note 105, at 98, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. at 5884; H.R.
REP. No. 595, supra note 105, at 384, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6340.
399. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1988). The Code does specify narrow circumstances under
which debtors are not entitled to receive a discharge in the context of a chapter 11 case. An
individual debtor is not entitled, pursuant to a chapter 11 plan, to obtain a discharge from
debts excepted from discharge under § 523. Id § 1141(d)(2). Moreover, a business debtor
that is not an individual is not entitled to obtain a discharge pursuant to a chapter 11 plan of
reorganization if (i) the plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the
debtor's assets and (ii) the debtor does not engage in business after consummation of the
plan. Id § 1141 (d)(3). Like § 727(a)(1)'s prohibition against discharging debtors that are not
individuals in a chapter 7 case, § 1141(d)(3)'s prohibition against discharging debtors that are
not individuals in a liquidating chapter 11 case was intended to preclude debtors from trading
in corporate shells.
400. Discharge generally only applies to debts owed by the debtor. Id. §i524(e). But compare Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that even
though bankruptcy laws generally preclude discharge of guarantor's liabilities, creditor is
foreclosed under doctrine of resjudicata from questioning legality of bankruptcy court's decision to discharge guaranty when such terms were accepted without objection as part of reorganization plan) with Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) ("The
bankruptcy court has no duty to discharge the liabilities of a nondebtor pursuant to the consent of creditors as part of a reorganization plan.") and Union Carbide v. Newboles, 686 F.2d
593, 595 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that "creditor's approval of the bankruptcy plan does not
discharge the bankrupt's guarantors"). In other appropriate circumstances, the bankruptcy
court may enjoin creditors from proceeding against certain nondebtor entities, See, e.g.,
Manard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins, Inc.), 880 F.2d 694, 704 (4th Cir. 1989) (permitting, in large tort case, bankruptcy court to enjoin creditors from proceeding against certain

1993]

CLARIFYING THE COMMON POOL ANALOGY

429

Moreover, although in a chapter 7 case only the postpetition wages
of an individual debtor are excluded from the property of the estate
and thus are beyond the reaches of creditors, in chapter 11, 12, and
13 "reorganization-type" cases, postpetition earnings are expressly
or impliedly subject to the reaches of creditors whether or not the
debtor is an individual. 401 The fresh start of all debtors, even those
debtors who are not individuals, is a consistent and important policy
40 2
goal in the Bankruptcy Code.
In addition, by narrowly describing the fresh start policy as limited to individuals, 40 3 Jackson ignores another important "independent social policy" purpose of the reorganization chapters of
the Bankruptcy Code. More than the simple maximization of distributions to creditors and the resolution of common pool problems,
Congress also intended to encourage the rehabilitation of debtors.
In the case of individual debtors, Congress furthered this rehabilitative goal by permitting debtors to bring a chapter 12 or 13 case to
adjust the debts of individuals with regular income or of family
farmers with regular annual income. 40 4 In the case of all debtors,
Congress sought to encourage their rehabilitation through the filing
40 5
of chapter 11 reorganization cases.
Both on theoretical grounds and in light of statistics that show the
infrequency of successful chapter 11 reorganizations, Baird, Jackson, and other commentators have expressly questioned the wisdom
of the goal of rehabilitation. 40 6 As a result, these commentators
nondebtor entities); MacArthur Co. v.Johns-Manville Corp. (In reJohns-Manville Corp.), 837
F.2d 89, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that bankruptcy court did not exceed its authority

when, in approving settlement of debtor's claims against insurers, it enjoined further suits
against insurers).
401. See Toibb v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197,2199 (1991) (holding that protection ofpostpetition earnings in context of chapter 11 reorganization applies to both nonbusiness debtors
and business debtors).
402. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 105, at 98, repinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5884;
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 105, at 384, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6340 (delineating

availability of fresh start provisions to debtors who qualify).
403. See JACKSON, LoGIC AND LIMrrs, supra note 5, at 225 (contending that right of discharge and fresh start is limited to individual debtors).
404. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (delineating differences between chapter 12
and 13 filing provisions).
405. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 105, at 9-10, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5787,579596 (describing chapter 11 as providing for rehabilitation of debtors by adjustment of debt and
equity in plan of reorganization). Although there previously existed a division among the
circuits as to whether chapter 11 was intended by Congress to be limited to business debtors,
the Supreme Court resolved this split in the circuits in 1991 when it held in Toibb v. Radloff,
111 S. Ct. 2197, 2199 (1991), that an individual with no business was eligible to commence a
chapter 11 reorganization case.
406. See Bowers, Bankruptcy Theory, supra note 23, at 2098 n.2 (concluding that creditors in
both chapter 7 and chapter 11 filings do not recover much from bankrupt debtors); Bowers,
Loss Distribution, supra note 23, at 29 n.6 (stating that in more than 90% of all bankruptcies,
creditors receive nothing); supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting that commentators
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propose to repeal or substantially limit chapter 11.407 The debate
on the efficiency of encouraging debtors to rehabilitate their businesses by filing a chapter 11 petition will continue. The point here
is simply that the analogy comparing bankruptcy to a common pool
problem adds little to the rehabilitation debate. Jackson candidly
admits that common pool analysis provides no assistance in normatively assessing the social policy of promoting fresh starts to individual debtors by providing them with discharges in bankruptcy. 40 8 He
should candidly admit the same with regard to the normative debate
surrounding the social policy of promoting a business debtor's
rehabilitation.
CONCLUSION

All models are flawed. In trying to capture merely the essence of
a problem rather than the problem's complexity, models suffer from
incompleteness. But depending on the assumptions made in simplifying a complex reality, a model need not be inaccurate. A good
model can stand a relaxation of its premises. A good model may be
successful if after stripping away the innumerable details involved in
any real-life situation, a basic truth appears that was previously obscured by the complexity. Model building is difficult because it is
difficult to strip away enough of the right details to disclose this basic truth, but not so many of the details that the conclusion of the
model is only basic but not true. And the best way to determine
whether a model is successful or not is to relax its assumptions and
critically assess the results in comparison to the results that follow
from other less stylized sorts of analyses.
Baird and Jackson's comparison of a financially troubled debtor to
a common pool problem is a strong model when it is used to assess
the proper standard for commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy case. This Article refines that model and, after relaxing some
of its assumptions, concludes that the analogy is sound and useful as
applied to this limited context. As applied to the standard for commencement of a voluntary bankruptcy case, however, the model
strips away too much and as a result leads Jackson to assert that the
model supports a requirement that only insolvent business debtors
such as Baird, Jackson, Bradley, and Rosenzweig have contested notion that bankruptcy theory justifies reorganization provisions).
407. See, e.g., BAIRD &JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS, supra note 6, at 952
(stating that "premises that underlie chapter 11 are controversial, and in many cases chapter
11 may do more harm than good");JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 209-2.1 (questioning usefulness of corporate reorganization process); see also supra note 23 (discussing these
and other commentators' proposals for repeal of chapter 11 reorganization provisions).
408. JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 5, at 225.
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enjoy access to voluntary bankruptcy relief. Jackson and others may
or may not have the better argument in the dialogue over the futility
of encouraging debtors to rehabilitate businesses in the context of a
chapter I1 reorganization case, but the analogy of an insolvent
debtor to a common pool of fish is itself irrelevant to this debate.

